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Information Warfare Online: Digital Disinformation in Egypt and African Countries

The development of digital technologies has revolutionized the way information is created, disseminated, and consumed worldwide. In the African context—particularly in Egypt—this transformation has opened new opportunities for the advancement of civil societies, while simultaneously giving rise to serious challenges related to information abuse. Increasingly, the digital space is becoming the primary battlefield for political, ideological, and social influence. Disinformation has emerged as a key instrument in this struggle. This analysis explores the phenomenon of digital disinformation in selected African countries, with a particular focus on Egypt, which—due to its geopolitical position, media structure, and mechanisms of state control—offers a uniquely compelling context for research. In the book Digital Disinformation in Africa: Hashtag Politics, Power and Propaganda, edited by Tony Roberts and George H. Karekwaivanane, the authors identify disinformation as one of the fundamental threats to democratic institutions and civil rights on the continent. Disinformation contributes to the distortion of electoral processes, fuels social tensions, and hinders rational public debate on issues such as public health, women's rights, and migration. In conditions marked by limited transparency and low levels of media literacy, the effects of disinformation tend to be particularly profound and difficult to reverse. This phenomenon has intensified in Africa due to the rapid growth in the number of internet and social media users. Over the past decade, approximately 300 million new individuals have come online, bringing the total number of regular internet users on the continent to around 600 million, with 400 million using social media platforms. However, this development has been highly uneven. For instance, in 2022, more than 70% of the populations in Egypt, Morocco, and the Seychelles had internet access, compared to just 7% in the Central African Republic. Egypt stands out with a relatively high internet penetration rate (over 75%), yet this access remains sharply unequal—concentrated in urban centers and limited in rural areas. Egypt and Africa in the Digital Information Battleground Digital inequalities, limited educational and technological infrastructure, and deficits in media literacy create an environment highly susceptible to information manipulation. In Egypt, an additional key factor is the political model of control over the information space. According to a report by African Arguments, regulations ostensibly aimed at countering disinformation are in practice used to suppress public debate and criminalize independent journalism. Security agencies are authorized to censor online content and penalize users, leading to increased levels of self-censorship and the marginalization of critical voices. From a research perspective, various theoretical approaches are employed to analyze this phenomenon. One of the most widely recognized is the so-called "4D model" proposed by Ben Nimmo of the Atlantic Council’s DFRLab, which identifies four core disinformation strategies: Dismiss, Distort, Distract, and Dismay. The literature also emphasizes the importance of taking historical context into account. According to the analysis by Tony Roberts and George Hamandishe Karekwaivanane, “the legacy of colonialism is a defining feature of African disinformation—a tool of colonial power transposed into the practices of post-independence states.” In the case of Egypt, the history of propaganda dates back to the era of the monarchy, intensified during the Nasser period, and continues today in digital forms. State-run media, controlled platforms, and repressive legislation still play a significant role in managing information narratives. As noted in the 2024 report by CIPESA, despite the presence of independent fact-checking initiatives, their impact remains limited—largely due to the dominance of state or government-affiliated media, the lack of algorithmic transparency, and an atmosphere of fear among internet users. Both historical and contemporary information operations—such as the Cambridge Analytica campaign in Kenya—demonstrate the continuity of this phenomenon and point to its evolution toward increasingly technologically sophisticated methods of influence. The authors of Digital Disinformation in Africa emphasize, however, that it is not the technology itself that generates disinformation, but rather the people and institutions who use it as a tool for manipulation. Its reach and effectiveness grow in direct proportion to social inequalities, legal constraints, and the weaknesses of democratic institutions. Cases of Information and Psychological Operations In Egypt, the government of President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has been actively using digital channels to shape public opinion by promoting nationalist narratives and delegitimizing political and social opponents. These campaigns often combine disinformation techniques with elements of psychological operations, making them particularly effective. A notable example is the targeting of the Sudanese refugee community, carried out as a campaign aimed at fostering social distance and hostility. An investigation by Beam Reports revealed that social media in Egypt had been flooded with content dehumanizing refugees. This included the dissemination of a manipulated video featuring a supposed "historian" who compared the presence of Sudanese people to an occupation in ancient Egypt. The campaign was associated with hashtags such as #Deportation_of_Sudanese and #Egypt_for_Egyptians, which gained widespread popularity and were promoted by well-known journalists and influencers, including Hala Sarhan. Refugees were portrayed as the cause of the economic crisis, a threat to Egyptian identity, and an “external force destabilizing the state.” Alongside anti-immigration campaigns, the Egyptian authorities have also carried out actions targeting women involved in social activism. As noted in the chapter dedicated to gendered disinformation in the book Digital Disinformation in Africa, Egyptian activists, journalists, and female politicians were regularly attacked on social media using sexist messages, suggestions of immorality, or a “lack of patriotism.” The aim was often to discredit women as incapable of representing the national interest or as “Western