Lebanon Faces Crisis: How Disinformation Shapes Perceptions of the Economy
Lebanon is facing one of the most serious economic crises in its recent history. The collapse of its currency, runaway inflation, and shortages of basic goods have created an atmosphere of uncertainty and fear. In such conditions, misinformation spreads rapidly, with rumors of secret foreign manipulation and hidden wealth. However, the reality is different: the true causes of the crisis in Lebanon lie primarily in financial mismanagement, banking sector instability, and political paralysis. The Lebanese pound has experienced significant instability in recent years. While some narratives attribute the crisis to foreign conspiracies, the main sources of the problems are internal – a weak banking sector, public debt, and political stalemate. Attributing the crisis solely to external factors distracts from necessary domestic reforms. Rumors often circulate that inflation is “artificial” or “managed” by foreign powers. Speculation may influence markets, but the real causes are structural: import dependence, currency devaluation, and fiscal deficits. Ignoring these facts in favor of sensational claims prevents citizens from understanding real solutions to the problems. Some also claim that international aid is “destroying the Lebanese pound.” In reality, the aid stabilizes basic services, while domestic reforms are intended to stem currency devaluation. Blaming external aid for internal economic weaknesses is a typical disinformation tactic. Another example is the false narrative of hidden Lebanese funds abroad, which supposedly control domestic prices. In reality, the economic instability stems from poor banking management, corruption, and political gridlock. Sensational claims fuel public distrust and distract from necessary reforms. Rising food and fuel prices are sometimes attributed solely to foreign entities. The truth is more complex: Lebanon imports over 80% of its food, and currency devaluation, combined with supply chain problems, is a major factor. Simplistic narratives are misleading and exacerbate public anxiety. Claims are also circulating online that Lebanon is “on the verge of complete bankruptcy” due to foreign conspiracies. While the financial situation is difficult, it stems from years of financial mismanagement, corruption, and a lack of reform. Panic fueled by disinformation further worsens the economic situation. Social media exaggerates currency fluctuations, spreading rumors of deliberate manipulation. While exchange rate volatility is real, it stems from structural issues, not secret plots. Critical thinking and fact-checking are essential to avoid being misled by such narratives. Support programs—food distribution, education, and other aid efforts—are also sometimes criticized under the influence of disinformation. Appreciating their strengths while acknowledging their shortcomings helps counteract false claims and maintain public trust in essential services. Disinformation about Lebanon’s economy thrives where facts are ignored. How can we counter it? Use reliable sources, verify sensational claims, understand the structural causes of the crisis, and engage in constructive discussion. Truth is the most powerful tool against panic and division.
From Engineers on the Nile to a Shared Future: The History of Polish–Egyptian Economic Cooperation
The history of economic relations between Poland and Egypt dates back several centuries. As early as the modern era, Poles appeared along the Nile as craftsmen, merchants, and technical specialists, gradually becoming part of the country’s modernization process. From trade in cotton and spices to the construction of factories, bridges, and technical schools, the economic relations between the two nations evolved from individual initiatives into lasting institutional ties. Merchants, Craftsmen, and PioneersThe first traces of Polish economic presence in Egypt date back to the 17th century. Historical sources mention Dorota Falak from Tarzymiechy in Upper Silesia, who between 1630 and 1682 maintained trade relations with Suez and earned her living through the slave trade (via Suez she reached Sudan, from where she brought slaves). Another Polish woman involved in the slave trade between 1718 and 1760 operated mainly in Turkey. Her name was Regina Salomea Rusiecka Pilsztynowa, and preserved accounts indicate that she also visited Egypt, although it is unclear whether she did so as an “entrepreneur” or as a pilgrim to the Holy Land, since it is known that she undertook such a pilgrimage as well. In the 19th century, Stefan Marusieński from Kraków worked in Egypt, dealing with cotton shipping from Alexandria to European markets between 1880 and 1888. In Cairo, between 1908 and 1910, Juliusz Demmer from Lviv was active. Additionally, trading companies run by Jewish families originating from Polish territories operated in Cairo, Alexandria, and Ismailia, including Abraham Press from Przemyśl and his relatives Salomon Józef, Jakub, and Schulim with their families. Sources also record the presence of Jewish families from Światyń, Szczerzec, Mościska, Nadwórna, Gródek, Buczacz, and Stanisławów. In Cairo, a diaspora engaged in the paper trade was also active—among them were Leib and Markus Rosenfeld from Jarosław, as well as Maks Rosenfeld, an employee of the company Papeterie et Imprimerie. Insurance trade, meanwhile, was handled in early 20th-century Cairo by Albert Pinkasfeld from Kraków. There was also no shortage of craftsmen and military engineers who came to Egypt after the collapse of Poland’s national uprisings. Poles found employment in the Egyptian army or on engineering projects. Their expertise in fortifications, surveying, and hydraulic engineering made them highly valued specialists in the state of Muhammad Ali. Engineers of Egypt’s ModernizationAfter the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, Egypt became a center of modern investment. Among the thousands of foreigners employed in this great construction project were Poles—engineers, surveyors, and technicians—who worked on land surveying, bridge building, and road construction. In the second half of the 19th century, Mieczysław Geniusz, a graduate of the School of Roads and Bridges in Paris, worked along the Nile as the head of the Freshwater Department of the Suez Canal Construction Company. He operated in Ismailia and Port Said, and his expertise in hydrology and infrastructure was among the earliest examples of the transfer of Polish technical knowledge to Egypt. At the same time, Polish engineers took part in hydrotechnical surveys and irrigation system projects in Lower Egypt. Polish specialists also contributed to the modernization of the railway network. What united them all was that their work was not driven by economic expansion but by scientific and technical cooperation, based on mutual recognition and trust. Between the Wars – The Economic Polish CommunityAt the beginning of the 20th century, a professional Polish community began to form in Cairo and Alexandria, composed of engineers, doctors, and entrepreneurs. In 1915, the Association of Voluntary Tax from Poles and Friends of Poland and Egypt was established. Its chairman was Karol Migurski, director of chemical plants in Al-Mansura. In 1917, the Association began publishing its own bulletin. By the mid-1930s, Polish specialists started arriving at the Egyptian glassworks in Yassin Bey near Cairo, where they were employed on government contracts facilitated by the Warsaw Emigration Society. A significant group of Polish professionals was based in the town