This material is one of ten analytical briefs accompanying the full report on the security of Lebanon’s information environment. It forms part of a broader series examining key trends and incidents shaping the informational landscape. We encourage you to read the full report:
https://shafafiyat.com/ar/2025/09/17/%d8%aa%d9%82%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%b1-%d8%a3%d9%85%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a8%d9%8a%d8%a6%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%85%d8%b9%d9%84%d9%88%d9%85%d8%a7%d8%aa%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d9%84%d8%a8%d9%86%d8%a7%d9%86/
The beginning of 2025 is a difficult period for Lebanon, in which the country has experienced rising border tensions, an increase in the exchange of fire between Hezbollah and the Israeli military (IDF), a protracted political deadlock over the presidential election, and a lack of economic and institutional reforms. State institutions have an extremely negligible influence on Hezbollah’s activities, worsening the unfavourable security environment and hindering Lebanon’s functioning on the international stage, especially in contacts with Western nations. Regional and global players are trying to pressure both Lebanon and Israel to limit the scale of the conflict and prevent its escalation. These efforts have so far yielded no results.
The risk of further deterioration in the regional security situation is real, though there are no clear indications of its likelihood. Towards the end of the first quarter of this year, there was an increase in IDF airstrikes on targets located significantly beyond the UNIFIL area of responsibility. The persistent political stalemate does not help the security situation. Discussions regarding the election of a new head of state have not brought a breakthrough. To date, the Lebanese political class has been unable to select a candidate who could take overpower in the state.
International mediations (involving the USA, Qatar, Egypt, France, and Saudi Arabia) have proven ineffective. In the face of unfavourable regional conditions, this situation is dangerous, as it significantly limits the state’s capacity to function on a formal level (inability to appoint heads of key state institutions) and in the economic sphere (the country’s persistent very low credit and investment rating). The Lebanese government and political decision-makers continue their anti-immigrant rhetoric, strengthened by the assassination of one of the leaders of the Christian party “Lebanese Forces,” which occurred at the beginning of the second quarter of this year. In May of this year, Commissioner Ursula von der Leyen visited Lebanon, offering aid totalling €1 billion, partly in exchange for securing the country’s borders and limiting illegal emigration to EU countries.
a) Escalation of the conflict on the Lebanese-Israeli border and the role of Hezbollah
The main factor shaping the country’s internal politics is the conflict with Israel, and particularly Hezbollah’s military involvement. Lebanese authorities appear to have virtually no control over the Party of God’s activities. Since the Hamas attack on Israel in October 2023, the intensity of the exchange of fire on the Lebanese-Israeli border has been systematically increasing. In the last quarter, a decided increase has been noted in the use of UAVs by Hezbollah and fighter jets by Israel (Lebanese UAVs are mainly used for reconnaissance; IDF air force and UAVs are used for precision strikes, including far beyond the UNIFIL area of responsibility (the area south of the Litani River).
To date, neither side has fully engaged its military potential. We assess that Hezbollah likely does not have Iran’s full consent to become fully involved in the conflict. Furthermore, the complex internal situation in Lebanon does not give Hezbollah complete freedom of action, and voices are increasingly heard among political leaders questioning the legitimacy of the decision to join the war. Even now, the indirect and direct costs of the armed activities on the border are significant. Since October 2023, approximately 95,000-100,000 people have left southern Lebanon and relocated to areas north of the Litani River. It is estimated that because of the IDF’s use of white phosphorus munitions, approximately 1,200 hectares of cultivated land have been permanently chemically contaminated and burned, making them unusable for agriculture. Olive groves, which form the basis of the region’s economy, have also been destroyed. Around 400,000 head of livestock have died. In total, approximately 75% of the population living in the south has lost its primary source of income. Lebanon’s total losses resulting from the conflict are estimated at roughly $1.7 billion USD.