agents.” This points to the use of disinformation to maintain social and gender hierarchies, which fits into a broader trend on the continent. These types of actions are supported by state structures. The Egyptian Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (MOCIET) cooperates with national security services and the Public Prosecutor’s Office in identifying and prosecuting social media users accused of “spreading false information.” The 2018 media laws, including the so-called Cybercrime Law, make it possible to block accounts and detain individuals who publish content considered to be contrary to “national security.” This system is supplemented by the use of advanced tools to monitor digital content, including artificial intelligence technologies used to automatically detect specific keywords or terms. The application of the 4D model – which classifies disinformation strategies as Dismiss, Distort, Distract, and Dismay – makes it possible to precisely describe the Egyptian case: • Dismiss (dismissal and delegitimization): stigmatizing activists, women, and journalists as “foreign agents” or “traitors to the nation”; • Distort (distortion): fabricating stories (e.g., comparing refugees to occupiers), reinterpretation of economic facts; • Distract (distraction): creating an external enemy (Sudan, NGOs, the West) as a cover for internal problems; • Dismay (intimidation): legal threats, repression of social media users, detentions based on posts. This four-part pattern illustrates the systemic nature of Egypt’s information and psychological operations, which combine elements of state control, legal repression, and emotional mobilization—often using digital techniques with a high degree of effectiveness. Between Censorship and Propaganda: African Examples of Information Operations Mozambique In the Cabo Delgado province, the government of Mozambique, led by the Frelimo party, organized an extensive disinformation campaign aimed at controlling the narrative about the conflict with Islamist militants. State-run websites (Notícias de Defesa and Defesa MZ) were used, along with a network of digital propagandists referred to as “digital firefighters.” Pro-government accounts denied independent reports about the conflict's casualties, while labeling journalists as “enemies of the nation” and “foreign agents.” The state's role in controlling media coverage during the conflict clearly had the characteristics of a psychological operation. Zimbabwe During the 2023 elections, the state-sponsored digital army “Varakashi” (loyal to ZANU-PF) and pro-government accounts dominated the information space, marginalizing opposition messages. Although political opponents also employed narrative campaigns (e.g., “Chamisa Nerorists”), research shows that the state apparatus was primarily responsible for instrumentalizing legislation to fight “fake news” in order to persecute activists and journalists. As a result, disinformation increased and public trust in institutions—including electoral commissions—declined. Ethiopia During the civil war in Tigray, there was intense use of hashtag campaigns led by the Ethiopian diaspora on both sides of the conflict. Platforms such as Unity for Ethiopia and Stand With Tigray instructed users on how to frame messages and which institutions to tag. These actions were massive in scale and influenced international discourse, contributing to the escalation of antagonistic narratives and making it more difficult to objectively assess the situation in the country. Who Is Behind It? Disinformation Actors in Egypt and Across the Continent The range of techniques used in disinformation campaigns in Africa is diverse and includes both simple content manipulation and advanced networked operations. Among the most commonly observed methods are: mass dissemination of content by network-linked accounts (mass sharing), the use of paid influencers, and so-called keyboard armies—organized groups of commentators often connected to consulting firms or governmental structures. One of the key tactics remains astroturfing, which involves posing as supposedly grassroots, citizen-led initiatives that are in fact centrally directed. This phenomenon is well documented, for example, in the chapter on Zimbabwe in Digital Disinformation in Africa, where political parties used fictitious civic movements to legitimize their own actions. Similarly, brigading—the coordinated targeting of specific individuals or institutions by thousands of users—is used to escalate hate and suppress dissenting opinions in the digital space. In the Egyptian context, a dominant role in disinformation campaigns is played by prominent publicists, media commentators, and individuals affiliated with state-run media. During the aforementioned smear campaign targeting Sudanese refugees, popular television journalists spoke out, systematically spreading disinformation—often enriched with emotional language and pseudo-scientific arguments. Such activities, supported by official media channels, significantly contributed to reinforcing social stereotypes and deepening ethnic divisions. Egyptian digital campaigns combine traditional persuasive techniques with technologically advanced tools. The increasing use of automated accounts (bots) and troll accounts linked to state apparatuses has been observed. These accounts function as narrative amplifiers, creating a false impression of widespread public support. Although the widespread use of deepfake materials has not yet been confirmed in Egypt, experts point out that the development of generative AI tools poses a real threat to future campaigns—especially during periods of social unrest, elections, or security crises. Social Consequences of Disinformation: Trust, Elections, Divisions According to research by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (2024), nearly 60% of documented disinformation campaigns in Africa were sponsored by foreign actors—mainly Russia, China, and the Gulf States. In the case of Egypt, although the state apparatus plays a dominant role, the existence of links with regional centers of influence cannot be ruled out—such as through the funding of Middle Eastern media outlets or the coordination of narratives on issues like the war in Gaza, the conflict in Sudan, or the presence of China in the Red Sea region. In addition to states and their security structures, private entities also play an important role in the disinformation ecosystem. A source of inspiration for many local and regional actions were the