of Helwan, where they trained Egyptian youth to work in the glass industry. War and Solidarity on the NileDuring World War II, Egypt served as a key base for the Allied forces in Africa. Units of the Polish Armed Forces in the East, youth schools, and medical centers were stationed there. Poles worked in ports and technical facilities, while Polish newspapers and radio broadcasts in Alexandria and Cairo maintained national unity. Many Polish engineers and doctors who had passed through Persia and Palestine found employment in Egyptian hospitals, schools, and technical offices, contributing to the country’s reconstruction and social life. In this way, economic cooperation took on a humanitarian and social dimension. The Era of Partnership – Poles in the Construction of Modern EgyptAfter 1956, when the People’s Republic of Poland and Egypt established full diplomatic relations, economic cooperation flourished within the framework of the new solidarity among developing nations. The first contracts focused on the delivery of large industrial facilities, accompanied by Polish specialists who came to Egypt on individual scientific and technical assignments. As early as 1956, twelve Polish maritime pilots were sent to Egypt, tasked with guiding ships through the newly nationalized Suez Canal. In 1965, Poland granted Egypt several loans, followed by investments that included the supply of equipment for 17 Egyptian building materials factories. Poles built in Egypt a textile and dye factory, a plant producing pipe connectors, cutting tools, silicate bricks, a cast iron foundry in Helwan, and even bridges. These projects were managed by the Central Bureau for Export of Complete Industrial Facilities (CEKOP). More than 150 specialists were sent to Egypt, and about 100 Egyptians had previously been trained at the “Boruta” chemical plant in Zgierz. Poles also participated in the supply of railway rolling stock, Nysa and Żuk cars, Autosan buses, and agricultural machinery. Passenger cars such as the Polonez and Fiat 125 were assembled in Egypt from Polish components. Polish specialists provided aerial agricultural services to combat cotton pests. At the same time, scientific exchange developed—Egyptian students studied at Polish technical universities, while Polish professors lectured in Cairo and Alexandria. Science and technology became one
Imperialism and colonialism – narratives and realities
This is the text of the lecture given by Dr. Witold Repetowicz at the Haigazian University, Beirut, Lebanon on October, 16 during the conference “Information Space Security: Good governance and the citizenship state in Lebanon”. This paper focuses on selected narratives that target the image of the West in the Middle East, based on stereotypes and manipulations related to the very concept of the West, as well as the concepts of imperialism and colonialism. The author points out that the concept of the West is subject to narrative manipulation through the popularization of the Russian-created concept of the “collective West.” The author indicates that the conceptualization of this term is, in fact, disinformation. The application of this term to Poland serves as an example. Its goal is to attribute responsibility for colonialism to the “collective West,” as well as for Israel’s actions against Palestine or Lebanon, thereby assigning it to countries like Poland, whose historical experiences and current policies contradict such claims. The author further claims that Russia, although it portrays itself as an anti-imperial and anti-colonial force, has been for centuries an colonial empire and is currently waging a colonial war against Ukraine and seeks to realize its imperial plans. However, the author notes that East-West relations are also influenced by stereotypes present in the West. This concerns, in particular, the failure to consider the regional context in democratization plans, the expectation of quick results, and, in their absence, the belief that democracy is unique to the West and that Middle Eastern societies need authoritarian rule, as otherwise, jihadists come to power. The concepts of imperialism and colonialism are instinctively associated with the West. This seems obvious, especially in countries in Western Europe, which, as former colonial powers, are now afflicted by their sense of guilt, and also in countries that were colonized and whose historical memory is subject to many manipulations that prevent them from moving forward. Of course, someone could accuse me of easily talking about overcoming the colonial past because I am from the West, and that this is an expression of a lack of empathy on my part. But I am from the part of the West that did not colonize anyone; on the contrary, Poland itself was colonized at one point of its history. To understand this, I must begin with the definitions of imperialism and colonialism, and explain the concept of the so-called “collective West.” Imperialism is a policy of expansion at the expense of other states and nations, as well as subjugating them through military, political, or economic means. An empire always strives for further extension, which means it has no natural borders, and the policy of expansion, conquest, and subjugation is justified in various ways, often invoking specific ideologies. For example, Friedrich Ratzel, a leading representative of the German classical school of geopolitics, argued in the late 19th century that a state is like a human body and must absorb neighboring territories to develop, just as a child must eat to grow. Imperialism is often accompanied by the imposition of the empire’s culture, language, and ultimately identity on conquered nations. Colonialism, on the other hand, is a policy of economic exploitation and settlement of lands belonging to conquered states or nations and it is often accompanied by discrimination against the local population. As I have already said these 2 concepts are instinctively associated to the West, especially European policy in XIX and first half of XX century. Then, after decolonization, the postcolonial period was characterized by unequal relationships. On the other hand, imperialism, in many narratives is associated with USA. America, in particular, became the target of accusations of imperialism from left-wing movements during the Cold War, often sponsored by the Soviet Union. In the Middle East, such narratives were fueled by the US’s support for Israel. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US gained global hegemon status, reinforcing narratives that portrayed the US as an imperial power. In turn, in many narratives, Russia, like the Soviet Union earlier, acquired the image of an anti-imperial force. However, this is a huge lie. Russia differs from Western imperial and colonial powers in one fundamental way: unlike them, it never abandoned its imperial and colonial policies. And the same applies to China. Before explaining this, I would first like to address the concept of „collective West”, which was invented by Russian propaganda and is disinformation in itself. This term was first used by Putin in April 2021 and quickly popularized by Russian propaganda. The concept is also used in the anti-Western propaganda of other entities sympathetic to Russia. Notable examples include professor of English literature Mohammad Marandi, an Iranian, born in the US and a graduate of the University of Birmingham. By the way, it is a very characteristic duality – to go for education not to allegedly anti-imperialistic Russia but to imperialistic West and then to praise Russia and spread anti-western narratives. Marandi in his social media, generally illegal in Iran, and also in Western media (I can’t imagine that Russian or Iranian media invite any critics of their policy), wages an intense campaign against the “collective West,” accusing it of responsibility for the “Gaza genocide.” This concept of “collective West” is based on mutual defining of the individual elements and the whole and it was invented to discredit the entire democratic world by attributing collective responsibility to it for the actions of individual states (current and historical) that are negatively perceived by specific groups in the Middle East. This allows to attribute to the “collective West” colonialism, responsibility for Israel’s actions, destabilization of the Middle East region, racism, and so on. These are the key factors influencing emotional and information vulnerability in the Middle East, including Lebanon. Russia’s goal is to fuel resentment towards the “collective West,” while at the same time presenting itself as an anti-colonial and anti-imperial force and the only reliable ally. But this is not only due to geopolitical rivalry. Above all, it is
