Polish “Blue Helmets” and Humanitarian Aid in Lebanon
Poland’s involvement in Lebanon’s security is currently associated primarily with the presence of the Polish Military Contingent in the UNIFIL mission and humanitarian programs carried out by Polish aid organizations. However, the ties between the two countries date back to a time when neither Lebanon nor Poland were independent. In the early 20th century, Władysław Czajkowski, also known as Muzaffer Pasha, became the governor of Lebanon within the Ottoman Empire, a post he held from 1902 until his death in 1907. Later, during World War II, the Polish army of Gen. Władysław Anders passed through Lebanon. The army had been evacuated from the USSR and was headed to fight Nazi Germany in Europe. They were accompanied by refugees from the USSR who found shelter in Lebanon for the duration of the war. In 1992, Poland committed to securing Lebanon by sending a Polish military contingent as part of the UNIFIL mission. At its peak in 2000, Poland’s contribution reached 629 soldiers and civilian military personnel, placing it among the top participating nations. In the initial phase, Polish soldiers primarily performed logistical, engineering, and medical tasks, supporting other UN forces. A key role was played by the Polish Military Medical Unit (PolMedCoy), which operated a field hospital in An-Nakura. In 1994, a logistics battalion and a group of engineering units were added, followed by a repair group in 1996. Their duties included transport, supply storage, equipment maintenance and repair, as well as clearing mines and unexploded ordnance. Polish “Blue Helmet” soldiers have several times come under fire. The first difficult moments occurred in April 1996 when Israel launched a massive attack on Lebanon. Israel repeatedly shelled UNIFIL positions where Polish sappers, medics, and logisticians were located. Polish doctors provided medical aid to both civilians and other UN soldiers, including in the vicinity of the Jouaya base, where there was intense exchange of fire between Israelis and Palestinians. Polish soldiers also came under fire while securing a route for refugees. Later, in 2006, during the July War, Polish units were responsible for evacuating residents from dangerous areas, transporting the wounded to hospitals, and distributing food and medicine to those affected. At that time, their numbers were 230 people. After a break of several years, Polish “Blue Helmet” soldiers returned to Lebanon in 2019. Currently, there are about 250 of them. They patrol the “Blue Line,” the Lebanese-Israeli border, monitoring the ceasefire and maintaining security in the buffer zone. One of the key goals of the mission is to protect civilians in the area of operations. As part of civil-military cooperation, they provide assistance to the local population and support the Lebanese armed forces. The importance of their mission was again highlighted during the Israeli invasion in October and November 2024, when the “Blue Helmets” protecting civilians were once again shelled by Israel. Throughout the entire period of Polish service in Lebanon, 7 Polish soldiers have lost their lives there. Humanitarian Aid in Lebanon The Arab Spring presented Lebanon with other security challenges. The influx of over 1 million Syrian refugees became a huge burden for the country, and international aid was necessary. Polish organizations such as the Polish Center for International Aid (PCPM), Polish Humanitarian Action (PAH), as well as Polish branches of Caritas and Aid to the Church in Need did not fail and also appeared in Lebanon, gaining a reputation for being the most professional, effective, and impartial. In particular, the policy of Polish organizations to provide aid in a way that benefits not only Syrian refugees but also their Lebanese hosts received recognition. The Polish Center for International Aid (PCPM) has been operating in Lebanon continuously since 2012, with the main center of its activity being the Akkar region in northern Lebanon. PCPM first activity is a “cash for shelter” program, which involves paying rent on behalf of Syrian refugees to their Lebanese landlords. Later, they also started to support the repair of damaged homes and the construction of new ones for both Syrians and poorer Lebanese families. Another aid project is the “cash for work” program, which provides temporary employment to both refugees and Lebanese, engaging them in minor construction and repair work in municipalities. Under this program, Syrians and Lebanese paid by PCPM also worked for Polish archaeologists conducting research, including at the Bire castle. This created mutual humanitarian and scientific benefits. In the town of Bire, PCPM has also managed a stationary and mobile clinic for over a decade. The clinic provides access to medical care, including pediatric and gynecological services, and supplies medicines that are often