strategies known from the operations of the company Cambridge Analytica in Kenya and Nigeria, where social media user data was analyzed for the purpose of micro-targeting emotional and propaganda-based content. In Egypt, similar mechanisms are observed in the form of contracting digital PR services by state-affiliated organizations or connected businessmen. Social media platforms—particularly Facebook, Twitter (X), WhatsApp, and TikTok—serve as the primary channels for the distribution of disinformation. The lack of adequate content moderation mechanisms in the Arabic language, along with the weak presence of local fact-checking centers, means that false information spreads rapidly and with impunity. This is especially true for socially polarizing topics such as migration, the COVID-19 pandemic, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and domestic economic issues. Consequences for Democracy, Civil Society, and Human Rights The findings of research and analyses conducted within the African Digital Rights Network, as well as reports by organizations such as CIPESA, clearly indicate that digital disinformation poses a serious threat to the foundations of democracy in African countries. Above all, it leads to the erosion of social trust, which in turn undermines the legitimacy of state institutions and representative mechanisms. As CIPESA states, “disinformation undermines trust in democratic institutions and hinders citizens’ ability to make informed decisions,” thereby limiting their capacity for genuine participation in public debate. Censorship or Protection? Egypt’s Information Policy In Egypt, this process takes on a particularly dangerous form. False narratives—especially those related to the “foreign threat” (e.g., migration, terrorism, foreign-funded NGOs)—are consistently used by the state to justify restrictions on freedom of expression and to stigmatize groups critical of the authorities. Examples such as disinformation campaigns targeting refugees, opposition journalists, or human rights organizations reinforce a climate of suspicion and social atomization, while simultaneously weakening trust in independent sources of information. During election periods, disinformation—whether originating from the authorities or spread by non-state actors—significantly increases the risk of political violence, particularly when fabricated reports of alleged electoral fraud, manipulated polls, or “national betrayal” begin to circulate. In countries such as Zimbabwe or Mozambique, these consequences have taken the form of ethnic and tribal antagonisms, amplified by digital media. In the case of Egypt, the structure of conflict is more ideological and institutional in nature, yet it similarly serves to deepen social divisions—particularly through the systematic delegitimization of pro-democratic organizations as “tools of state destabilization.” Disinformation also affects the way the space for civil liberties is shaped. The official rhetoric of combating “fake news” is often, in practice, used as a pretext for introducing repressive legislation. In Egypt, particular significance was attached to the introduction of the so-called Cybercrime Law in 2018, which allows for the blocking of websites, accounts, and applications, as well as the penalization of actions deemed to involve “spreading false information.” In practice, this leads to arrests, acts of symbolic violence, show trials, and the confiscation of digital equipment. The Digital Disinformation in Africa report highlights that in such states, information surveillance takes on a structural character—that is, it combines the monitoring of social media, the overinterpretation of criminal laws, and the use of investigative technologies to control individuals. As a result, a climate of self-censorship emerges, in which citizens restrict their online statements, delete posts, and refrain from participating in debates out of fear of surveillance or repression. Common repressive strategies also include: • cutting off internet access during moments of political crisis or protests (practiced, for example, in Ethiopia and Nigeria, and in Egypt in a limited form during mass demonstrations); • deliberately restricting the reach of specific accounts and hashtags through pressure exerted on digital platform operators; • the use of preventive detentions targeting users of TikTok, Instagram, and Twitter, increasingly affecting young women who post content that deviates from the state’s ideological line. A particularly vulnerable group to information manipulation in Egypt consists of younger users of mobile applications—especially TikTok—where disinformation is disseminated in a visually appealing, emotional format, often using humor, irony, or identity-based narratives. The lack of sufficient moderation resources in the Arabic language, combined with algorithmic opacity, further exacerbates the scale of the phenomenon. As a result, civil society—understood both as organized NGOs and individual citizens—faces new barriers to public engagement. On the one hand, transparent public debate is disappearing; on the other, the space for independent organizations to operate is shrinking. False narratives become a tool of symbolic power and, at the same time, a means by which the state apparatus consolidates its real political dominance. Information Pushback: Fact-Checking, Law, and Social Activism In response to the growing wave of disinformation, African states, civil society organizations, and international partners are implementing a variety of counterstrategies. Among the most widespread are independent fact-checking initiatives, educational activities, and legal regulations undertaken at the national and supranational levels. In Egypt, despite the high level of control over the digital space, certain forms of response to disinformation are also developing, although they are significantly constrained by political realities and legal frameworks that enable repression. Independently operating fact-checking projects, such as Daftar Ahwal or collaborations with regional networks (e.g., the Arab Fact-Checkers Network), attempt to neutralize widely circulated false content, although they often function on the margins of official discourse. The fact that many of these entities operate from abroad or rely on grant support makes them vulnerable to accusations of acting “against the interests of the state.” At the same time, traditional Egyptian media—mostly controlled by the state or linked to political elites—have