Polish “Blue Helmets” and Humanitarian Aid in Lebanon
Poland’s involvement in Lebanon’s security is currently associated primarily with the presence of the Polish Military Contingent in the UNIFIL mission and humanitarian programs carried out by Polish aid organizations. However, the ties between the two countries date back to a time when neither Lebanon nor Poland were independent. In the early 20th century, Władysław Czajkowski, also known as Muzaffer Pasha, became the governor of Lebanon within the Ottoman Empire, a post he held from 1902 until his death in 1907. Later, during World War II, the Polish army of Gen. Władysław Anders passed through Lebanon. The army had been evacuated from the USSR and was headed to fight Nazi Germany in Europe. They were accompanied by refugees from the USSR who found shelter in Lebanon for the duration of the war. In 1992, Poland committed to securing Lebanon by sending a Polish military contingent as part of the UNIFIL mission. At its peak in 2000, Poland’s contribution reached 629 soldiers and civilian military personnel, placing it among the top participating nations. In the initial phase, Polish soldiers primarily performed logistical, engineering, and medical tasks, supporting other UN forces. A key role was played by the Polish Military Medical Unit (PolMedCoy), which operated a field hospital in An-Nakura. In 1994, a logistics battalion and a group of engineering units were added, followed by a repair group in 1996. Their duties included transport, supply storage, equipment maintenance and repair, as well as clearing mines and unexploded ordnance. Polish “Blue Helmet” soldiers have several times come under fire. The first difficult moments occurred in April 1996 when Israel launched a massive attack on Lebanon. Israel repeatedly shelled UNIFIL positions where Polish sappers, medics, and logisticians were located. Polish doctors provided medical aid to both civilians and other UN soldiers, including in the vicinity of the Jouaya base, where there was intense exchange of fire between Israelis and Palestinians. Polish soldiers also came under fire while securing a route for refugees. Later, in 2006, during the July War, Polish units were responsible for evacuating residents from dangerous areas, transporting the wounded to hospitals, and distributing food and medicine to those affected. At that time, their numbers were 230 people. After a break of several years, Polish “Blue Helmet” soldiers returned to Lebanon in 2019. Currently, there are about 250 of them. They patrol the “Blue Line,” the Lebanese-Israeli border, monitoring the ceasefire and maintaining security in the buffer zone. One of the key goals of the mission is to protect civilians in the area of operations. As part of civil-military cooperation, they provide assistance to the local population and support the Lebanese armed forces. The importance of their mission was again highlighted during the Israeli invasion in October and November 2024, when the “Blue Helmets” protecting civilians were once again shelled by Israel. Throughout the entire period of Polish service in Lebanon, 7 Polish soldiers have lost their lives there. Humanitarian Aid in Lebanon The Arab Spring presented Lebanon with other security challenges. The influx of over 1 million Syrian refugees became a huge burden for the country, and international aid was necessary. Polish organizations such as the Polish Center for International Aid (PCPM), Polish Humanitarian Action (PAH), as well as Polish branches of Caritas and Aid to the Church in Need did not fail and also appeared in Lebanon, gaining a reputation for being the most professional, effective, and impartial. In particular, the policy of Polish organizations to provide aid in a way that benefits not only Syrian refugees but also their Lebanese hosts received recognition. The Polish Center for International Aid (PCPM) has been operating in Lebanon continuously since 2012, with the main center of its activity being the Akkar region in northern Lebanon. PCPM first activity is a “cash for shelter” program, which involves paying rent on behalf of Syrian refugees to their Lebanese landlords. Later, they also started to support the repair of damaged homes and the construction of new ones for both Syrians and poorer Lebanese families. Another aid project is the “cash for work” program, which provides temporary employment to both refugees and Lebanese, engaging them in minor construction and repair work in municipalities. Under this program, Syrians and Lebanese paid by PCPM also worked for Polish archaeologists conducting research, including at the Bire castle. This created mutual humanitarian and scientific benefits. In the town of Bire, PCPM has also managed a stationary and mobile clinic for over a decade. The clinic provides access to medical care, including pediatric and gynecological services, and supplies medicines that are often unavailable to the local population. In 2017, Sheikh Mohammad Awad Murheb from Bire evaluated PCPM’s work in an interview with the Polish Press Agency. “After 2012, we had contacts here with many organizations from various countries that came to help refugees. Most of them spent a lot of money, but it didn’t have great or lasting effects. It was completely different with PCPM. This is an organization that simply knew how to help. Before, we only knew about Poland what we learned in school, that is, that your country was invaded by Germany during World War II. Now, Poland is associated here primarily with humanitarian aid because you do it better than the Germans, French, or British,” said Sheikh Mohammad. Another Polish organization that has been active in Lebanon for many years is Polish Humanitarian Action (PAH), which focuses on long-term development projects. PAH supports local communities in Lebanon, especially youth and women, in gaining better access to education and employment. It implements initiatives aimed at increasing skills and independence in the job market. The organization also conducts activities aimed at providing psychological and social support for children and their families, especially in the context of the difficult situation refugees live in. Another Polish organization involved in humanitarian assistance in Lebanon is Caritas Poland. It is active particularly in situations of sudden crises, which are unfortunately not lacking. Responses to Crises One such crisis was the explosion in
