In early November 2024, posts appeared on Arabic-language propaganda accounts promoting Russian narratives. These posts suggested that Poland, followed by Bulgaria and Austria, had agreed to pay for Russian gas in rubles. According to these claims, the European Commission allegedly authorized EU member states to purchase gas in Russian currency amidst a so-called crisis. However, this information referred to past events, specifically April 2022, when Russia indeed halted gas supplies to Poland and Bulgaria due to their refusal to pay in rubles.
In reality, since then, Poland and Bulgaria have significantly reduced their dependence on Russian gas by investing in alternative energy sources. Why, then, has this narrative resurfaced? What objective does the Kremlin aim to achieve by portraying historical events as current facts? This article analyzes the mechanisms of Russian disinformation and examines its goals in the new geopolitical context. This case study provides insights into how Russia uses disinformation as a tool in its information warfare to manipulate public opinion and strengthen its political position.
Mechanism of Disinformation
Russian propaganda narratives referencing past events, such as those from April 2022, are a striking example of the strategic use of disinformation in the Kremlin’s ongoing information warfare. The mechanism employed in this case can be analyzed in several key contexts.
The first is the manipulation of the perception of time and events. Russian propaganda deliberately presents old events as current, effectively creating informational chaos. Recipients, who may vaguely recall events from several years ago, often struggle to remember specific details or dates. This creates confusion and hinders the accurate assessment of event chronology. As a result, disinformation leads some recipients to believe false claims, such as Poland, Bulgaria, and other EU countries currently changing their stance toward Russia and agreeing to Kremlin-imposed conditions, such as paying for gas in rubles.
The second critical aspect of this strategy is undermining European solidarity. The narrative suggesting that EU countries agreed to pay in Russian currency aims to erode unity within the EU’s joint energy policy. Such messages portray member states as inconsistent and susceptible to Moscow’s pressure, weakening trust in Europe’s efforts to diversify energy supply sources. Breaking the common EU front against Russia remains one of the main goals of Russian disinformation regarding energy policy.
Another context for this narrative is creating an illusion of the effectiveness of Russian policy. In this way, Russia seeks to bolster its image as a powerful geopolitical player that, despite international isolation and economic sanctions, still possesses leverage over European countries. This narrative presents Russia as an independent and dominant actor in global politics, effectively opposing Western „imperialism.” In particular, such messages resonate well in the Arab media space, which historically harbors skepticism toward U.S. and European actions in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.
Furthermore, Russia seeks to generate sympathy and build its image as a reliable partner, contrasting with U.S. and European policies. Depicting EU countries as supposedly „humiliated” by Russia and forced into concessions, such as ruble payments, aims to undermine the credibility of the West while positioning the Kremlin as a more stable alternative economic and political partner in the eyes of Global South nations.
This type of disinformation is not a random act but a carefully orchestrated element of a broader Russian information warfare strategy aimed at destabilizing Europe while strengthening Russian influence on the international stage.
Propaganda Goals
The dissemination of disinformation, such as the narrative about ruble payments, primarily aims to divert attention from Russia’s current challenges. At the turn of October and November 2024, the Kremlin faced significant difficulties both internationally and domestically. One of the key challenges was the geopolitical tension stemming from the ongoing war in Ukraine, which consumed substantial financial and human resources while tarnishing Russia’s image on the global stage. Additionally, the U.S. presidential elections could influence decisions on continued Western support for Ukraine. Russia also grappled with increasing political and economic isolation due to sanctions that effectively restricted its access to global markets and technologies.
Creating narratives about alleged successes in gas policy allowed Russia to distract from these difficulties. Propaganda suggesting that European countries had supposedly re-accepted Russian payment conditions in rubles aimed to overshadow the symbolic blows to Russia’s energy strategy caused by Europe’s energy diversification efforts, initiated after the 2022 gas supply cutoffs to Poland and Bulgaria. While initially perceived as an act of strength by the Kremlin, these events ultimately demonstrated the effectiveness of Europe’s strategy to reduce reliance on Russian energy resources. However, propaganda sought to undermine the success of these efforts by creating a false image of Europe’s dependence on Russia.