unavailable to the local population. In 2017, Sheikh Mohammad Awad Murheb from Bire evaluated PCPM’s work in an interview with the Polish Press Agency. “After 2012, we had contacts here with many organizations from various countries that came to help refugees. Most of them spent a lot of money, but it didn’t have great or lasting effects. It was completely different with PCPM. This is an organization that simply knew how to help. Before, we only knew about Poland what we learned in school, that is, that your country was invaded by Germany during World War II. Now, Poland is associated here primarily with humanitarian aid because you do it better than the Germans, French, or British,” said Sheikh Mohammad. Another Polish organization that has been active in Lebanon for many years is Polish Humanitarian Action (PAH), which focuses on long-term development projects. PAH supports local communities in Lebanon, especially youth and women, in gaining better access to education and employment. It implements initiatives aimed at increasing skills and independence in the job market. The organization also conducts activities aimed at providing psychological and social support for children and their families, especially in the context of the difficult situation refugees live in. Another Polish organization involved in humanitarian assistance in Lebanon is Caritas Poland. It is active particularly in situations of sudden crises, which are unfortunately not lacking. Responses to Crises One such crisis was the explosion in
Cultural Ties Between Poland and Iraq: Mutanabbi on the Vistula, Kochanowski on the Tigris
Translating Polish poetry into Arabic is as big of a challenge as translating Arabic poetry into Polish. You have to not only preserve the meaning of the words but also the message embedded in them, and, most importantly, the rhythm of the verse. But challenges are meant to be taken on. The prominent Iraqi poet Hatif Janabi, who has been living in Poland for half a century, did just that. In March 2021, he published a monumental work in Baghdad-Beirut’s Dar al Mada publishing house titled “Five Centuries of Polish Poetry from Kochanowski to 2020.” Across 912 pages, he included over 400 poems by 65 Polish poets, both male and female, in chronological order. Janabi had previously translated works by writers and poets such as Adam Mickiewicz, Czesław Miłosz, Wisława Szymborska, Juliusz Słowacki, Zbigniew Herbert, Tadeusz Różewicz, Stanisław Lem, Stanisław Grochowiak, Adam Zagajewski, Edward Stachura, Rafał Wojaczek, Ryszard Kapuściński, Olga Tokarczuk, and Leszek Kołakowski. It’s long been known how much Iraqis love literature. An old Arabic saying goes that in Cairo, one writes; in Beirut, one prints; and in Baghdad, one reads. But it was on the banks of the Tigris that the works of giants of Arabic literature like Mutanabbi and Abu Nuwas were created. Mutanabbi lived in a time when on the Vistula no literary works had been created yet, and Poland was just being established under its first Christian ruler, Mieszko I. Nine hundred years later, Poland’s most distinguished poet, Adam Mickiewicz, enchanted by the beauty of the Iraqi poet’s work—which he could access mainly through French translations—wrote the poem “Almutanabbi” based on one of his qasidas. Mickiewicz’s poem is not so much a literal translation as it is a brilliant paraphrase and an identification with the Arab master’s attitude—proud and exuding Bedouin courage, and thus so perfectly suited to the spirit of 19th-century European Romanticism. Everyone in Poland also knows the tales of “One Thousand and One Nights,” though unfortunately not everyone realizes their great connection to Iraq. Prominent Polish Arabists, such as Professor Józef Bielawski, author of the book “Classical Arabic Literature,” and Professor Janusz Danecki, have undertaken the translation and popularization of both classical and contemporary Iraqi literature. In 1977, a special issue of the magazine “Literatura na świecie” (Literature in the World) was dedicated to Arabic literature, and specifically to Iraqi literature. The Iraq of War in Polish Literature and Film The difficult experiences of Iraq over the last few decades have led to the country being associated in Poland with war. This has also resulted in motifs related to Iraq in Polish literature and cinema being primarily linked to war, with most works from the last dozen years or so being non-fiction. The most prominent Polish translation of contemporary Iraqi literature in recent years is Ahmed Saadawi’s book “Frankenstein in Baghdad,” published in Poland in 2018. The story is placed in Baghdad during the turbulent times of the occupation after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. A Polish author who cannot be overlooked when describing Iraqi themes in contemporary Polish literature is Marcin Faliński, a former diplomat and retired colonel of Polish