At the beginning of September 2025, there was a serious violation of Polish airspace. During a Russian attack on Ukraine, a group of drones, identified by the Polish side as Russian, flew into the territory of the Republic of Poland. They were neutralized by Polish air defense forces in cooperation with NATO. Prime Minister Donald Tusk declared that the incident was intentional and called on citizens not to succumb to Russian disinformation. He rejected the emerging accusations directed against Ukraine, clearly stating that the responsibility lay with the Russian Federation. This statement was part of Poland’s broader effort to maintain solidarity with Ukraine and to assure both public opinion and allies that Moscow’s provocations would not lead to divisions.

The Russian reaction was defensive and predictable. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov described the prime minister’s statement as “nothing new,” accusing Warsaw and other European capitals of making baseless accusations. The Russian Ministry of Defense denied that the attack was aimed at Poland, claiming that no targets were planned on its territory. It was also argued that the range of the drones used did not exceed 700 kilometers, which was meant to suggest the accidental nature of the violation. Meanwhile, the Belarusian General Staff put forward the thesis that Ukrainian electronic warfare had “pushed” the drones into Belarusian airspace, presenting this as an alleged provocation by Kyiv rather than Moscow’s actions. Such claims fit into a coordinated disinformation campaign designed to blur the facts and shift responsibility away from Russia.

A strange RT Arabic article about “reactions on social media”

Against the backdrop of official communiqués and government positions, particular attention was drawn to an article published by RT Arabic (the Arabic-language branch of Russia Today). The piece did not focus on analyzing statements by authorities or experts, but on alleged reactions from Polish social media users.

The article, titled “The Polish prime minister’s statements set social media platforms against him”, suggested that Donald Tusk’s warnings against Russian disinformation had sparked wide-ranging debate in Poland’s digital space.

RT Arabic illustrated this thesis by citing several anonymous comments, allegedly from the X platform. The highlighted quotes aligned with key Russian propaganda themes: they criticized Ukraine, relativized Russia’s responsibility, and undermined the credibility of the West. One of the cited posts stated that “the real harm to the Polish state does not come from Russian propaganda, but from Ukrainian, German and Anglo-Saxon propaganda.” This directly inverted the narrative presented by the prime minister and exemplified the blame-shifting technique.

The strategy used by RT Arabic departed from the typical pattern of Russian state media, which usually base their message on statements from officials, experts, or institutions—even if biased or controlled. In this case, the material relied solely on anonymous posts whose authors were unverifiable. Such an approach allowed for arbitrary content selection and created the impression that the Polish government’s position was met with widespread opposition from citizens.

It cannot be ruled out that some of the cited comments came from real Polish internet users. However, the probability that they were the work of pro-Russian trolls or bots is high. This method fits into the technique of astroturfing—creating a semblance of public debate using anonymous or fictitious voices. Combined with the mechanism of false balance, suggesting that such posts were equivalent to official state positions, it illustrates the growing flexibility of Russian disinformation directed at Arab audiences.

The novelty here is the departure from conventions used in earlier RT coverage of Poland. Previous reports drew on comments from politicians or experts, while the current article was constructed entirely from anonymous, unverifiable sources. This may signal experimentation with new narrative formats, granting the Kremlin greater freedom to tailor messages to the expectations of Arab recipients.

Propaganda through anonymous accounts: What was quoted?

The content of the posts cited by RT Arabic fit neatly into the main lines of Russian propaganda. For example, the claim that “the real harm to the Polish state does not come from Russian propaganda, but from Ukrainian, German and Anglo-Saxon propaganda” reflected classic blame shifting. The implication was that Poland’s troubles stemmed from its Western allies, not Russia’s aggression.

Other parts of the article quoted comments mocking Prime Minister Tusk and NATO, stressing that Poland allegedly “overreacts” and “accuses Russia out of habit.” RT Arabic also underscored that the prime minister “described the drones as Russian but presented no evidence”—a textbook example of denialism and an attempt to undermine the credibility of government communications.

This construction served several propaganda goals at once. First, it blurred Russia’s responsibility for violating Polish airspace, diverting attention toward alleged Ukrainian or Western guilt. As noted in our earlier analyses (compare: https://disinfodigest.pl/2025/09/12/prorosyjskie-narracje-w-polsce-dezinformacja-wokol-incydentu-z-dronami/), the identical narrative—accusing Ukraine of provocation—was actively promoted in pro-Russian media within Poland. RT Arabic thus employed false balance, presenting unverifiable posts as proof of widespread opposition to government policy.