The narrative also targeted audiences in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, intending to build Russia’s prestige among Global South countries. The Kremlin aimed to present itself as an effective mediator and defender of the region’s interests, contrasting with the image of the West, often perceived in these countries as interventionist and imperialist. By highlighting Europe’s alleged vulnerabilities to its pressure, Russia reinforced the argument that cooperation with Moscow is more stable and beneficial than alliances with Western nations.
This narrative supported the Kremlin’s political and economic objectives on two key fronts. First, it aimed to undermine the credibility of the West and its ability to conduct effective energy policy while simultaneously weakening EU unity. Second, it enhanced Russia’s image as a reliable partner in the MENA region, bolstering its influence and position in the Global South. This type of disinformation not only advanced Russia’s international goals but also helped deflect attention from internal issues, reinforcing the image of Russia as a strong country capable of effective action on the global stage.
Propaganda Techniques in the Kremlin’s Arsenal
In this disinformation operation, the Kremlin employed several characteristic manipulation techniques that are staple elements of its propaganda playbook. One of the most commonly used methods is „information recycling,” i.e., re-presenting past events in a way that makes them appear current. These narratives rely on the assumption that recipients may not recall the details of events from years ago, opening the door to manipulation of their perceptions.
In the November 2024 disinformation case, events from April 2022 were utilized, when Russia indeed halted gas supplies to Poland and Bulgaria over their refusal to pay in rubles. Referencing a genuine past event lent the narrative a veneer of credibility, but the crucial manipulative element was introducing the falsehood that this situation was current, suggesting that these countries had recently changed their position and accepted the Kremlin’s conditions. The false claim that the European Commission required EU member states to settle in Russian currency further exaggerated this narrative. As a result, a completely false depiction of the present situation emerged, rooted in real but out-of-context past events.
The „information recycling” technique is particularly effective when combined with elements of „embellishment” or fact distortion. In this case, Russia leveraged the fact that the 2022 gas supply cutoffs were real and the ruble payment dispute authentic. However, extending this narrative with false claims about the European Commission and EU countries’ current actions created a classic fake news story, where a grain of truth was used to lend credibility to an entirely fabricated story.
Such disinformation operations are neither accidental nor spontaneous but form part of a broader strategic plan in which manipulation techniques, such as „information recycling” and crafting half-truth-based fake news, play a pivotal role. This approach not only creates confusion among recipients but also complicates effective countermeasures against propaganda, especially in societies with limited access to reliable information sources.
Conclusions
The disinformation surrounding ruble payments for gas is part of a broader Russian information strategy aimed at destabilizing Europe, undermining the EU’s internal cohesion, and strengthening Russian influence in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Addressing this narrative to Arabic-speaking audiences primarily serves to build Russia’s image as a global player capable of imposing its will even on Western countries. This supports Russia’s interests in MENA nations, which often distance themselves from European conflicts but remain susceptible to anti-Western sentiments.
In the Arab information space, such disinformation seeks to enhance Russia’s reputation as a reliable economic and political partner, contrasting with the „inconsistent and weak” West. This narrative also deflects attention from Russia’s internal problems and casts doubt on the effectiveness of Western sanctions. Furthermore, suggesting that European countries „yield” to Russia reinforces the perception that cooperation with Moscow yields greater benefits than alliances with Western nations.
Audiences of such messages—both in Europe and MENA—must remain particularly vigilant and base their opinions on verified and reliable information sources. Russia’s disinformation efforts are carefully planned and tailored to the specific characteristics of their audience, making critical analysis and verification of information essential for countering their impact.
A public task financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland within the frame of “Public Diplomacy 2024-2025: The European Dimension and Countering Disinformation” contest
The publication expresses only the views of the author and cannot be identified with the official position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland.