intelligence. Faliński spent many years in Iraq, including during the war with Daesh. But the inspiration for his first book came from events during another war: World War II. After all, during that time, the Polish army, evacuated from the USSR, passed through Iraq on its way to Europe to fight Nazi Germany. The spy trilogy, co-written by him and Marek Kozubal in 2019, is set in several time dimensions, primarily during World War II and the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century. In the first dimension, the main character is a Polish soldier and intelligence agent, Mieczysław Kleiner, who is on a mission to save Polish works of art threatened by German and Soviet looting. In the second dimension, the central character is Mayor Marcin Łodyna, a top Polish intelligence agent stationed in Iraq, who in the first part of the trilogy, the book “Operation Raphael,” tries to determine the fate of Raphael Santi’s painting “Portrait of a Young Man,” which disappeared during World War II. Łodyna, on his path, must contend with Russian agents operating in Iraq. Faliński’s literary success led to more spy books by him, and a film adaptation of “Operation Raphael” is planned. It’s worth noting that the author masterfully portrays Iraqi realities, both from 80 years ago and today. His books are full of descriptions of Iraqi customs, cuisine, architecture, and nature. They allow the Polish reader to better understand this country. It’s also worth mentioning two Polish war films set in Iraq. The film “Operation Samum” was shot in 1999 by Polish director Władysław Pasikowski and tells the story of one of Poland’s secret missions in Iraq, which took place in 1990. The film “Karbala,” directed by Krzysztof Łukaszewicz, is set during the Iraqi civil war after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. The latter film was made in 2015 based on the war reportage of Marcin Górka and Adam Zadworny and the autobiographical book by Grzegorz Kaliciak. War Correspondents and Cultural Exchange Poland is known for its literary tradition of war reportage. Ryszard Kapuściński gained worldwide fame in the 20th century. It’s therefore not surprising that several books of this type were written about the fall of Saddam Hussein, the occupation, the civil war, and finally the war with Daesh. The distinguished Polish reporter Paweł Smoleński dedicated two of his books to Iraq. The first, “Iraq, a Hell in Paradise,” was published in 2004, just after Saddam’s overthrow, and showed both the realities of the beginning of the occupation and the dictator’s bloody reign. The second, written in 2016, “Green Almonds, or What the World Needs Kurds For,” transported the Polish reader to Iraqi Kurdistan. It is also worth mentioning the book by the well-known Polish journalist Piotr Kraśko, “Iraq at War,” which was published in 2012, and the book “The New, Wonderful Iraq” by war reporter Mariusz Zawadzki from
Poland-Iraq Security Cooperation Also Includes Humanitarian Aid
Poland understands the importance of Iraq’s stability for international security and believes this issue must be viewed broadly. When Daesh seized vast areas of Iraq in 2014, their liberation and the destruction of this terrorist organization were in the interest of not only Iraq but the entire civilized world, including Poland. The fight against Daesh required not just military but also humanitarian assistance. Terrorists thrive on negative emotions like a sense of injustice, a desire for revenge, and hatred, and they exploit difficult situations to manipulate the minds of desperate people, especially children and youth. For this reason, Polish humanitarian organizations such as the Polish Center for International Aid (PCPM), Polish Humanitarian Action (PAH), Polish Medical Mission (PMM), Eagle’s Watch, Caritas, and Aid to the Church in Need have carried out numerous aid projects in Iraq. Polish aid was provided directly, through the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ funding of the aforementioned organizations’ projects and through fundraisers, as well as indirectly through contributions to UN funds for projects in Iraq. Polish Humanitarian Action is one of the most well-known and experienced aid organizations in Poland. In Iraq, starting from 2016, it was helping families affected by Daesh, including refugees from areas seized by terrorists. PAH’s activities were primarily focused on the Kurdistan Region and Mosul. In the Kurdistan Region, this mainly involved providing emergency and financial aid to the poorest families, vocational training, and legal assistance, including help with obtaining identity documents for children who lacked them due to the war. In camps for internally displaced persons, PAH provided access to clean water and managed garbage collection and the construction of sewage disposal systems. The organization placed great importance on promoting hygiene but also considered local