Social vulnerabilities
This material is one of ten analytical briefs accompanying the full report on the security of Lebanon’s information environment. It forms part of a broader series examining key trends and incidents shaping the informational landscape. We encourage you to read the full report:
https://shafafiyat.com/ar/2025/09/17/%d8%aa%d9%82%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%b1-%d8%a3%d9%85%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a8%d9%8a%d8%a6%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%85%d8%b9%d9%84%d9%88%d9%85%d8%a7%d8%aa%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d9%84%d8%a8%d9%86%d8%a7%d9%86/
Lebanon, a country with an exceptionally complex socio-political structure, is currently in a state of profound crisis. The impact of sectarianism, ethnic tensions, extreme economic instability, and growing security threats creates a mosaic of social vulnerabilities that systematically undermine the foundations of statehood and national unity. In the absence of strong state institutions, religious identity and communal affiliation become the dominant frameworks for social and political life.
Religious vulnerabilities
The religious landscape of Lebanon is incredibly diverse. In 2023, the population was approximately 5.4 million, including 4.5 million citizens, about 1.5 million refugees, mainly from Syria and Iraq, and over 180 thousand from Palestine. Sunni Muslims dominate the migrant population, introducing additional religious divisions and intensifying social fragmentation. Although Lebanon has not conducted an official census since 1932, data from Statistics Lebanon indicate that 69.3% of citizens are Muslims (including 31.2% Sunni, 32% Shia, and 6.1% Alawites and Ismailis), while 30.7% are Christians, mainly Maronites and Greek Catholics. Additionally, the country is home to religious minorities such as Druze (5.5% of the population), Jews, Baha’is, and representatives of Buddhism and Hinduism (constituting less than 1% of the population), further enriching Lebanon’s religious mosaic.
Religious identity in Lebanon plays a key role in shaping daily social practices, serving as an essential marker of belonging that, on the one hand, strengthens ties among members, but on the other, intensifies boundaries between communities and often leads to a sense of exclusion. The diversity of groups also significantly affects access to basic services such as education, healthcare, and social support, leading to inequality and creating a system where individuals rely on their religious communities for aid and resources. This dependence fosters patron-client relationships, in which loyalty to religious sects becomes more important than national allegiance. As a result, communal identities become stronger, and broader social cohesion is weakened.
These mechanisms make it difficult to build a national identity in Lebanon, with citizens often seeing themselves primarily as members of their groups rather than united citizens of a state. Consequently, Lebanese society struggles to forge lasting solidarity, limiting inter-sectarian trust and impeding the construction of a common, national unity.
Sectarianism and ethno-sectarianism
Sectarianism and ethno-sectarianism in Lebanon have deep historical roots, dating back to the Ottoman and colonial eras, which shaped religious and political divisions. The consociational system, introduced in the 20th century, institutionalised these divisions, allocating power and resources based on religious affiliation. Under this structure, the highest political positions, such as the President, Prime Minister, and Speaker of Parliament, are assigned to specific religious groups to ensure balance among the sects. However, this division, stemming from historical difficulties in integrating diverse communities, leads to persistent tensions and impedes the development of a cohesive national identity.
The Taif Agreement of 1989, which ended the civil war, changed the power-sharing formula that underpinned governance in Lebanon under the 1943 National Pact. The terms for Lebanon’s political reconstruction, enshrined in the Taif Agreement, modified the structure to reflect Lebanon’s contemporary demographic realities. Several key provisions of the National Pact were changed: most presidential powers were transferred to the Parliament and the Council of Ministers, leaving the Maronite Christian president with only a symbolic role. Important public offices, including those in Parliament, the Council of Ministers, and first-grade positions, were redistributed equally between Muslims and Christians, thus disrupting the traditional six-to-five ratio that favoured Christians under the National Pact.
These divisions are significantly reflected in Lebanese society and politics. An example is the inability to elect a president, which has led to political impasses and weakened citizen trust in state institutions. Lebanon struggles with effective governance because group interests dominate over a unified approach to state affairs. Similarly, the political system limits the possibility of implementing broad economic reforms, maintaining social loyalties to religious leaders instead of building national unity.
Political-religious groups, such as Hezbollah and Amal, further reinforce these divisions by controlling specific regions of Lebanon and selectively providing social services exclusively to their supporters. In times of crisis, when citizens seek a sense of security, their loyalty to their communities deepens social divisions, which in turn hampers cooperation between different groups and heightens tensions.