implemented limited information verification mechanisms, but their public credibility remains low. The situation differs in some Sub-Saharan African countries; for instance, Africa Check in South Africa and PesaCheck in East Africa are active both online and in the educational sphere, offering open-access resources and cooperating with local journalists. In Egypt—similar to Ghana and Kenya—state digital content monitoring centers function primarily as instruments of internal security rather than as transparent tools for combating disinformation. The 2024 CIPESA report notes that although such institutions claim to be fighting fake news, they lack independence, transparency, and public trust, which significantly undermines their effectiveness. Education and Resilience: How to Counter Disinformation in Egypt and Africa Civil society plays a key role in building information resilience, particularly through media campaigns, workshops, and support for victims of disinformation. In Egypt, a positive example is the work of organizations such as the Association for Freedom of Thought and Expression (AFTE), which combines research on digital rights with legal interventions and the monitoring of censorship cases. Meanwhile, educational initiatives targeting women and people from smaller communities—modeled after Uganda’s Her Internet—exist in Egypt primarily within the diaspora or as informal support networks. At the legislative level, the main challenge lies in balancing protection against disinformation with the safeguarding of civil rights. Egypt’s 2018 Cybercrime Law, although intended to protect society from information manipulation, has in practice become a tool of repression. It enables the arbitrary blocking of websites, surveillance of social media, and penalization of so-called “harmful content.” The lack of clear criteria and appeal mechanisms makes these regulations incompatible with international standards (e.g., the African Declaration on Internet Rights and Freedoms and UN Resolution 522 on digital violence against women). Regional organizations such as the ACHPR, along with international partners (e.g., UNESCO, the EU), promote more balanced approaches, encouraging states to adopt legal frameworks that: • provide clear definitions of disinformation, • introduce independent oversight mechanisms for the implementation of laws, • enable public and judicial oversight of administrative decisions, such as content blocking. In practice, however—as shown by the case of Egypt—the implementation of these guidelines is highly selective and often marginalized by national security interests. Despite their declarations to combat disinformation, digital technology platforms continue to fail when it comes to content moderation in North Africa. There is a lack of dedicated teams analyzing content in Arabic (and its dialects), algorithms do not recognize cultural context, and abuse reporting systems are ineffective. As a result, local mechanisms for reporting abuse, the creation of national fact-checking networks, and the building of partnerships between public media, NGOs, and tech platforms are recommended. Among the priority recommendations by experts for countries in the region (including Egypt) are: • developing media and digital literacy among youth and marginalized groups, • promoting transparency in algorithms and recommendation data, • creating cross-sectoral alliances for information resilience that include various stakeholder groups: schools, media, civil society organizations, religious leaders, and government representatives. Conclusions: The Digital Future and Informational Responsibility Digital disinformation in Africa—and particularly in Egypt and the North African region—remains one of the central challenges of contemporary digital transformation. As clearly demonstrated in the book Digital Disinformation in Africa, the rapid development of social media and access to mobile telephony has opened up new avenues for civic expression, but at the same time has become a tool for manipulation, censorship, and symbolic violence. State authorities, private companies, and foreign actors use these channels to pursue political and geostrategic interests, thereby undermining citizens’ trust in institutions and democratic processes. The conclusions drawn from this analysis lead to several core recommendations: First, there is a pressing need to intensify media and digital literacy education, especially among youth, women, and marginalized groups. The Egyptian experience points to a lack of reliable training programs in this area, which contributes to vulnerability to manipulation. The involvement of civil society organizations in educational efforts—as seen in initiatives such as Her Internet in Uganda—could yield similar benefits in countries like Egypt. Second, sustainable and inclusive partnerships are needed between governments, media, NGOs, and technology platforms to develop standards of accountability and transparency in the digital environment. Egyptian experiences show that the absence of independent oversight mechanisms over platforms and the lack of local ethical standards for content moderation exacerbate the problem of disinformation, particularly during periods of social unrest. Third, legal regulations must be balanced and consistent with international human rights standards. As noted by African Arguments (2024), Egypt’s anti-disinformation legislation has, in practice, become a tool of repression rather than protection. Therefore, reforms are needed that on the one hand enable the identification and counteraction of disinformation campaigns, while on the other hand guarantee the rights to freedom of expression, pluralism, and due process. Fourth, the role of the state should not be limited to enforcing regulations; it must also include active support for independent media, fact-checking initiatives, and access to reliable sources of information. In Egypt, the lack of transparent support for such mechanisms results in an information vacuum that is filled by unverified content, propaganda, and so-called keyboard armies. Finally, a digital policy is needed that rests on four pillars: civic education, public participation, strong and resilient institutions, and effective protection of human rights in the online environment. Only then will it be possible to transform technological potential into a real force supporting democratization and social cohesion—instead of, as is currently the case, a source of tension, division, and repression.