Second, the selected quotes undermined trust in Polish institutions and leaders. By portraying anonymous comments as “the voice of Poles,” RT Arabic suggested that the prime minister did not represent the public but acted against it. This is a clear example of astroturfing: manufacturing apparent grassroots debate through anonymous accounts, trolls, or bots.

Third, the quotes reinforced anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western disinformation. The claim that “Ukrainian and Anglo-Saxon propaganda” posed the real threat to Poland echoed the Kremlin’s broader strategy of eroding trust in Polish-Ukrainian relations. The insinuation that Ukraine might have provoked the incident was intended to weaken solidarity with Kyiv and frame the situation as a ploy to drag NATO into war.

Finally, some cited posts targeted NATO directly, portraying the alliance as ineffective and passive in the face of Russian actions. This classic technique of discrediting international institutions sought to weaken Western defense cohesion. By contrasting this with Belarus’s supposedly “responsible” stance, RT Arabic created a false image of Russia and its allies as stabilizing actors.

In sum, every element of the RT Arabic article—from blaming Ukraine, to ridiculing Polish leaders, to questioning NATO—formed part of a coordinated disinformation operation. The use of anonymous posts instead of credible sources gave Russian narratives the appearance of an authentic, grassroots Polish voice.

Coordinated disinformation: Fitting into the Russian “narrative manual”

The RT Arabic article did not stand alone. It was part of the Kremlin’s wider disinformation campaign around the drone incident. Moscow’s strategy was not about presenting facts but about controlling their interpretation. Russia is not competing for truth, but for narrative dominance—using a synchronized sequence of statements to shape perception. Several recurring lines can be identified in Russian and Belarusian messaging:

1. Denying Russian responsibility. Repeated claims that Russia “had no targets in Poland” and that the incident was “accidental” or “reactive.” This is denialism, a classic propaganda tactic aimed at obscuring facts and avoiding blame. Adding technical details—such as the alleged drone range under 700 km—served as pseudo-expertise to undermine Poland’s credibility.
2. Shifting blame to Ukraine and the West. Russian and Belarusian sources suggested Ukraine (“a provocation to escalate the war”) or NATO (“an anti-Russian plot”) were to blame. This is blame shifting and conspiracy theory-making, designed to frame Poland as a victim of its allies rather than of Russian aggression.
3. Trivializing and ridiculing. State media and so-called milbloggers consistently used mockery to downplay the incident. They spoke of “unknown objects” instead of drones, compared it to events in Estonia, and described Poland’s response as “hysterical.” This trivialization aimed to ridicule opponents and discredit their warnings.
4. Reversing victim and aggressor. The Kremlin portrayed Poland as the escalation provocateur and Russia as reactive. This is victim playing—recasting roles to shield Moscow from criticism. References to the 2022 Przewodów incident were used to suggest Poland “habitually” blames Russia unfairly.

These narratives were amplified across the pro-Russian information ecosystem: from Kremlin spokesmen, to state media (RT, RIA Novosti), to Telegram channels. Their consistency was no accident but evidence of a coordinated influence operation.

Four goals of this strategy were evident:

• undermining public trust by stressing a “lack of evidence” and implying manipulation by authorities;
• fanning anti-Ukrainian sentiment by accusing Kyiv of provocations;
• fracturing alliance unity by driving wedges between Poland, NATO, and the USA;
• legitimizing Russian aggression through the narrative of defensive reaction to the West.

The aim is not to fully convince but to create doubt and disorientation. Uncertainty itself constitutes victory for the Kremlin. In this context, RT Arabic played a key role, tailoring narratives for Arab audiences. By citing allegedly Polish comments against Tusk and NATO, it created the illusion of grassroots opposition—a textbook example of astroturfing—thereby advancing the Kremlin’s overarching goal: sowing chaos and deepening divisions in Poland and the West.

A sign of desperation: Why this tactic is unusual

The RT Arabic article attracted the attention of Disinfo Digest analysts because of its unusual narrative construction. RT outlets rarely build their coverage solely on anonymous social media comments, especially regarding sensitive geopolitical events. State propaganda typically relies on official statements, quotes from so-called independent experts, or identifiable figures, lending an air of authority.

Using random, unverifiable internet posts is characteristic of low-grade clickbait sites or covert influence accounts, not of a broadcaster posing as a global news outlet. The fact that RT Arabic resorted to such a tactic can be read as a sign of propaganda desperation. With no credible Polish public figures, experts, or officials available to defend Russia, RT “borrowed legitimacy” from anonymous supposed users of Polish internet forums. This created the illusion of real grassroots support for Kremlin narratives in Poland.