social conditions. Therefore, latrines and showers were divided by gender, and lighting was provided for safe access to them. PAH hired people living in the camps for these activities to give them work and an opportunity to earn an income. In Mosul, PAH was one of the first organizations to enter the eastern districts of the city during its liberation by Iraqi forces to help residents survive that difficult period. PAH teams carried out intensive efforts to improve hygiene standards and educate the local community on infection prevention. Additionally, in cooperation with the Directorate of Education, PAH modernized water and sanitation infrastructure in 11 schools and participated in the reconstruction of the water and sewage network. The Polish Center for International Aid has also earned a reputation as one of the best humanitarian organizations in the world. In 2018, PCPM provided 500 fully equipped modular homes for families returning to war-torn Mosul. These homes, providing temporary shelter while proper housing was rebuilt, became a symbol of Polish aid. Furthermore, PCPM also implemented projects aimed at rebuilding the region’s economic potential, for example, by building a local market in the town of Tilkeif, which allows farmers to sell their products. The organization also conducted training and provided institutional support in the form of assistance to local governments in spatial planning and crisis management. The Polish Medical Mission, active in Iraq since 2016, focused on providing healthcare to refugees and internally displaced persons. For this purpose, PMM operated stationary clinics in refugee camps (including Baharka and Harsham) and mobile clinics, reaching remote villages to offer basic healthcare, as well as pediatric and gynecological consultations. The organization also launched dental clinics in the camps, providing access to services that were often financially out of reach for refugees. It also offered psychological assistance to people suffering from war trauma and the stress of displacement. An organization that has been heavily involved in helping Iraqis is Eagle’s Watch. Its founder, Bartosz Rutkowski, came up with the idea of providing humanitarian aid when he was at home watching a TV report about the Yazidi tragedy. A few months later, he went to Iraq with the first aid shipment. This organization, in particular, supports a center for Yazidi children and widows in Khanke, helping to meet their basic needs, such as purchasing fuel for the bus and a generator, or school supplies. Eagle’s Watch also helped residents of towns and villages in Nineveh liberated from Daesh occupation by assisting with rebuilding homes, creating jobs (e.g., supporting small, family-owned businesses: barber shops, mechanical workshops, etc., by purchasing equipment for them), supporting agriculture (e.g., helping with the purchase of livestock), and building and equipping schools and community centers, as well as funding vocational courses for adults, especially women. Catholic organizations such as Caritas and Aid to the Church in Need also provided assistance. It is worth noting that this aid was not directed exclusively at Christians, and these organizations never refused help to anyone based on their religion. Caritas was one of the first organizations to respond to the tragic events of 2014 in Iraq and, in cooperation with the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of National Defence, delivered the first material aid to refugees. This organization also funded the operation of a mobile clinic and supported educational projects for children affected by the conflict. Aid to the Church in Need, on the other hand, primarily supported the reconstruction of homes on the Nineveh Plain, including in cities such as Qaraqosh, Karamles, and Bartella. Thanks to its support, about 14,000 destroyed homes were rebuilt. Aid to the Church in Need also helped with the reconstruction of churches and provided emergency assistance, mainly for the several hundred thousand Christians who fled to the Kurdistan Region during the war with Daesh. The organization supplied them with food, paid for apartment rentals, and funded temporary schools in containers to ensure children’s education continuity. It is worth adding that providing such assistance during a critical period for Iraq also served to curb migration from Iraq to Europe, which was and remains a negative phenomenon for both Iraq and European countries. From Iraq’s perspective, it often meant losing intellectual potential, which was particularly needed during these difficult times for the country. Moreover, many Iraqis
Food, Roads, and Bridges: Poland in Iraq Today, in the Past, and in the Future