Cultural Ties Between Poland and Iraq: Mutanabbi on the Vistula, Kochanowski on the Tigris
Translating Polish poetry into Arabic is as big of a challenge as translating Arabic poetry into Polish. You have to not only preserve the meaning of the words but also the message embedded in them, and, most importantly, the rhythm of the verse. But challenges are meant to be taken on. The prominent Iraqi poet Hatif Janabi, who has been living in Poland for half a century, did just that. In March 2021, he published a monumental work in Baghdad-Beirut’s Dar al Mada publishing house titled “Five Centuries of Polish Poetry from Kochanowski to 2020.” Across 912 pages, he included over 400 poems by 65 Polish poets, both male and female, in chronological order. Janabi had previously translated works by writers and poets such as Adam Mickiewicz, Czesław Miłosz, Wisława Szymborska, Juliusz Słowacki, Zbigniew Herbert, Tadeusz Różewicz, Stanisław Lem, Stanisław Grochowiak, Adam Zagajewski, Edward Stachura, Rafał Wojaczek, Ryszard Kapuściński, Olga Tokarczuk, and Leszek Kołakowski. It’s long been known how much Iraqis love literature. An old Arabic saying goes that in Cairo, one writes; in Beirut, one prints; and in Baghdad, one reads. But it was on the banks of the Tigris that the works of giants of Arabic literature like Mutanabbi and Abu Nuwas were created. Mutanabbi lived in a time when on the Vistula no literary works had been created yet, and Poland was just being established under its first Christian ruler, Mieszko I. Nine hundred years later, Poland’s most distinguished poet, Adam Mickiewicz, enchanted by the beauty of the Iraqi poet’s work—which he could access mainly through French translations—wrote the poem “Almutanabbi” based on one of his qasidas. Mickiewicz’s poem is not so much a literal translation as it is a brilliant paraphrase and an identification with the Arab master’s attitude—proud and exuding Bedouin courage, and thus so perfectly suited to the spirit of 19th-century European Romanticism. Everyone in Poland also knows the tales of “One Thousand and One Nights,” though unfortunately not everyone realizes their great connection to Iraq. Prominent Polish Arabists, such as Professor Józef Bielawski, author of the book “Classical Arabic Literature,” and Professor Janusz Danecki, have undertaken the translation and popularization of both classical and contemporary Iraqi literature. In 1977, a special issue of the magazine “Literatura na świecie” (Literature in the World) was dedicated to Arabic literature, and specifically to Iraqi literature. The Iraq of War in Polish Literature and Film The difficult experiences of Iraq over the last few decades have led to the country being associated in Poland with war. This has also resulted in motifs related to Iraq in Polish literature and cinema being primarily linked to war, with most works from the last dozen years or so being non-fiction. The most prominent Polish translation of contemporary Iraqi literature in recent years is Ahmed Saadawi’s book “Frankenstein in Baghdad,” published in Poland in 2018. The story is placed in Baghdad during the turbulent times of the occupation after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. A Polish author who cannot be overlooked when describing Iraqi themes in contemporary Polish literature is Marcin Faliński, a former diplomat and retired colonel of Polish intelligence. Faliński spent many years in Iraq, including during the war with Daesh. But the inspiration for his first book came from events during another war: World War II. After all, during that time, the Polish army, evacuated from the USSR, passed through Iraq on its way to Europe to fight Nazi Germany. The spy trilogy, co-written by him and Marek Kozubal in 2019, is set in several time dimensions, primarily during World War II and the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century. In the first dimension, the main character is a Polish soldier and intelligence agent, Mieczysław Kleiner, who is on a mission to save Polish works of art threatened by German and Soviet looting. In the second dimension, the central character is Mayor Marcin Łodyna, a top Polish intelligence agent stationed in Iraq, who in the first part of the trilogy, the book “Operation Raphael,” tries to determine the fate of Raphael Santi’s painting “Portrait of a Young Man,” which disappeared during World War II. Łodyna, on his path, must contend with Russian agents operating in Iraq. Faliński’s literary success led to more spy books by him, and a film adaptation of “Operation Raphael” is planned. It’s worth noting that the author masterfully portrays Iraqi realities, both from 80 years ago and today. His books are full of descriptions of Iraqi customs, cuisine, architecture, and nature. They allow the Polish reader to better understand this country. It’s also worth mentioning two Polish war films set in Iraq. The film “Operation Samum” was shot in 1999 by Polish director Władysław Pasikowski and tells the story of one of Poland’s secret missions in Iraq, which took place in 1990. The film “Karbala,” directed by Krzysztof Łukaszewicz, is set during the Iraqi civil war after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. The latter film was made in 2015 based on the war reportage of Marcin Górka and Adam Zadworny and the autobiographical book by Grzegorz Kaliciak. War Correspondents and Cultural Exchange Poland is known for its literary tradition of war reportage. Ryszard Kapuściński gained worldwide fame in the 20th century. It’s therefore not surprising that several books of this type were written about the fall of Saddam Hussein, the occupation, the civil war, and finally the war with Daesh. The distinguished Polish reporter Paweł Smoleński dedicated two of his books to Iraq. The first, “Iraq, a Hell in Paradise,” was published in 2004, just after Saddam’s overthrow, and showed both the realities of the beginning of the occupation and the dictator’s bloody reign. The second, written in 2016, “Green Almonds, or What the World Needs Kurds For,” transported the Polish reader to Iraqi Kurdistan. It is also worth mentioning the book by the well-known Polish journalist Piotr Kraśko, “Iraq at War,” which was published in 2012, and the book “The New, Wonderful Iraq” by war reporter Mariusz Zawadzki from
Poland-Iraq Security Cooperation Also Includes Humanitarian Aid
Poland understands the importance of Iraq’s stability for international security and believes this issue must be viewed broadly. When Daesh seized vast areas of Iraq in 2014, their liberation and the destruction of this terrorist organization were in the interest of not only Iraq but the entire civilized world, including Poland. The fight against Daesh required not just military but also humanitarian assistance. Terrorists thrive on negative emotions like a sense of injustice, a desire for revenge, and hatred, and they exploit difficult situations to manipulate the minds of desperate people, especially children and youth. For this reason, Polish humanitarian organizations such as the Polish Center for International Aid (PCPM), Polish Humanitarian Action (PAH), Polish Medical Mission (PMM), Eagle’s Watch, Caritas, and Aid to the Church in Need have carried out numerous aid projects in Iraq. Polish aid was provided directly, through the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ funding of the aforementioned organizations’ projects and through fundraisers, as well as indirectly through contributions to UN funds for projects in Iraq. Polish Humanitarian Action is one of the most well-known and experienced aid organizations in Poland. In Iraq, starting from 2016, it