The leading global player involved in attempting to develop mechanisms for a cessation of hostilities is the United States. Washington appointed the State Department’s Special Envoy for Lebanon, A. Hochstein, to negotiate with the conflict parties (Hochstein was previously involved in talks between Lebanon and Israel regarding access to gas fields in disputed territorial waters). The scenario proposed by the Americans assumes the withdrawal of Hezbollah forces to 8-10 km from the border with Israel, the reinforcement of LAF presence in that area, and the opening of negotiations regarding the shape of the border line (in which Israel will likely be proposed to withdraw from disputed territories). For the USA, a stable situation in Lebanon remains one of the guarantees of relative regional peace.
Despite the country’s resolute declarations, which emphasize a lack of will to escalate the conflict, attempts to neutralize Hezbollah’s influence have so far been unsuccessful, and the exchange of fire is gaining intensity. Lebanon’s stance on the conflict will be reactive in response to the scale and dynamics of Israel’s actions.
b) The problem of Syrian refugees as a key element of domestic policy
The Syrian issue remains one of the most critical topics shaping the domestic political discourse. Despite differences in other areas, the issue of Syrian migrants unites political blocs and decision-makers, who advocate the urgent need to regulate migration. Approximately 780,000 registered Syrian refugees and hundreds of thousands of unregistered ones reside in Lebanon. The Lebanese parliament approved a program to establish a ministerial commission tasked with communicating Lebanon’s policy priorities on the Syrian issue in the international and regional arena. Lebanese services have intensified repatriation efforts. Representatives of the Lebanese government use strong, unambiguous anti-migration rhetoric. Lebanon’s Minister of the Interior is explicit: only Syrians whose stay is justified for security reasons can remain in the country; the authorities’ priority is to ensure the country’s security. During the “Brussels VIII” conference in May of this year, Lebanon’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, A. Bou Hablb, stated that Lebanon has reached a critical mass on the Syrian issue, according to the official government position, Syrian refugees are one of the leading causes of the increase in crime, the creation of organized criminal groups, kidnappings for ransom, etc.
The Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs plans a diplomatic offensive aimed at reaching the international community and developing a timeframe for the relocation of Syrian refugees to Syria. According to the official position of the Lebanese authorities, Lebanon can no longer bear the burden of the Syrians’ presence and does not have the resources to act “as migration protection” for the EU. Internal sectarian tensions directed against the Syrian community in Lebanon have been rising since the assassination of a key politician of the Maronite “Lebanese Forces” party, P. Sleiman, in April of this year. P. Sleiman was killed during an armed robbery. Despite the findings of Lebanese military intelligence, which indicated that the abduction and death of P. Sleiman were not politically motivated, local communities (mainly Christians) organized actions directed against Syrians. There were sporadic attacks on Syrian shops, Syrians are subjected to detailed checks by local security forces, and politicians cynically use these issues to build political capital.
However, following the fall of President Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024, many Syrians began to return to their country, expressing hope for a safer and more stable environment in their homeland. Nevertheless, significant uncertainty remains regarding the safety and stability of some regions in Syria, as well as the country’s capacity to receive the returning population. Lebanese officials, including Prime Minister Najib Mikati, have publicly called for the return of Syrian refugees, citing the burden on Lebanon’s resources and infrastructure. Mikati described the return as the “best solution” to the issue, reflecting Lebanon’s stance on the matter.
In response to the changing political landscape in Syria, Lebanon is adjusting its policy regarding Syrian refugees. Although the government has not implemented formal repatriation programs, it has facilitated the return process by easing bureaucratic and legal procedures and providing logistical support to individuals who decide to return. The international community continues to monitor developments, emphasizing the importance of voluntary, safe, and dignified returns.
c) Political impasse and lack of prospects for presidential election
There is little prospect of reaching a compromise on the presidential election. Despite the ongoing conflict, institutional obstruction (the lack of constitutional authority to appoint the most critical state officials), and the protracted economic crisis, particularly affecting the public sector, there is practically no chance of quickly selecting a candidate who could gain broader political support. One axis of the dispute currently revolves around S. Frangieh, the leader of the “Marada” group, the candidate nominated by Hezbollah and the Amal Shiite party. The head of the Christian party “Free Patriotic Movement”, G. Bassil, who had previously been unequivocally critical of this candidacy, shows signs of softening his stance. This is significant because the FPM parliamentary bloc could provide the necessary quorum to hold the elections. Nevertheless, now, there are no symptoms suggesting progress in this regard.