Despite these difficulties, there is a possibility for the gradual weakening of sectarian influence in Lebanese politics. According to the provisions of the Lebanese Constitution and the National Reconciliation Pact, proposed reforms aim to include the establishment of a Senate representing religious communities, the rotation of the highest state offices among sects, and the gradual transformation of the political system toward more cross-sectarian representation in Parliament. These actions are intended not only to lessen the impact of sectarianism but also to build a more united society that is resilient to internal divisions and external pressures.
The current difficult migratory situation in the country, linked to the Israeli campaign against Hezbollah, has the potential to unite people across divides through mutual aid for those fleeing the most affected areas. An example of this behaviour is Marjayoun, a predominantly Christian town in South Lebanon, which has opened its schools and church to accommodate dozens of people of various faiths fleeing Israeli attacks.
Economic vulnerabilities
Political instability protracted regional conflicts, and deeply entrenched corruption have led to a decline in GDP growth and the collapse of key economic sectors, such as banking and tourism, which are particularly vulnerable to the country’s security situation. In 2017, the debt-to-GDP ratio reached an alarming 152.8%, indicating severe financial instability, compounded by the dominance of political elites over the economy.
In 2019, Lebanon was hit by one of the world’s worst economic crises. Food prices rose by over 1000%, and GDP fell by 70-75% compared to pre-crisis values. 80% of Lebanon’s population (over 3 million people) lived in poverty, and extreme poverty affected 36% of Lebanese (1.38 million).
International efforts have been made to support Lebanon amid its difficult economic situation. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Government of Lebanon reached an agreement on proposed economic reforms in April 2022. The government committed to implementing reform-related actions before the IMF Board would consider financing a 3 billion USD, 4-year loan. However, as of April 2024, Lebanon has made only limited progress on these actions.
According to the latest 2024 report by the United States Department of State, Lebanon continued to struggle with reduced economic activity stemming from the financial crisis that began at the end of 2019. Furthermore, Lebanon’s current economic situation is influenced by the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Although hostilities have largely been confined to Lebanon’s southern border areas, the instability and risk of escalation pose an obstacle to Lebanon’s economic recovery.
Corruption and clientelism, particularly evident in the banking sector and public services, significantly reduce market efficiency, increase income inequality, and restrict access to fair employment. Additionally, the influx of refugees from Syria, which increased competition in the labour market, lowered wages in low-paid sectors, leading to a rise in unemployment and deepening poverty among Lebanese citizens.
Simultaneously, inflation, driven by rapid currency devaluation, has caused the cost of living to soar, with food expenditures accounting for over half of many households’ budgets. This forces many Lebanese into debt and confronts a growing problem of food insecurity. Underfunded infrastructure and corruption in public institutions, such as healthcare and education, further weaken social safety nets, leading to mass emigration.
All these factors already significantly deepen Lebanon’s economic fragility, and additional destruction caused by past regional conflicts and the current escalation of the conflict with Israel further destabilises the situation, worsening poverty and limiting the potential for economic reconstruction. Intensive bombing and ground operations have destroyed key infrastructure, including bridges, roads, and airports, hindering the delivery of essential goods and services. Additionally, escalating tensions deter investors and tourists, exacerbating the economic crisis the country is already vulnerable to.
The rise in regional tensions, combined with political instability, hinders the implementation of necessary economic reforms, further exacerbating the financial crisis and social inequalities.
Ethnic vulnerabilities
Social vulnerabilities in Lebanon, resulting from ethnic and religious differences, demonstrate the profound effects of the long-standing political-religious hierarchy, a divided educational system, and economically marginalised refugee communities. Since 1992, the Lebanese political scene has been shaped by a rigid structure in which the Shia, Sunni, and Maronites, recognised as “Senior Partners,” have dominant influence. Meanwhile, the Druze, Greek Orthodox, and Armenian Orthodox, designated as “Junior Partners,” have limited political opportunities, and smaller communities, such as the Alawites and Armenian Catholics, are practically “powerless.” Palestinian refugees are in a particularly marginalised position, classified as “discriminated,” with limited access to rights, job opportunities, and political participation. This entrenched structure has shaped Lebanon’s political power, creating social vulnerabilities where ethnic and religious identity can significantly affect life prospects.