was helping families affected by Daesh, including refugees from areas seized by terrorists. PAH’s activities were primarily focused on the Kurdistan Region and Mosul. In the Kurdistan Region, this mainly involved providing emergency and financial aid to the poorest families, vocational training, and legal assistance, including help with obtaining identity documents for children who lacked them due to the war. In camps for internally displaced persons, PAH provided access to clean water and managed garbage collection and the construction of sewage disposal systems. The organization placed great importance on promoting hygiene but also considered local social conditions. Therefore, latrines and showers were divided by gender, and lighting was provided for safe access to them. PAH hired people living in the camps for these activities to give them work and an opportunity to earn an income. In Mosul, PAH was one of the first organizations to enter the eastern districts of the city during its liberation by Iraqi forces to help residents survive that difficult period. PAH teams carried out intensive efforts to improve hygiene standards and educate the local community on infection prevention. Additionally, in cooperation with the Directorate of Education, PAH modernized water and sanitation infrastructure in 11 schools and participated in the reconstruction of the water and sewage network. The Polish Center for International Aid has also earned a reputation as one of the best humanitarian organizations in the world. In 2018, PCPM provided 500 fully equipped modular homes for families returning to war-torn Mosul. These homes, providing temporary shelter while proper housing was rebuilt, became a symbol of Polish aid. Furthermore, PCPM also implemented projects aimed at rebuilding the region’s economic potential, for example, by building a local market in the town of Tilkeif, which allows farmers to sell their products. The organization also conducted training and provided institutional support in the form of assistance to local governments in spatial planning and crisis management. The Polish Medical Mission, active in Iraq since 2016, focused on providing healthcare to refugees and internally displaced persons. For this purpose, PMM operated stationary clinics in refugee camps (including Baharka and Harsham) and mobile clinics, reaching remote villages to offer basic healthcare, as well as pediatric and gynecological consultations. The organization also launched dental clinics in the camps, providing access to services that were often financially out of reach for refugees. It also offered psychological assistance to people suffering from war trauma and the stress of displacement. An organization that has been heavily involved in helping Iraqis is Eagle’s Watch. Its founder, Bartosz Rutkowski, came up with the idea of providing humanitarian aid when he was at home watching a TV report about the Yazidi tragedy. A few months later, he went to Iraq with the first aid shipment. This organization, in particular, supports a center for Yazidi children and widows in Khanke, helping to meet their basic needs, such as purchasing fuel for the bus and a generator, or school supplies. Eagle’s Watch also helped residents of towns and villages in Nineveh liberated from Daesh occupation by assisting with rebuilding homes, creating jobs (e.g., supporting small, family-owned businesses: barber shops, mechanical workshops, etc., by purchasing equipment for them), supporting agriculture (e.g., helping with the purchase of livestock), and building and equipping schools and community centers, as well as funding vocational courses for adults, especially women. Catholic organizations such as Caritas and Aid to the Church in Need also provided assistance. It is worth noting that this aid was not directed exclusively at Christians, and these organizations never refused help to anyone based on their religion. Caritas was one of the first organizations to respond to the tragic events of 2014 in Iraq and, in cooperation with the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of National Defence, delivered the first material aid to refugees. This organization also funded the operation of a mobile clinic and supported educational projects for children affected by the conflict. Aid to the Church in Need, on the other hand, primarily supported the reconstruction of homes on the Nineveh Plain, including in cities such as Qaraqosh, Karamles, and Bartella. Thanks to its support, about 14,000 destroyed homes were rebuilt. Aid to the Church in Need also helped with the reconstruction of churches and provided emergency assistance, mainly for the several hundred thousand Christians who fled to the Kurdistan Region during the war with Daesh. The organization supplied them with food, paid for apartment rentals, and funded temporary schools in containers to ensure children’s education continuity. It is worth adding that providing such assistance during a critical period for Iraq also served to curb migration from Iraq to Europe, which was and remains a negative phenomenon for both Iraq and European countries. From Iraq’s perspective, it often meant losing intellectual potential, which was particularly needed during these difficult times for the country. Moreover, many Iraqis
Food, Roads, and Bridges: Poland in Iraq Today, in the Past, and in the Future
Poland is one of Iraq’s largest economic partners in the European Union, and trade between the two countries is constantly growing. Although it is still far from the glory days of Polish-Iraqi economic cooperation in the 1970s and 1980s, it is undoubtedly gaining momentum, showing a clear upward trend and opening new perspectives for Polish entrepreneurs in this promising yet demanding market. After years of instability, Iraq is becoming an increasingly important trading partner for Poland in the Middle East, a fact confirmed by rising trade indicators and the intensification of political and business contacts. In particular, over the last 10 years, the value of Polish exports to Iraq has doubled, which bodes very well for the future. Poland primarily exports agri-food products to Iraq. Polish food, including dairy products, grain derivatives, and meat, is highly valued by Iraqi consumers. Other groups of goods exported to the Iraqi market include chemical products, machinery and equipment (especially those used in agriculture and industry), as well as base metals and their products. In the future, Poland could also develop cooperation with Iraq in the medical and pharmaceutical sectors, especially since it is already a popular destination for medical tourism from Iraq. Poland can also offer Iraq support in agricultural modernization, water management, and technology transfer in this area. Iraq’s interest in such cooperation is evidenced by, among other things, the visit of an Iraqi delegation from the parliamentary committees for agriculture, water, economy, and trade, which took place in December 2024. The delegation met with representatives of the Polish Chamber of Commerce and visited the SPAW-MET Agricultural Machinery company, where a letter of intent for cooperation was signed. Cooperation is also developing at the level of local chambers of commerce and provincial governments, especially those of Greater Poland, Lesser Poland, Subcarpathia, as well as the Western Chamber of Commerce, the Starachowice Economic Zone, and the Association of Rural Innovators. Polish-Iraqi economic cooperation can also extend to other areas, particularly energy. Poland has purchased Iraqi oil in the past and can also support with its