The development of digital technologies has revolutionized the way information is created, disseminated, and consumed worldwide. In the African context—particularly in Egypt—this transformation has opened new opportunities for the advancement of civil societies, while simultaneously giving rise to serious challenges related to information abuse. Increasingly, the digital space is becoming the primary battlefield for political, ideological, and social influence. Disinformation has emerged as a key instrument in this struggle.
This analysis explores the phenomenon of digital disinformation in selected African countries, with a particular focus on Egypt, which—due to its geopolitical position, media structure, and mechanisms of state control—offers a uniquely compelling context for research.

In the book Digital Disinformation in Africa: Hashtag Politics, Power and Propaganda, edited by Tony Roberts and George H. Karekwaivanane, the authors identify disinformation as one of the fundamental threats to democratic institutions and civil rights on the continent. Disinformation contributes to the distortion of electoral processes, fuels social tensions, and hinders rational public debate on issues such as public health, women’s rights, and migration. In conditions marked by limited transparency and low levels of media literacy, the effects of disinformation tend to be particularly profound and difficult to reverse.

This phenomenon has intensified in Africa due to the rapid growth in the number of internet and social media users. Over the past decade, approximately 300 million new individuals have come online, bringing the total number of regular internet users on the continent to around 600 million, with 400 million using social media platforms. However, this development has been highly uneven. For instance, in 2022, more than 70% of the populations in Egypt, Morocco, and the Seychelles had internet access, compared to just 7% in the Central African Republic. Egypt stands out with a relatively high internet penetration rate (over 75%), yet this access remains sharply unequal—concentrated in urban centers and limited in rural areas.

Egypt and Africa in the Digital Information Battleground
Digital inequalities, limited educational and technological infrastructure, and deficits in media literacy create an environment highly susceptible to information manipulation. In Egypt, an additional key factor is the political model of control over the information space. According to a report by African Arguments, regulations ostensibly aimed at countering disinformation are in practice used to suppress public debate and criminalize independent journalism. Security agencies are authorized to censor online content and penalize users, leading to increased levels of self-censorship and the marginalization of critical voices.

From a research perspective, various theoretical approaches are employed to analyze this phenomenon. One of the most widely recognized is the so-called “4D model” proposed by Ben Nimmo of the Atlantic Council’s DFRLab, which identifies four core disinformation strategies: Dismiss, Distort, Distract, and Dismay. The literature also emphasizes the importance of taking historical context into account. According to the analysis by Tony Roberts and George Hamandishe Karekwaivanane, “the legacy of colonialism is a defining feature of African disinformation—a tool of colonial power transposed into the practices of post-independence states.”

In the case of Egypt, the history of propaganda dates back to the era of the monarchy, intensified during the Nasser period, and continues today in digital forms. State-run media, controlled platforms, and repressive legislation still play a significant role in managing information narratives. As noted in the 2024 report by CIPESA, despite the presence of independent fact-checking initiatives, their impact remains limited—largely due to the dominance of state or government-affiliated media, the lack of algorithmic transparency, and an atmosphere of fear among internet users.

Both historical and contemporary information operations—such as the Cambridge Analytica campaign in Kenya—demonstrate the continuity of this phenomenon and point to its evolution toward increasingly technologically sophisticated methods of influence. The authors of Digital Disinformation in Africa emphasize, however, that it is not the technology itself that generates disinformation, but rather the people and institutions who use it as a tool for manipulation. Its reach and effectiveness grow in direct proportion to social inequalities, legal constraints, and the weaknesses of democratic institutions.

Cases of Information and Psychological Operations
In Egypt, the government of President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has been actively using digital channels to shape public opinion by promoting nationalist narratives and delegitimizing political and social opponents. These campaigns often combine disinformation techniques with elements of psychological operations, making them particularly effective. A notable example is the targeting of the Sudanese refugee community, carried out as a campaign aimed at fostering social distance and hostility.

An investigation by Beam Reports revealed that social media in Egypt had been flooded with content dehumanizing refugees. This included the dissemination of a manipulated video featuring a supposed “historian” who compared the presence of Sudanese people to an occupation in ancient Egypt. The campaign was associated with hashtags such as #Deportation_of_Sudanese and #Egypt_for_Egyptians, which gained widespread popularity and were promoted by well-known journalists and influencers, including Hala Sarhan. Refugees were portrayed as the cause of the economic crisis, a threat to Egyptian identity, and an “external force destabilizing the state.”

Alongside anti-immigration campaigns, the Egyptian authorities have also carried out actions targeting women involved in social activism. As noted in the chapter dedicated to gendered disinformation in the book Digital Disinformation in Africa, Egyptian activists, journalists, and female politicians were regularly attacked on social media using sexist messages, suggestions of immorality, or a “lack of patriotism.” The aim was often to discredit women as incapable of representing the national interest or as “Western agents.” This points to the use of disinformation to maintain social and gender hierarchies, which fits into a broader trend on the continent.

These types of actions are supported by state structures. The Egyptian Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (MOCIET) cooperates with national security services and the Public Prosecutor’s Office in identifying and prosecuting social media users accused of “spreading false information.” The 2018 media laws, including the so-called Cybercrime Law, make it possible to block accounts and detain individuals who publish content considered to be contrary to “national security.” This system is supplemented by the use of advanced tools to monitor digital content, including artificial intelligence technologies used to automatically detect specific keywords or terms.