Unsurprisingly, these complex ethnic divisions constitute a significant element of the social tensions that have shaped its political and social landscape over the years. The influx of Syrian refugees in 2012 further exacerbated these tensions, and anti-immigrant rhetoric intensified social divisions and contributed to political support for exclusionary narratives. To this day, many refugees, mainly Syrians and Palestinians, remain excluded from the formal labour market, forcing them into precarious, low-wage jobs without legal protection. This dependence on uncertain employment increases their vulnerability to poverty and deepens reliance on international aid.
In the educational sphere, Lebanese institutions are often associated with specific religious or political ideologies, creating an environment in which ethnic affiliation shapes social interactions and academic experiences. This divided system, reinforced by linguistic differences—where French and English often symbolise distance from the Arab identity, hinders the pursuit of national unity. Because controversial topics are frequently skirted, a hidden educational curriculum perpetuates sectarian prejudices, limiting opportunities for cross-cultural understanding. As a result, the Lebanese social fabric remains deeply divided, impeding the emergence of a coherent national identity and perpetuating social vulnerabilities related to ethnic divisions that weaken democratic engagement and public trust.
Lebanon, host to the most significant number of refugees in the world per capita, is grappling with serious ethnic and social problems. The country has taken in about 1.5 million Syrians, 479 thousand Palestinians, and over 12 thousand people from other countries. Additionally, over 250 thousand migrant domestic workers, mainly from African and Asian countries, reside in Lebanon.
Lebanon has not signed the 1951 Geneva Convention on the status of refugees, resulting in a lack of formal legal frameworks for refugee protection. Instead, the country relies on ad hoc agreements with the UNHCR. The only legal act regulating the status of foreigners is a 1962 decree, which does not provide comprehensive refugee protection.
The lack of formal protection mechanisms leads to the marginalisation and discrimination of refugees and migrants. Many of them lack access to basic services, such as education or healthcare, which deepens their difficult situation. Furthermore, the “kafala” system, regulating migrant employment, contributes to abuse and exploitation, limiting the rights of migrant workers.
The presence of such many refugees and migrants affects Lebanon’s delicate demographic balance, leading to social and political tensions. The lack of effective integration policies and adequate legal frameworks makes solving these problems difficult, negatively affecting the country’s stability.
Political vulnerabilities
The Lebanese political system is a complicated hybrid, combining formal state institutions with the interests of sectarian parties, making elites and clientelism the core of the country’s governance. Such a structure generates significant social threats, as public resources are distributed primarily through the prism of political and ideological connections, rather than through fair public policies. Political parties, acting as intermediaries between the state and their supporters, use their control over resources and regional influence, often leading to monopolies on basic services, such as electricity or fuel. This creates deep socio-economic divisions, leaving citizens dependent on political actors for necessities and fostering widespread corruption.
The political framework is further weakened by these divisions, which complicate processes such as presidential elections, as factions are unable to reach a common agreement. This impasse weakens the state’s ability to solve urgent problems, further deepening social instability. Lebanon’s neoliberal economic model, favoured by the political elites, focuses on short-term gains in the financial, real estate, and services sectors, marginalising sustainable sectors such as agriculture and industry. This approach to financialization and dependence on foreign capital flows leads to increasing inequalities and inadequate social safety nets, leaving the population vulnerable to economic changes and external pressures. Due to the impasse in key reforms, Lebanon’s economy is fragile, public investment is limited, and social instability is increasingly deepening, provoking a rise in inter-communal unrest.
Lebanon has been without a president since October 31, 2022, due to a lack of consensus among the country’s various political and religious groups. According to the 1943 National Pact, the President of Lebanon must be a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni, and the Speaker of Parliament a Shia. This system is intended to ensure balance among the different religious communities, but in practice, it often leads to political deadlock. After the end of President Michel Aoun’s term in October 2022, Parliament failed to elect his successor due to a lack of consensus among political factions. As a result, Prime Minister Najib Mikati assumed the duties of head of state, while simultaneously serving as prime minister. Such a situation is unconstitutional and undermines the stability of state institutions. The lack of a president deepens Lebanon’s political and economic crisis. The country is grappling with severe financial problems, including hyperinflation, high unemployment, and mass emigration. Additionally, the presence of strong-armed groups, such as Hezbollah, weakens the authority of the state and hinders democratic processes.