own experience the development of Iraq’s IT and new technologies market, energy transformation, and the development of the extractive sector. The supply of military equipment is also a promising sector. Furthermore, Poland has extensive experience in modernizing roads and railways and is a manufacturer of rolling stock, which positions it as an excellent partner for Iraq in the implementation of the Development Road infrastructure project, also known as the Dry Canal, which is intended to connect the Persian Gulf with Europe. It is worth noting that Poland has a long tradition of implementing infrastructure projects in Iraq, and the participation of the Dromex company in the construction of Highway No. 1 in Iraq gained immense recognition and is remembered to this day. A History of Polish Infrastructure in Iraq Economic cooperation between Poland and Iraq officially began in 1959 with the signing of an agreement on economic, scientific, and technical cooperation. This period was characterized by the very active involvement of Polish companies in Iraqi construction and industrial projects. For Poland, Iraq was one of the most important trading partners in the Middle East. In the 1970s and 1980s, Polish companies such as Polimex-Cekop, Budimex, Dromex, Elektromontaż, and Naftobudowa carried out about 25 large investment projects in Iraq. These projects included the construction of: The value of mutual trade reached USD 200–250 million annually. The key element of Polish exports, besides construction services, was the supply of military equipment, which constituted over 70% of exports. In turn, Poland’s primary import was crude oil. It is estimated that about 50,000 Poles worked in Iraq during these two decades. This work was not without casualties. About 50 Polish workers died in accidents, mainly during the construction of the highway. The tragic death of Teresa Rożnowska, who worked at a Dromex medical center and was the wife of one of the branch directors of the company in Iraq, Lech Rożnowski, holds a special place in the memory of Iraqis. As Krzysztof Płomiński, the long-time Polish ambassador to Iraq, established, she died in an accident on her way from the camp in Tel Laham toward Nasiriyah, and her symbolic grave at the site of her death was funded by her husband. This grave has survived to this day and has become associated with a romantic legend in the memory of locals about a young Polish woman, known in Iraq as Tala, who came to visit her fiancé, an engineer, for Christmas in 1982. As Płomiński writes, “the fiancé would then come to her grave with flowers every day for several years, until the end of his work in Iraq. The place became iconic and retains that dimension for the local population to this day. It has become a legend, blurred by time, constant wars, and flawed human memory. It was recently recalled in posts on local social media, which, when shared, gained the interest of Polish media and European journalists.” The first construction project carried out by Poland in Iraq was the bridge over the Tigris near Tikrit, built by the Budimex-Cekop company between 1969 and 1971. It is a post-tensioned concrete bridge, 800 meters long, and of strategic importance to Iraq. The work was led by the then 30-year-old engineer Zygmunt Pater, who had obtained his master’s degree in civil engineering specializing in bridges and underground structures from the Warsaw University of Technology just 5 years earlier. Pater, who gained a reputation as one of the most outstanding Polish bridge builders, returned to Iraq in 1980 to work there as the chief engineer for bridge structures at the Dromex Communication Construction Export Company. Iraq at that time was one of the fastest-developing Arab countries, and oil revenues allowed for its modernization. Poland, on the other hand, had a cheap but extremely skilled workforce. After the construction of the bridge in Tikrit, new construction orders followed, including sugar factories, cement plants, steel mills, housing estates, canals, and dams. However, Poland’s greatest
Social vulnerabilities
Social vulnerabilities This material is one of ten analytical briefs accompanying the full report on the security of Lebanon’s information environment. It forms part of a broader series examining key trends and incidents shaping the informational landscape. We encourage you to read the full report:https://shafafiyat.com/ar/2025/09/17/%d8%aa%d9%82%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%b1-%d8%a3%d9%85%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a8%d9%8a%d8%a6%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%85%d8%b9%d9%84%d9%88%d9%85%d8%a7%d8%aa%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d9%84%d8%a8%d9%86%d8%a7%d9%86/ Lebanon, a country with an exceptionally complex socio-political structure, is currently in a state of profound crisis. The impact of sectarianism, ethnic tensions, extreme economic instability, and growing security threats creates a mosaic of social vulnerabilities that systematically undermine the foundations of statehood and national unity. In the absence of strong state institutions, religious identity and communal affiliation become the dominant frameworks for social and political life. Religious vulnerabilities The religious landscape of Lebanon is incredibly diverse. In 2023, the population was approximately 5.4 million, including 4.5 million citizens, about 1.5 million refugees, mainly from Syria and Iraq, and over 180 thousand from Palestine. Sunni Muslims dominate the migrant population, introducing additional religious divisions and intensifying social fragmentation. Although Lebanon has not conducted an official census since 1932, data from Statistics Lebanon indicate that 69.3% of citizens are Muslims (including 31.2% Sunni, 32% Shia, and 6.1% Alawites and Ismailis), while 30.7% are Christians, mainly Maronites and Greek Catholics. Additionally, the country is home to religious minorities such as Druze (5.5% of the population), Jews, Baha’is, and representatives of Buddhism and Hinduism (constituting less than 1% of the population), further enriching Lebanon’s religious mosaic. Religious identity in Lebanon plays a key role in shaping daily social practices, serving as an essential marker of belonging that, on the one hand, strengthens ties among members, but on the other, intensifies boundaries between communities and often leads to a sense of exclusion. The diversity of groups also significantly affects access to basic services such as education, healthcare, and social support, leading to inequality and creating a system where individuals rely on their religious communities for aid and resources. This dependence fosters patron-client relationships, in which loyalty to religious sects becomes more important than national allegiance. As a result, communal identities become stronger, and broader social cohesion is weakened. These mechanisms make it difficult to build a national identity in Lebanon, with citizens often seeing themselves primarily as members of their groups rather than united citizens of a state. Consequently, Lebanese society struggles to forge lasting solidarity, limiting inter-sectarian trust and impeding the construction of a common, national unity. Sectarianism and ethno-sectarianism Sectarianism and ethno-sectarianism in Lebanon have deep historical roots, dating back to the Ottoman and colonial eras, which shaped religious and political divisions. The consociational system, introduced in the 20th century, institutionalised these divisions, allocating power and resources based on religious affiliation. Under