This mechanism is classic astroturfing—the fabrication of public sentiment. The cited posts carried no verifiable details (no names, no authentic profiles), allowing unlimited manipulation of both source and content. They could just as easily have come from genuine citizens as from trolls, bots, sockpuppets, or RT editors themselves. The lack of transparency was deliberate, ensuring the narrative could not be conclusively debunked.

This reveals the weakness of Russia’s narrative: faced with the undeniable fact of NATO airspace being violated by Russian drones, Moscow found no consistent counter-argument. Instead, it relied on manipulation: “some Poles say their government is wrong.” This is a manipulated argument, where anonymous, unverifiable posts are presented as evidence.

While RT and other Russian outlets have long used social media quotes as illustrations, making them the central basis of a political narrative represents an escalation. To argue that “Poles oppose their prime minister and NATO, and sympathize with Russia” solely on the basis of such posts marks a significant intensification of propaganda technique. It demonstrates a Kremlin strategy of manufacturing fictional grassroots support to compensate for a lack of genuine legitimacy.

Targeting the Arab world: Why RT Arabic is pushing this narrative

Publishing this narrative on RT Arabic highlights a broader Kremlin strategy. The Middle East and North Africa have become central battlegrounds for information influence. RT launched its Arabic service in 2007, steadily positioning itself as an alternative to Western media. Two moments especially boosted its role: the Arab Spring, which exposed the power of media narratives, and Russia’s 2015 intervention in Syria, symbolizing Moscow’s return as a regional power. Since then, RT Arabic has consistently promoted pro-Kremlin perspectives, blaming the West for instability and portraying Russia as a stabilizing force. This message resonates with segments of Arab audiences skeptical of US and European policies.

In the context of the war in Ukraine, RT Arabic and Sputnik Arabic are among the Kremlin’s most active tools in the Arab world. Studies show their social media reach exceeds even BBC Arabic or Al Jazeera. Content ranges from conspiracy theories (e.g., alleged US biolaboratories in Ukraine) to denialism (denying Russian war crimes, blaming NATO for the conflict). In 2022, for example, they circulated fake recordings blaming the Bucha massacre on Ukrainian forces and spread rumors about President Zelensky “fleeing.” Such narratives are not aimed at outright persuasion but at sowing doubt and undermining support for the West.

Against this backdrop, the RT Arabic article on Poland and NATO serves as propaganda targeting the Global South. By suggesting that Poland is internally divided and its citizens criticize both the prime minister and NATO, the article sought to achieve two effects:

1. Undermining Western unity—in the eyes of Arab audiences, Poland is shown as a country where “even its own people” oppose actions against Russia.
2. Building a positive image of Russia—the Kremlin casts itself as the victim of unjust accusations, while the West appears incompetent, divided, and hypocritical.

The technique used here is international astroturfing: presenting fictitious, anonymous “Polish” voices in a way that convinces Arab audiences that NATO itself harbors deep doubts. This is significant, as Arab states are more likely than Europe or North America to maintain neutral or ambivalent positions on the war. Moscow exploits RT Arabic to reinforce this neutrality or tilt opinion in its favor.

Another factor is that in the MENA region, RT Arabic is not subject to restrictions like those imposed in Europe (e.g., the EU ban on RT broadcasting). This enables the Kremlin to reach millions of Arabic-speaking viewers freely, pushing its version of events. The narrative of Polish drones woven into claims of NATO incompetence and Warsaw’s hypocrisy exemplifies soft-power propaganda—not designed to change Arab states’ policies directly, but to fuel skepticism toward the West.

Implications for Poland’s security

The actions of RT Arabic—and the broader disinformation campaign they form part of—illustrate hostile information operations directed at NATO states, with particular focus on Poland. As one of Ukraine’s most steadfast supporters and a frontline NATO member, Poland is at the center of Kremlin attention. Russian propaganda seeks to weaken Poland’s resolve and credibility by undermining the image of its leaders—depicting them as incompetent, overreacting, or even staging provocations. Such narratives risk diminishing the impact of Polish warnings about Russian aggression. By fostering doubt toward official communications, they erode public trust and may undermine allied solidarity.

It is therefore in Poland’s interest to swiftly identify and counter such influence operations. Government institutions and fact-checking bodies issue timely warnings about false narratives surrounding the drone incident and urge reliance on official sources. At the same time, analytical centers such as Disinfo Digest monitor and document the propaganda techniques in use, mapping how they are synchronized across the pro-Russian ecosystem. Such analysis not only complements state efforts but also offers a broader understanding of how narratives are constructed and what strategic objectives they serve.

Equally important is highlighting this problem in international relations. Warsaw can present such cases as evidence that Russian disinformation operates across languages and markets, with the goal of weakening NATO and EU cohesion. The incident underscores that the struggle is not only over territory but also over narrative control.