Foreign policy
The main area of interest for Lebanon’s foreign partners currently is security issues directly related to the Lebanese-Israeli conflict and its regional and global consequences. In the second quarter of this year, there was a noticeable increase in the dynamism of contacts with Lebanon from high-ranking EU representatives. In May of this year, the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, arrived in Lebanon (accompanied by the President of Cyprus, N. Christodoulides). The purpose of the visit to Beirut was to discuss the most significant internal and regional challenges.
The Commissioner announced that the EU will provide Lebanon with a financial aid package worth €1 billion, spread over the years 2024-2027. The funds are intended to help guarantee citizens access to basic services such as education, social protection, and healthcare. The support is to be accompanied by the introduction of necessary and urgent economic, financial, and banking sector reforms. The aid is also to cover the Lebanese Armed Forces and institutions responsible for state security, they are to receive equipment and training, including in border management and combating smuggling. The visit of the President of the European Commission and the conditions under which the EU financial support is to be granted met with criticism from selected political circles (including the FPM) and religious groups in Lebanon, which described the aid package as a bribe for keeping the Syrians in Lebanon.
b) The role of France in shaping Lebanon’s internal policy
France remains one of Lebanon’s most important Western partners in shaping the country’s internal policy. In May of this year, the special envoy of the French President for Lebanon, Jean-Yves Le Drian, visited Lebanon. The purpose of the visit was to signal the urgent need to overcome the political impasse that has lasted since the end of the term of former President M. Aoun. France seems politically determined to continue efforts to normalize its political situation. Although Le Drian’s visit did not yield measurable achievements, it constitutes a significant contribution to Western countries’ overall engagement in the situation in the country, creating a counterbalance to Iran’s influence. Additionally, France’s recent activity “recalls” the existence of the “Lebanese Quintet,” i.e., a group of five countries – France, the USA, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Egypt that have established closer cooperation to jointly develop mechanisms to help Lebanon emerge from the political impasse. However, the ambitious declarations of the “Lebanese Quintet” have not been accompanied by any real achievements.
c) Limited effectiveness of UNIFIL and UNSCOL missions in the context of security
UNIFIL and UNSCOL remain critical components of Lebanon’s security architecture, but their actual capacity to shape the local reality is limited. Despite the activities of these UN agencies, it has not been possible to secure the areas south of the Litani River permanently, and Hezbollah’s military activity is increasing in intensity. The current situation casts doubt on the possibility of the comprehensive implementation of Resolution 1701, which outlines the conditions that Lebanon and Israel should adhere to guarantee regional peace.
Economic situation
Despite recording some positive trends at the end of the first quarter, the latest indicators for Lebanon’s economy are not optimistic. In April of this year, the PMI index (which measures economic and production trends in the private sector) recorded its lowest level in four months (48.8 points; in March, it was 49.4 points), below the neutral level. The decline was mainly due to weaker demand and a drop-in business activity, which was related to rising geopolitical tensions in the region. The increase in public-sector wages and the doubling of the minimum private-sector salary (to $200 USD) should be viewed positively.
It is worth noting that despite significant concerns in the HoReCa industry, the beginning of the holiday season is accompanied by very high tourist traffic. Military operations in the south of the country have not significantly affected turnover in this sector. LOT Polish Airlines is also recording an almost record-high occupancy on the BEY-WAW-BEY route. The connection is mainly used by transit passengers (main destinations: Scandinavian countries, the USA, and Canada).
Security issues
The conflict on the Lebanese-Israeli border and the IDF attacks on targets inside the country negatively affect the security environment. However, there are currently no direct signs of a full-scale war. The current scenarios for the situation’s development are varied, and the key, of course, is the reaction of Western countries, which can influence Israel.
For over two years, Lebanon has been grappling with a political crisis stemming from an electoral deadlock, connected to Michel Aoun’s departure from office and the inability of parliament to elect a head of state (the President in Lebanon can only be a Maronite Christian).