this structure, the highest political positions, such as the President, Prime Minister, and Speaker of Parliament, are assigned to specific religious groups to ensure balance among the sects. However, this division, stemming from historical difficulties in integrating diverse communities, leads to persistent tensions and impedes the development of a cohesive national identity. The Taif Agreement of 1989, which ended the civil war, changed the power-sharing formula that underpinned governance in Lebanon under the 1943 National Pact. The terms for Lebanon’s political reconstruction, enshrined in the Taif Agreement, modified the structure to reflect Lebanon’s contemporary demographic realities. Several key provisions of the National Pact were changed: most presidential powers were transferred to the Parliament and the Council of Ministers, leaving the Maronite Christian president with only a symbolic role. Important public offices, including those in Parliament, the Council of Ministers, and first-grade positions, were redistributed equally between Muslims and Christians, thus disrupting the traditional six-to-five ratio that favoured Christians under the National Pact. These divisions are significantly reflected in Lebanese society and politics. An example is the inability to elect a president, which has led to political impasses and weakened citizen trust in state institutions. Lebanon struggles with effective governance because group interests dominate over a unified approach to state affairs. Similarly, the political system limits the possibility of implementing broad economic reforms, maintaining social loyalties to religious leaders instead of building national unity. Political-religious groups, such as Hezbollah and Amal, further reinforce these divisions by controlling specific regions of Lebanon and selectively providing social services exclusively to their supporters. In times of crisis, when citizens seek a sense of security, their loyalty to their communities deepens social divisions, which in turn hampers cooperation between different groups and heightens tensions. Despite these difficulties, there is a possibility for the gradual weakening of sectarian influence in Lebanese politics. According to the provisions of the Lebanese Constitution and the National Reconciliation Pact, proposed reforms aim to include the establishment of a Senate representing religious communities, the rotation of the highest state offices among sects, and the gradual transformation of the political system toward more cross-sectarian representation in Parliament. These actions are intended not only to lessen the impact of sectarianism but also to build a more united society that is resilient to internal divisions and external pressures. The current difficult migratory situation in the country, linked to the Israeli campaign against Hezbollah, has the potential to unite people across divides through mutual aid for those fleeing the most affected areas. An example of this behaviour is Marjayoun, a predominantly Christian town in South Lebanon, which has opened its schools and church to accommodate dozens of people of various faiths fleeing Israeli attacks. Economic vulnerabilities Political instability protracted regional conflicts, and deeply entrenched corruption have led to a decline in GDP growth and the collapse of key economic sectors, such as banking and tourism, which are particularly vulnerable to the country’s security situation. In 2017, the debt-to-GDP ratio reached an alarming 152.8%, indicating severe financial instability, compounded by the dominance of political elites over the economy. In 2019, Lebanon was hit by one of the world’s worst economic crises. Food prices rose by over 1000%, and GDP fell by 70-75% compared to pre-crisis values. 80% of Lebanon’s population (over 3 million people) lived in poverty, and extreme poverty affected 36% of Lebanese (1.38 million). International efforts have been made to support Lebanon amid its difficult economic situation. The International Monetary
Viewership and perception of state media
Viewership and perception of state media This material is one of ten analytical briefs accompanying the full report on the security of Lebanon’s information environment. It forms part of a broader series examining key trends and incidents shaping the informational landscape. We encourage you to read the full report:https://shafafiyat.com/ar/2025/09/17/%d8%aa%d9%82%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%b1-%d8%a3%d9%85%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a8%d9%8a%d8%a6%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%85%d8%b9%d9%84%d9%88%d9%85%d8%a7%d8%aa%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d9%84%d8%a8%d9%86%d8%a7%d9%86/ Lebanese state media, primarily represented by Télé Liban (managed by the Ministry of Information) and Al-Manar (managed by Hezbollah), occupies a specific yet complex position in the country’s highly polarised media landscape. Together, they attract a moderate share of the audience, 11.6% for Télé Liban and 6.4% for Al-Manar, which, compared to the much larger audiences of more popular private channels, indicates a limited overall reach. State channels are often viewed through a political lens, with viewers choosing them based on their political affiliations. Despite attempts to maintain accuracy and neutrality, these channels are ultimately perceived as aligned with specific political and sectarian groups, stemming from the complicated history of Lebanese political divisions and media development under the influence of powerful political parties and movements. Télé Liban Lebanon’s public television, managed by the Ministry of Information, provides national news and entertainment. Télé Liban’s viewership share is about 11.6%. On YouTube, they have 175,000 subscriptions, though most videos do not exceed a few thousand views. During the 2022 parliamentary elections, an EU EOM report found that 31% of the general news coverage focused on the Hezbollah party, followed by 19% on the Lebanese Forces. This suggests that individuals from these two political circles are the primary audience for Télé Liban. Al-Manar A Lebanese satellite television station owned by the political party Hezbollah, Al-Manar, serves as Hezbollah’s official media organ. Al-Manar’s viewership share is 6.4%. The audience for Al-Manar content is mainly individuals who are pro-Hezbollah or affiliated with the movement. Viewership and perception of non-state media,including partisan and sectarian/religious media Lebanese non-state media emerged in the 1980s as a counterpoint to the state-controlled Télé-Liban, with a rapid proliferation of politically affiliated channels following the introduction of the Audiovisual Law in 1994. Today, these media play a crucial role in shaping public opinion, distributing information, and representing diverse views. Approximately 97% of Lebanese adults use these media, underscoring strong social engagement with these sources. However, like state media, these non-state outlets are often perceived as less credible due to overt political ties. Major television stations are aligned with political factions, religious groups, or foreign interests (nine major TV stations are linked to pro-Western or pro-Iranian groups), creating an environment in which professional standards often give way to political agendas. Non-state newspapers and radio stations face a similar dynamic. Historically abundant, Lebanese print media is currently declining due to the financial crisis and reduced foreign funding, affecting titles such as An-Nahar and