The application of the 4D model – which classifies disinformation strategies as Dismiss, Distort, Distract, and Dismay – makes it possible to precisely describe the Egyptian case:
• Dismiss (dismissal and delegitimization): stigmatizing activists, women, and journalists as “foreign agents” or “traitors to the nation”;
• Distort (distortion): fabricating stories (e.g., comparing refugees to occupiers), reinterpretation of economic facts;
• Distract (distraction): creating an external enemy (Sudan, NGOs, the West) as a cover for internal problems;
• Dismay (intimidation): legal threats, repression of social media users, detentions based on posts.

This four-part pattern illustrates the systemic nature of Egypt’s information and psychological operations, which combine elements of state control, legal repression, and emotional mobilization—often using digital techniques with a high degree of effectiveness.

Between Censorship and Propaganda: African Examples of Information Operations

Mozambique
In the Cabo Delgado province, the government of Mozambique, led by the Frelimo party, organized an extensive disinformation campaign aimed at controlling the narrative about the conflict with Islamist militants. State-run websites (Notícias de Defesa and Defesa MZ) were used, along with a network of digital propagandists referred to as “digital firefighters.” Pro-government accounts denied independent reports about the conflict’s casualties, while labeling journalists as “enemies of the nation” and “foreign agents.” The state’s role in controlling media coverage during the conflict clearly had the characteristics of a psychological operation.

Zimbabwe
During the 2023 elections, the state-sponsored digital army “Varakashi” (loyal to ZANU-PF) and pro-government accounts dominated the information space, marginalizing opposition messages. Although political opponents also employed narrative campaigns (e.g., “Chamisa Nerorists”), research shows that the state apparatus was primarily responsible for instrumentalizing legislation to fight “fake news” in order to persecute activists and journalists. As a result, disinformation increased and public trust in institutions—including electoral commissions—declined.

Ethiopia
During the civil war in Tigray, there was intense use of hashtag campaigns led by the Ethiopian diaspora on both sides of the conflict. Platforms such as Unity for Ethiopia and Stand With Tigray instructed users on how to frame messages and which institutions to tag. These actions were massive in scale and influenced international discourse, contributing to the escalation of antagonistic narratives and making it more difficult to objectively assess the situation in the country.

Who Is Behind It? Disinformation Actors in Egypt and Across the Continent
The range of techniques used in disinformation campaigns in Africa is diverse and includes both simple content manipulation and advanced networked operations. Among the most commonly observed methods are: mass dissemination of content by network-linked accounts (mass sharing), the use of paid influencers, and so-called keyboard armies—organized groups of commentators often connected to consulting firms or governmental structures.

One of the key tactics remains astroturfing, which involves posing as supposedly grassroots, citizen-led initiatives that are in fact centrally directed. This phenomenon is well documented, for example, in the chapter on Zimbabwe in Digital Disinformation in Africa, where political parties used fictitious civic movements to legitimize their own actions. Similarly, brigading—the coordinated targeting of specific individuals or institutions by thousands of users—is used to escalate hate and suppress dissenting opinions in the digital space.

In the Egyptian context, a dominant role in disinformation campaigns is played by prominent publicists, media commentators, and individuals affiliated with state-run media. During the aforementioned smear campaign targeting Sudanese refugees, popular television journalists spoke out, systematically spreading disinformation—often enriched with emotional language and pseudo-scientific arguments. Such activities, supported by official media channels, significantly contributed to reinforcing social stereotypes and deepening ethnic divisions.

Egyptian digital campaigns combine traditional persuasive techniques with technologically advanced tools. The increasing use of automated accounts (bots) and troll accounts linked to state apparatuses has been observed. These accounts function as narrative amplifiers, creating a false impression of widespread public support. Although the widespread use of deepfake materials has not yet been confirmed in Egypt, experts point out that the development of generative AI tools poses a real threat to future campaigns—especially during periods of social unrest, elections, or security crises.

Social Consequences of Disinformation: Trust, Elections, Divisions
According to research by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (2024), nearly 60% of documented disinformation campaigns in Africa were sponsored by foreign actors—mainly Russia, China, and the Gulf States. In the case of Egypt, although the state apparatus plays a dominant role, the existence of links with regional centers of influence cannot be ruled out—such as through the funding of Middle Eastern media outlets or the coordination of narratives on issues like the war in Gaza, the conflict in Sudan, or the presence of China in the Red Sea region.

In addition to states and their security structures, private entities also play an important role in the disinformation ecosystem. A source of inspiration for many local and regional actions were the strategies known from the operations of the company Cambridge Analytica in Kenya and Nigeria, where social media user data was analyzed for the purpose of micro-targeting emotional and propaganda-based content. In Egypt, similar mechanisms are observed in the form of contracting digital PR services by state-affiliated organizations or connected businessmen.

Social media platforms—particularly Facebook, Twitter (X), WhatsApp, and TikTok—serve as the primary channels for the distribution of disinformation. The lack of adequate content moderation mechanisms in the Arabic language, along with the weak presence of local fact-checking centers, means that false information spreads rapidly and with impunity. This is especially true for socially polarizing topics such as migration, the COVID-19 pandemic, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and domestic economic issues.