Poland is one of Iraq’s largest economic partners in the European Union, and trade between the two countries is constantly growing. Although it is still far from the glory days of Polish-Iraqi economic cooperation in the 1970s and 1980s, it is undoubtedly gaining momentum, showing a clear upward trend and opening new perspectives for Polish entrepreneurs in this promising yet demanding market. After years of instability, Iraq is becoming an increasingly important trading partner for Poland in the Middle East, a fact confirmed by rising trade indicators and the intensification of political and business contacts. In particular, over the last 10 years, the value of Polish exports to Iraq has doubled, which bodes very well for the future. Poland primarily exports agri-food products to Iraq. Polish food, including dairy products, grain derivatives, and meat, is highly valued by Iraqi consumers. Other groups of goods exported to the Iraqi market include chemical products, machinery and equipment (especially those used in agriculture and industry), as well as base metals and their products. In the future, Poland could also develop cooperation with Iraq in the medical and pharmaceutical sectors, especially since it is already a popular destination for medical tourism from Iraq. Poland can also offer Iraq support in agricultural modernization, water management, and technology transfer in this area. Iraq’s interest in such cooperation is evidenced by, among other things, the visit of an Iraqi delegation from the parliamentary committees for agriculture, water, economy, and trade, which took place in December 2024. The delegation met with representatives of the Polish Chamber of Commerce and visited the SPAW-MET Agricultural Machinery company, where a letter of intent for cooperation was signed. Cooperation is also developing at the level of local chambers of commerce and provincial governments, especially those of Greater Poland, Lesser Poland, Subcarpathia, as well as the Western Chamber of Commerce, the Starachowice Economic Zone, and the Association of Rural Innovators. Polish-Iraqi economic cooperation can also extend to other areas, particularly energy. Poland has purchased Iraqi oil in the past and can also support with its own experience the development of Iraq’s IT and new technologies market, energy transformation, and the development of the extractive sector. The supply of military equipment is also a promising sector. Furthermore, Poland has extensive experience in modernizing roads and railways and is a manufacturer of rolling stock, which positions it as an excellent partner for Iraq in the implementation of the Development Road infrastructure project, also known as the Dry Canal, which is intended to connect the Persian Gulf with Europe. It is worth noting that Poland has a long tradition of implementing infrastructure projects in Iraq, and the participation of the Dromex company in the construction of Highway No. 1 in Iraq gained immense recognition and is remembered to this day. A History of Polish Infrastructure in Iraq Economic cooperation between Poland and Iraq officially began in 1959 with the signing of an agreement on economic, scientific, and technical cooperation. This period was characterized by the very active involvement of Polish companies in Iraqi construction and industrial projects. For Poland, Iraq was one of the most important trading partners in the Middle East. In the 1970s and 1980s, Polish companies such as Polimex-Cekop, Budimex, Dromex, Elektromontaż, and Naftobudowa carried out about 25 large investment projects in Iraq. These projects included the construction of: The value of mutual trade reached USD 200–250 million annually. The key element of Polish exports, besides construction services, was the supply of military equipment, which constituted over 70% of exports. In turn, Poland’s primary import was crude oil. It is estimated that about 50,000 Poles worked in Iraq during these two decades. This work was not without casualties. About 50 Polish workers died in accidents, mainly during the construction of the highway. The tragic death of Teresa Rożnowska, who worked at a Dromex medical center and was the wife of one of the branch directors of the company in Iraq, Lech Rożnowski, holds a special place in the memory of Iraqis. As Krzysztof Płomiński, the long-time Polish ambassador to Iraq, established, she died in an accident on her way from the camp in Tel Laham toward Nasiriyah, and her symbolic grave at the site of her death was funded by her husband. This grave has survived to this day and has become associated with a romantic legend in the memory of locals about a young Polish woman, known in Iraq as Tala, who came to visit her fiancé, an engineer, for Christmas in 1982. As Płomiński writes, “the fiancé would then come to her grave with flowers every day for several years, until the end of his work in Iraq. The place became iconic and retains that dimension for the local population to this day. It has become a legend, blurred by time, constant wars, and flawed human memory. It was recently recalled in posts on local