Foreign vulnerabilities
Lebanese society is highly sensitive to foreign intervention due to the country’s complex political history, marked by colonialism, foreign influence, and ongoing regional conflicts. The legacy of the French Mandate and the presence of international players in Lebanese politics, especially during the civil war and post-war reconstruction, have fostered distrust of external involvement. This sensitivity is extreme when foreign states are perceived as interfering in Lebanon’s internal affairs, whether through political, economic, or military support. Lebanon’s unique sectarian structure further complicates these sensitivities, as different factions may support or oppose foreign powers, depending on their ideological or strategic interests. For example, the presence and influence of Hezbollah are supported by Iran, and Sunni groups in Lebanon receive aid from Saudi Arabia.
While some view foreign intervention as necessary for stability or countering hostile neighbours, others see it as a violation of Lebanon’s sovereignty and a deepening of internal divisions. This delicate balance shapes the national discourse, where external influences are often viewed with suspicion, especially when they threaten the fragile political order or exacerbate Lebanon’s vulnerabilities.
Lebanon has become a field of rivalry for Israel, Syria, Iran, and other states, which use local conflicts to pursue their own interests. Israel has carried out numerous interventions, including armed invasions, aimed, among other things, at eliminating the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). The presence of Palestinian militants, especially in the south, gave Israel a pretext for military action, and the Lebanese central government’s weakness facilitated the PLO’s functioning as a “state within a state.”
Lebanon’s situation is closely linked to the broader Israeli-Arab conflict and, simultaneously, to the struggle for influence between Arab countries and Iran. Lebanon, despite its desire to protect its sovereignty, has repeatedly fallen victim to interventions that have deepened its internal divisions. Lebanese people, regardless of religion, often consistently advocate that the resolution of the Palestinian issue should not come at the expense of their state’s integrity.
Security vulnerabilities
Lebanon is grappling with a range of interconnected security threats that deepen its social vulnerability, creating unstable living conditions for residents.
One of the most frequently mentioned threats is religious extremism and factions related to the Syrian conflict (over 70% of citizens perceived these as serious, according to 2013 research). Additionally, the widespread sense of insecurity is contributed to by political violence, including bombings, assassinations, and street attacks. The rise in crime, such as theft, robbery, and muggings, constitutes another problem, as do sexual assault, harassment, and domestic violence (especially against women). Widespread access to firearms intensifies these threats, as nearly half the population reported contact with weapons in their neighbourhood (as of 2013, a number certainly higher today).
Sectarian tensions exacerbate these vulnerabilities, forcing many people to avoid mixed areas for fear of violence. This situation is further worsened by the growing role of non-state actors in maintaining security, as political parties such as Hezbollah and Amal effectively (or not) replace the state’s role as a guarantor of security. Their dominance in local security and governance creates a fragmented system in which citizens, mainly those loyal to these parties, rely on their protection. In contrast, others remain vulnerable to the marginalisation of the state’s role.
Societal security problems are also reflected in the growing food insecurity, which is further deepened by the ongoing economic crisis. Many Lebanese families, especially in rural areas, struggle with limited access to food, forcing them to adopt extreme survival strategies, such as skipping meals or going into debt. Food insecurity deepens the country’s existing social problems, particularly affecting larger households and those living far from markets, leading to increased poverty and greater dependence on aid (especially foreign aid).
Concurrently, cybersecurity has become a significant new threat, as Lebanon’s IT infrastructure is riddled with security gaps, particularly in sectors such as banking, healthcare, and government administration, exposing sensitive data to unauthorised use. The lack of effective cyber protection measures combined with the minimal institutional response to such threats puts not only national security but also social stability into question, threatening key economic services and functions. The rising number of cyberattacks targeting intellectual property and sensitive data, coupled with the inability of both the public and private sectors to manage these threats effectively, deepens the overall sense of insecurity, underscoring the urgent need for robust protection measures.
Summary
The multidimensional crisis in Lebanon, fueled by sectarianism, ethnic inequalities, a deep economic collapse, and chronic political instability, undermines social cohesion and the state’s ability to ensure security and development. The lack of fundamental reforms and dependence on clientelist arrangements result in the further marginalisation of society, especially refugees and minority groups. External influences, ineffective international aid, and escalating regional conflicts strengthen existing divisions. Despite this, grassroots gestures of solidarity and constitutionally enshrined potential reforms offer a small but real hope for long-term change, provided the political impasse can be overcome and citizens’ trust in state structures restored.