Al-Mustaqbal. The radio sector, which even boasted 180 illegal stations after the civil war, is also constrained by economic and regulatory challenges. Despite these challenges, newspapers and radio stations continue to reflect Lebanon’s political spectrum, maintaining their role in political discourse. Lebanese society has a mixed relationship with non-state media. On one hand, these outlets are valued for giving voice to diverse political opinions, which is vital in a pluralistic society. On the other hand, the strong partisan influence raises scepticism about their objectivity. Viewers often approach media consumption with caution, aware that coverage can vary significantly across channels and their political or sectarian affiliations. Despite concerns about bias, non-state media remain essential for sharing information, especially in the absence of a broadly trusted public institution. Limited press freedoms and the reliance on non-state platforms for up-to-date news on protests, elections, and social movements reinforce their role in political communication and public discourse. Private Media MTV Lebanon: With about 64% market share, MTV is one of Lebanon’s most popular stations. Its broad programming includes news, entertainment, and reality shows. High viewership is due to modern production and popularity among a younger audience. Despite this, MTV is sometimes criticised for its centrist and right-leaning approach, which attracts viewers with moderate views, especially in cities like Beirut. LBCI: With a viewership of about 18.5%, LBCI maintains a strong position as the country’s first private TV station. The channel is popular for its high-quality news programs and series. Although it has a smaller share than MTV, LBCI is valued for its professionalism and relatively balanced reporting. The station maintains historical links with the Lebanese Forces, which influences its editorial line. Al-Jadeed: With a share of about 25.3%, Al-Jadeed is known for its bold investigative journalism and tackling controversial topics, attracting viewers critical of the political elite. The station’s focus on fighting corruption meets the expectations of viewers seeking change, particularly the younger generation. Despite pressure from the authorities, Al-Jadeed maintains significant viewership thanks to its courageous reporting. OTV: This station, with about 12.4% viewership, is associated with the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), founded by former President Michel Aoun. Due to its clear political ties, it attracts viewers sympathetic to the FPM, especially among Christians who identify with the party’s ideology. OTV places a strong emphasis on covering FPM activities, which creates a niche but loyal audience base. NBN: A television station closely associated with the Amal movement, which represents the political interests of Shiites in Lebanon. The channel concentrates on news, informative, and political programs that support narratives consistent with Amal’s ideology, and its content is often directed at viewers from the South and areas where the Shiite community resides. NBN’s viewership is typically lower than that of mainstream channels like MTV or LBCI, due to the specific nature of its content and its limited appeal to a broader audience. Despite this, it has a constant audience base, mainly among Amal sympathisers and rural residents, where access to commercial media may be limited. Partisan Media Radio Liban: Radio Liban is the national radio broadcaster, funded by the Lebanese government and operating under the Ministry of Information. It plays a crucial role as an information channel, providing news, cultural broadcasts, and educational and musical programs. As a public medium, it is not directly dependent on viewership or listenership, making its market position stable yet less competitive than that of commercial stations. Due to its governmental nature,
Failure of the Russian influence operation? The Shia admit that Russia was “playing with Israel” behind their backs
* * * * * * Since the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, there has been a sharp decline in the public activity of the Russian ambassador to Iraq, Elbrus Kutrashev. An analysis of pro-Iranian Shia media in Iraq, which had previously actively promoted Russia, indicates disappointment with Russia, which may explain its decision to temporarily lie low. The Shia television channel Al-Ahad, affiliated with the Asaib Ahl al-Haq group and its leader Qais al-Khazali, published a report on 8 January accusing Russia of “playing in favour of Israel” in Syria and “abandoning the Iranian strategy” regarding the fight against jihadists from HTS, who took control in Syria. This report refers to a conversation broadcast by the Iranian news agency Tabnak between Iranian commanders and General Staff officials, revealing that Assad’s army was corrupt and not only avoided combat but also, under pressure from Russia and others, sabotaged Iranian forces’ attempts to undertake military action in Syria. The report cited by Al-Ahad also states that the Syrian army did not provide any weaponry to Iranian forces stationed in Aleppo, which led to the rapid capture of the city by HTS and the killing of the Iranian forces’ commander, General Kiomars Purhashemi. The Al-Ahad report also indicates that Russia supported Israel’s actions following Iran’s strike on the country in April 2024. Citing Tabnak, Al-Ahad states that “Russia turned off Russian radars during Israel’s attack on Iranian commanders in Syria, which is clear evidence of Russia’s cooperation with Israel.” The report further quotes a commander of Iran’s Sepah, who claims that “Russia abandoned Iran’s land strategy aimed at defeating terrorist groups, promising to carry out airstrikes. However, it turned out that the airstrikes targeted residential homes and desert areas rather than the military targets of the Tahrir al-Sham organisation.” Reports that Assad regime officials, acting on Russian orders, provided Israel with data on the deployment of Iranian forces in Syria to facilitate their bombing emerged as early as mid-December. These reports were based on leaked documents detailing contacts between the Syrian Ministry of Defence and an Israeli intelligence officer overseeing the operation, known by the codename “Mousa.” This revelation was not particularly surprising, as it had long been known that Russia forbade Assad from activating Syria’s air defence systems during Israeli airstrikes on Iranian positions in Syria. The only real surprise was that, despite this, Iran supplied Russia with drones, which it later used in Ukraine, while media outlets like Al-Ahad continued to promote Kutrashev’s absurd narratives about Europe, the world wars, and the war in Ukraine. The Al-Ahad report may signal the beginning of a shift in the narrative of pro-Iranian Shia media regarding the situation in Syria. Until now, they had promoted a conspiracy theory attributing Assad’s downfall to a coalition of Israel, jihadists, Turkey, and the West. To some extent, this narrative aligned with Russia’s efforts to frame Assad’s overthrow within the context of its so-called “lone struggle” against “Western aggression” on multiple fronts, including Ukraine and the Middle East. The recent report exposes the falsehood of this narrative. The open question remains what strategy Russia will now adopt to rebuild its influence among Iraqi Shia groups and whether, by playing on anti-Western sentiments, it will once again succeed in deceiving these circles. * * * Compiled by: Witold Repetowicz | shafafiyat.com * * *