social media, which, when shared, gained the interest of Polish media and European journalists.” The first construction project carried out by Poland in Iraq was the bridge over the Tigris near Tikrit, built by the Budimex-Cekop company between 1969 and 1971. It is a post-tensioned concrete bridge, 800 meters long, and of strategic importance to Iraq. The work was led by the then 30-year-old engineer Zygmunt Pater, who had obtained his master’s degree in civil engineering specializing in bridges and underground structures from the Warsaw University of Technology just 5 years earlier. Pater, who gained a reputation as one of the most outstanding Polish bridge builders, returned to Iraq in 1980 to work there as the chief engineer for bridge structures at the Dromex Communication Construction Export Company. Iraq at that time was one of the fastest-developing Arab countries, and oil revenues allowed for its modernization. Poland, on the other hand, had a cheap but extremely skilled workforce. After the construction of the bridge in Tikrit, new construction orders followed, including sugar factories, cement plants, steel mills, housing estates, canals, and dams. However, Poland’s greatest
Polish Archaeologists in Iraq
It’s a well-known fact that Polish archaeologists enjoy a top-tier reputation worldwide, and Iraq is a paradise for any archaeologist, as it is the very cradle of civilization. Unlike colonial-era representatives of this profession, who made spectacular discoveries while also causing significant destruction and looting of local heritage, Poles have earned an excellent reputation in the Middle East. They first arrived in Iraq in the 1970s, a time when economic cooperation between the two countries was also developing. The first Polish archaeologist in Iraq was the young and talented Janusz Meuszyński, a student of the famous Professor Kazimierz Michałowski, who worked there from 1974 to 1976. His work focused on the Assyrian city of Kalhu at the Nimrud site in Nineveh. Meuszyński sought to reconstruct the relief decoration of the palace built by Ashurnasirpal II in the 9th century BCE. Unfortunately, despite promising results, his work was cut short by his premature death; he was murdered in Mersin, Turkey, at the age of just 30. Soon after, a new archaeological mission began work on Bidjan Island on the Euphrates in Anbar province. It was led by Professor Michał Gawlikowski and the late Dr. Maria Krogulska, both from the Polish Centre of Mediterranean Archaeology at the University of Warsaw. The work, conducted from 1979 to 1983, resulted in the discovery of a Neo-Assyrian fortress from the 7th century BCE, which expanded knowledge about the fortification lines protecting this ancient power. Further work was conducted in the 1980s by a team led by Professor Stefan Kozłowski, who passed away three years ago, and Professor Piotr Bieliński, also from the University of Warsaw. Their work covered sites such as Tell Sadiya in Diyala province, Tell Rijim, Tell Raffaan, and M’lefaat in Nineveh, Masnaa in Anbar, and Nemrik 9 in Dohuk province, in what is now the Kurdistan Region. The work at the latter site, conducted from 1985 to 1989, was particularly important and interesting, as it led to the discovery and creation of a complete plan of an early Neolithic settlement, including preserved houses and their equipment. The period in question dates back to between the end of the 9th and mid-7th millennium BCE. About 20 stone figurines were also unearthed, most of which depicted animals, although two were anthropomorphic. Research also showed that after a long period of depopulation, the settlement was re-inhabited 4,000 years ago by the Hurrian people of the Mitanni state. Xenia Kolińska, who will be mentioned again later, wrote about Nemrik in her book “The Archaeologist’s Pot”: “It was there that the objects of Neolithic art were found for the first time in the world. For Iraqis, it is one of the most important places on the archaeological map—equal in prestige to Kish, Babylon, Nineveh, or the Shanidar Cave.” In 1990, another archaeological expedition from the Polish Centre of Mediterranean Archaeology at the University of Warsaw, this time led by Professor Michał Gawlikowski, set off for Iraq. Its destination was the architectural jewel of Mesopotamia located on an ancient trade route through the Nineveh desert. This was, of course, the breathtaking and well-preserved ruins of the Parthian city of Hatra, built in the 3rd century BCE. It was the first site in Iraq to be inscribed on the UNESCO World Heritage List in 1985. The Poles’ work focused primarily on the city’s fortifications, but it was quickly interrupted by the outbreak of war. Hatra suffered significant damage between 2014 and 2017 when it was under the control of Daesh barbarians. Just a few days after the terrorists were expelled from the area, a report by Witold Repetowicz was published