Consequences for Democracy, Civil Society, and Human Rights
The findings of research and analyses conducted within the African Digital Rights Network, as well as reports by organizations such as CIPESA, clearly indicate that digital disinformation poses a serious threat to the foundations of democracy in African countries. Above all, it leads to the erosion of social trust, which in turn undermines the legitimacy of state institutions and representative mechanisms. As CIPESA states, “disinformation undermines trust in democratic institutions and hinders citizens’ ability to make informed decisions,” thereby limiting their capacity for genuine participation in public debate.

Censorship or Protection? Egypt’s Information Policy
In Egypt, this process takes on a particularly dangerous form. False narratives—especially those related to the “foreign threat” (e.g., migration, terrorism, foreign-funded NGOs)—are consistently used by the state to justify restrictions on freedom of expression and to stigmatize groups critical of the authorities. Examples such as disinformation campaigns targeting refugees, opposition journalists, or human rights organizations reinforce a climate of suspicion and social atomization, while simultaneously weakening trust in independent sources of information.

During election periods, disinformation—whether originating from the authorities or spread by non-state actors—significantly increases the risk of political violence, particularly when fabricated reports of alleged electoral fraud, manipulated polls, or “national betrayal” begin to circulate. In countries such as Zimbabwe or Mozambique, these consequences have taken the form of ethnic and tribal antagonisms, amplified by digital media. In the case of Egypt, the structure of conflict is more ideological and institutional in nature, yet it similarly serves to deepen social divisions—particularly through the systematic delegitimization of pro-democratic organizations as “tools of state destabilization.”

Disinformation also affects the way the space for civil liberties is shaped.
The official rhetoric of combating “fake news” is often, in practice, used as a pretext for introducing repressive legislation. In Egypt, particular significance was attached to the introduction of the so-called Cybercrime Law in 2018, which allows for the blocking of websites, accounts, and applications, as well as the penalization of actions deemed to involve “spreading false information.” In practice, this leads to arrests, acts of symbolic violence, show trials, and the confiscation of digital equipment.

The Digital Disinformation in Africa report highlights that in such states, information surveillance takes on a structural character—that is, it combines the monitoring of social media, the overinterpretation of criminal laws, and the use of investigative technologies to control individuals. As a result, a climate of self-censorship emerges, in which citizens restrict their online statements, delete posts, and refrain from participating in debates out of fear of surveillance or repression.

Common repressive strategies also include:
• cutting off internet access during moments of political crisis or protests (practiced, for example, in Ethiopia and Nigeria, and in Egypt in a limited form during mass demonstrations);
• deliberately restricting the reach of specific accounts and hashtags through pressure exerted on digital platform operators;
• the use of preventive detentions targeting users of TikTok, Instagram, and Twitter, increasingly affecting young women who post content that deviates from the state’s ideological line.

A particularly vulnerable group to information manipulation in Egypt consists of younger users of mobile applications—especially TikTok—where disinformation is disseminated in a visually appealing, emotional format, often using humor, irony, or identity-based narratives. The lack of sufficient moderation resources in the Arabic language, combined with algorithmic opacity, further exacerbates the scale of the phenomenon.

As a result, civil society—understood both as organized NGOs and individual citizens—faces new barriers to public engagement. On the one hand, transparent public debate is disappearing; on the other, the space for independent organizations to operate is shrinking. False narratives become a tool of symbolic power and, at the same time, a means by which the state apparatus consolidates its real political dominance.

Information Pushback: Fact-Checking, Law, and Social Activism
In response to the growing wave of disinformation, African states, civil society organizations, and international partners are implementing a variety of counterstrategies. Among the most widespread are independent fact-checking initiatives, educational activities, and legal regulations undertaken at the national and supranational levels.

In Egypt, despite the high level of control over the digital space, certain forms of response to disinformation are also developing, although they are significantly constrained by political realities and legal frameworks that enable repression. Independently operating fact-checking projects, such as Daftar Ahwal or collaborations with regional networks (e.g., the Arab Fact-Checkers Network), attempt to neutralize widely circulated false content, although they often function on the margins of official discourse. The fact that many of these entities operate from abroad or rely on grant support makes them vulnerable to accusations of acting “against the interests of the state.”

At the same time, traditional Egyptian media—mostly controlled by the state or linked to political elites—have implemented limited information verification mechanisms, but their public credibility remains low. The situation differs in some Sub-Saharan African countries; for instance, Africa Check in South Africa and PesaCheck in East Africa are active both online and in the educational sphere, offering open-access resources and cooperating with local journalists.

In Egypt—similar to Ghana and Kenya—state digital content monitoring centers function primarily as instruments of internal security rather than as transparent tools for combating disinformation. The 2024 CIPESA report notes that although such institutions claim to be fighting fake news, they lack independence, transparency, and public trust, which significantly undermines their effectiveness.