The total number of victims since October 2023 has risen to over 1,800 killed and 9,100 injured. The victims include civilians, healthcare workers, and humanitarian personnel. The conflict has severely disrupted essential services, damaged critical infrastructure, and displaced hundreds of thousands of people. As of September 30, 2024, 346,209 internally displaced persons (IDPs) were identified. Furthermore, over 175,000 Lebanese and Syrians have fled to Syria.
Another issue is the country’s economic collapse, driven by rampant corruption, the zero value of the Lebanese pound, and the collapse of the banking system. All this generates difficulties in accessing electricity, services, the Internet, and cash. The concentration of strategic companies, such as EDL (Électricité du Liban), in the hands of prominent politicians, or the control of fuel access, paralyzes life in Lebanon and makes the Lebanese entirely dependent on the political cartel.
The Israeli ground invasion on September 30, 2024, also led to the paralysis of Lebanese education. Two out of five students in Lebanon have been displaced because of Israeli airstrikes. Approximately 500,000 students out of 1.25 million, or 40% of them, have been displaced due to Israeli army strikes. Due to the fighting, the start of the school year was postponed until November 4.
Lebanon’s security situation is also dependent on Hezbollah, specifically its political and military arms. Hezbollah is the most influential Shiite party in Lebanon. Lebanon is also in a difficult position because it does not control the entirety of its territory and is treated as a proxy area by Iran, Hezbollah, and Israel. The weakness of the state is also manifested in the passivity of the Lebanese army (Lebanese Armed Forces / LAF), which numbers 15,000 soldiers. In military terms, the Lebanese army is relatively powerless, ranking among the weakest in the region.
The security situation has not improved under the UN mission UNIFIL, whose mandate is not “peace enforcement” but instead monitoring, humanitarian aid, cooperation with the Lebanese armed forces, and coordination with Beirut and Tel Aviv, the very scope of its activities demonstrates the helplessness of this contingent.
Regional conflicts pose a threat to the entire country by driving migratory movements. In this way, Lebanon has become a place of refuge for Palestinians, Iraqis, and Syrians in recent decades. Migration is even more dangerous for Lebanon because Beirut is often unable to guarantee decent living conditions and access to public goods for its own citizens.
Lebanon also faces the threat of disinformation, primarily driven by Russian activities. The key instrument of Russian propaganda in Lebanon is Sputnik Arabic, which influences the Shiites. The Kremlin’s narrative is aimed at creating a negative perception of the West and moderating the moods of the Arab population.
New government
The new government of Lebanon, appointed in January 2025, is the result of a compromise between the main political groups and represents an attempt to overcome the institutional impasse that has lasted for months. Najib Mikati once again heads the cabinet, gaining a mandate as Prime Minister to continue talks both domestically and internationally. However, new faces appeared in key ministries. Jihad Azour, a former IMF regional director, was appointed Minister of Finance, seen as a nod to the West and a signal of openness to economic reforms. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was taken over by Fares Boueiz, an experienced diplomat and former Minister, who is expected to strengthen Lebanon’s position in contacts with Arab countries and the European Union.
Bassam Mawlawi, who held the position in the previous cabinet and is considered a pragmatist capable of managing the tense security situation, was appointed as the new Minister of the Interior. A key element of the new administration is also the Minister of Defence, Ziad Baroud, a former Minister of the Interior, valued for his technocratic approach and negotiation skills. His nomination may signal a push for improved cooperation between the Lebanese army and international organizations such as UNIFIL. Representatives of the main political groups also joined the government. Hezbollah maintained influence in several ministries, including the Ministry of Health, which will be headed by Ali Hassan Khalil from the Amal party.
The new cabinet faces a considerable challenge in addition to tackling the economic crisis and ensuring political stability: it must confront the escalating tensions on the southern border and international pressure over the presidential elections. It is still unclear whether the new political configuration will allow for a breakthrough in divisions. Still, its composition suggests some openness to reforms and an attempt to reconcile the interests of various factions.