in the Polish media; he had reached the site with the Hashd al-Shaabi forces and documented the extent of the destruction. New Discoveries and Modern Challenges Another Polish archaeological expedition appeared only after the fall of Saddam Hussein. It was a difficult time for Iraq’s cultural heritage. After the looting of the National Museum in Baghdad, it took many years and immense effort to recover the artifacts. Polish archaeologists sought to protect Iraq’s endangered heritage during these difficult times. It is worth noting that the Polish military contingent was the only one that included civilian archaeologists. Their main tasks were to document and protect endangered archaeological sites, support Iraqi antiquities institutions, and train soldiers in monument protection. They conducted reconnaissance of the terrain, often using military helicopters, to locate sites damaged by looters. Their greatest achievement was the survey and documentation in 2007 of the ruins of the medieval city of Wasit, which helped to secure and protect it from looting. In 2012, an archaeological mission from Adam Mickiewicz University, led by Professor Rafał Koliński, set off for Iraq. Its achievements rival those made in the mid-1980s at Nemrik-9. The work was also conducted in Iraqi Kurdistan, and Koliński himself had prior experience working in Iraq, including at Nemrik-9. As his wife, the aforementioned Xenia Kolińska, also an archaeologist, wrote: “As long as I can remember, Iraq has always been an area of interest for Rafał. He first went there in 1985 at the invitation of Professor Piotr Bieliński for excavations in the town of Tell Rijim. The following year, he accompanied Professor Stefan K. Kozłowski at the now-iconic Nemrik site.” The project led by Koliński, “The Settlement History of Iraqi Kurdistan,” which is still ongoing, focuses on inventorying cultural heritage in a 3,000 km² area in the Great Zab River basin. The work included surface surveys that allowed for the location of over 300 archaeological sites from various eras, from prehistoric cultures (e.g., the Hassuna culture) to modern times. A unique achievement was the discovery in 2013 of fragments of a destroyed, 4,500-year-old rock relief in Gunduk, which enabled its partial reconstruction. Interestingly, its destruction did not happen in antiquity but in 1996. As Professor Koliński explained in an interview with PAP: “A group of treasure hunters from Turkey placed an explosive charge, the explosion of which was meant to open a path to valuables hidden behind
The Battle for Legitimacy: Disinformation, Refugees and State Authority in Lebanon
Lebanon’s governance crisis turns on two linked questions: who wields force, and who controls the narrative. In 2025 both remain unsettled, and both are being contested in an information environment optimised for outrage. As Beirut explores a pathway that would place greater responsibility on the Lebanese Armed Forces while seeking reciprocal Israeli drawdowns in the South, the public debate is pre-loaded with distortions. At the same time, rumour-driven campaigns against Syrian refugees and public institutions hollow out social trust. These pressures feed one another: when legitimacy is degraded, policy becomes theatre; when policy is theatrical, disinformation finds easy purchase. Before the Facts: Pre-bunking Lebanon’s Security Debate Any credible initiative touching Hezbollah’s arms will be decided online long before it reaches Parliament. The choreography is familiar. Anonymous channels purport to leak drafts and claim the existence of secret clauses; partisan accounts inflate or suppress polling to paint their preferred outcome as inevitable; activists on both extremes frame the proposal as either surrender or masterstroke. The middle ground—sequencing, verification, enforcement—rarely trends. In such conditions, pre-bunking is more valuable than rebuttal. Publishing a process note that sets out authorship, consultations and decision points equips journalists and citizens with a factual spine before rumours define the terms. The refugee file reveals an equally corrosive pattern. Spikes in anti-refugee sentiment are catalysed by de-contextualised clips, recycled across pages and groups until they acquire the weight of fact. Headlines prioritise nationality where it is incidental; commentary offers vigilante “solutions” when legal and administrative pathways are the only responsible route. Policy ambiguity then becomes a force multiplier for falsehood. Without a coherent, rights-respecting approach to residency, labour and returns, the digital space substitutes rage for governance and political actors profit from televised “decisiveness”. History and identity are routinely weaponised to foreclose compromise. Regional propaganda repackages Lebanese debates within broader civilisational frames—resistance versus crusaders, Arab honour versus Western puppets—bundling