Education and Resilience: How to Counter Disinformation in Egypt and Africa
Civil society plays a key role in building information resilience, particularly through media campaigns, workshops, and support for victims of disinformation. In Egypt, a positive example is the work of organizations such as the Association for Freedom of Thought and Expression (AFTE), which combines research on digital rights with legal interventions and the monitoring of censorship cases. Meanwhile, educational initiatives targeting women and people from smaller communities—modeled after Uganda’s Her Internet—exist in Egypt primarily within the diaspora or as informal support networks.

At the legislative level, the main challenge lies in balancing protection against disinformation with the safeguarding of civil rights. Egypt’s 2018 Cybercrime Law, although intended to protect society from information manipulation, has in practice become a tool of repression. It enables the arbitrary blocking of websites, surveillance of social media, and penalization of so-called “harmful content.” The lack of clear criteria and appeal mechanisms makes these regulations incompatible with international standards (e.g., the African Declaration on Internet Rights and Freedoms and UN Resolution 522 on digital violence against women).

Regional organizations such as the ACHPR, along with international partners (e.g., UNESCO, the EU), promote more balanced approaches, encouraging states to adopt legal frameworks that:
• provide clear definitions of disinformation,
• introduce independent oversight mechanisms for the implementation of laws,
• enable public and judicial oversight of administrative decisions, such as content blocking.

In practice, however—as shown by the case of Egypt—the implementation of these guidelines is highly selective and often marginalized by national security interests.

Despite their declarations to combat disinformation, digital technology platforms continue to fail when it comes to content moderation in North Africa. There is a lack of dedicated teams analyzing content in Arabic (and its dialects), algorithms do not recognize cultural context, and abuse reporting systems are ineffective. As a result, local mechanisms for reporting abuse, the creation of national fact-checking networks, and the building of partnerships between public media, NGOs, and tech platforms are recommended.

Among the priority recommendations by experts for countries in the region (including Egypt) are:
• developing media and digital literacy among youth and marginalized groups,
• promoting transparency in algorithms and recommendation data,
• creating cross-sectoral alliances for information resilience that include various stakeholder groups: schools, media, civil society organizations, religious leaders, and government representatives.

Conclusions: The Digital Future and Informational Responsibility
Digital disinformation in Africa—and particularly in Egypt and the North African region—remains one of the central challenges of contemporary digital transformation. As clearly demonstrated in the book Digital Disinformation in Africa, the rapid development of social media and access to mobile telephony has opened up new avenues for civic expression, but at the same time has become a tool for manipulation, censorship, and symbolic violence. State authorities, private companies, and foreign actors use these channels to pursue political and geostrategic interests, thereby undermining citizens’ trust in institutions and democratic processes.

The conclusions drawn from this analysis lead to several core recommendations:

First, there is a pressing need to intensify media and digital literacy education, especially among youth, women, and marginalized groups. The Egyptian experience points to a lack of reliable training programs in this area, which contributes to vulnerability to manipulation. The involvement of civil society organizations in educational efforts—as seen in initiatives such as Her Internet in Uganda—could yield similar benefits in countries like Egypt.

Second, sustainable and inclusive partnerships are needed between governments, media, NGOs, and technology platforms to develop standards of accountability and transparency in the digital environment. Egyptian experiences show that the absence of independent oversight mechanisms over platforms and the lack of local ethical standards for content moderation exacerbate the problem of disinformation, particularly during periods of social unrest.

Third, legal regulations must be balanced and consistent with international human rights standards. As noted by African Arguments (2024), Egypt’s anti-disinformation legislation has, in practice, become a tool of repression rather than protection. Therefore, reforms are needed that on the one hand enable the identification and counteraction of disinformation campaigns, while on the other hand guarantee the rights to freedom of expression, pluralism, and due process.

Fourth, the role of the state should not be limited to enforcing regulations; it must also include active support for independent media, fact-checking initiatives, and access to reliable sources of information. In Egypt, the lack of transparent support for such mechanisms results in an information vacuum that is filled by unverified content, propaganda, and so-called keyboard armies.

Finally, a digital policy is needed that rests on four pillars: civic education, public participation, strong and resilient institutions, and effective protection of human rights in the online environment. Only then will it be possible to transform technological potential into a real force supporting democratization and social cohesion—instead of, as is currently the case, a source of tension, division, and repression.

Author: Wojciech Pokora

Sources

  • Research on Egypt’s Information Environment – INFO OPS Polska Foundation
  • Roberts, Shaun; Karekwaivanane, George (eds.) Digital Disinformation in Africa. London: African Internet Observatory, 2024.
  • African Arguments. In Sisi’s Egypt, laws aimed at curbing disinformation are instruments of political repression. Accessed: March 2024.
  • Disinfo.Africa. Spontaneous Association or Coordinated Behavior? Disinformation Trends in Africa. African Observatory, 2024.
  • CIPESA (Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa). Report Highlights Collaborative Efforts to Counter Disinformation in Africa, August 2024.
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