centuries into a morality tale that admits no nuance. The technique is hardly novel, but its efficiency in a fatigued public sphere is undeniable. Once a question is framed as existential, evidence is an afterthought and every deviating fact can be dismissed as enemy information warfare. The South is where information and security most obviously converge. Patchy withdrawals, buffer strips and sporadic exchanges create a permanent grey zone in which a single unverified report—about a patrol, an incursion, a strike—can trigger panic in villages already stretched by displacement and poverty. This is not collateral; it is a tactic. Confuse the facts on the ground, then present non-state actors as the only reliable interpreters and protectors. The consequent erosion of confidence in the Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL is not accidental; it is the point. Lebanon’s media remains a national asset but operates under severe constraints. Power shortages, staffing losses and legal pressures sap editorial capacity. Into the vacuum step partisan outlets with production slickness and elastic ethics. The outcome is a brutal market test: cautious reporting, which admits uncertainty, loses to instant certainty, which flatters identity. Once audiences adopt the assumption that all sides are equally mendacious, only tribal cues matter. That is the disinformation operator’s victory condition. Governing in a Fog: Countering Rumour While Rebuilding Authority A defence is possible, but it must run through institutions rather than around them. The government and the Lebanese Armed Forces would benefit from a modest, standing deconfliction protocol with UNIFIL and major editors: short, time-stamped incident notes within a fixed window for events south of the Litani, stating what is known and what remains unverified. This is not messaging; it is procedure. By normalising timely, factual updates, authorities deny oxygen to rumour while avoiding the trap of advocacy. Newsrooms can reinforce the centre by adopting simple guardrails on stories that inflame: verify with at least two independent sources; avoid highlighting nationality in headlines unless materially warranted; add official data context; and include lawful policy avenues rather than vigilante prescriptions. Civil society can monitor compliance and publish transparent scorecards, rewarding outlets that resist the cheap dopamine of outrage. Platforms have obligations that can no longer be ducked. During escalations they should activate temporary friction on forwards in high-risk districts and deploy moderation teams fluent in Levantine Arabic. Contextual panels linking to a public rumour ledger—an open, searchable record of high-impact claims with status updates—would give users a neutral reference without privileging any political actor. Transparency in enforcement decisions, even if partial, would undercut the suspicion that removals are partisan. Attribution matters, too. When state-linked actors engage in intimidation campaigns against Lebanese civilians online, public technical attributions—narrowly framed and legally vetted—raise the cost of repetition and educate the public about methods. Strategic silence might suit short-term diplomatic needs, but habitual silence breeds conspiracy and invites escalation. A measured naming policy, paired with discreet channels for de-escalation, strikes a better balance. Education cannot be an afterthought. Two-hour, phone-centred micro-modules on media hygiene, delivered through schools, municipalities and unions, can lift the baseline of scepticism without breeding cynicism. The aim is modest: to make the average user pause before sharing, to recognise common manipulation tells, and to understand that admitting uncertainty is a strength, not a weakness. Lebanon’s battle for legitimacy will not be won by rhetorical flourishes. It will be won by restoring the habit of believing verified facts and punishing those who profit from their inversion. Disinformation is not an abstract irritant; it is a tool that licenses vigilantism, sabotages diplomacy and corrodes institutions. The answer is not louder propaganda but steadier procedure: publish what is known, mark what is uncertain, and do it at a tempo that respects the audience’s attention. In a polity exhausted by improvisation, discipline is strategy. If Lebanon can harden the public square in this way—less theatre, more verification—it will gain the breathing space required for any security settlement that reduces risks for civilians. That would not end the information war. It would, however, reset the terms of engagement in favour of those who have the harder task: governing.
Lebanon in the Crosshairs: Disinformation as a Weapon in the Israel–Hezbollah Standoff
Lebanon’s security crisis is no longer confined to artillery ranges and border belts. The decisive contests now unfold on screens, feeds and encrypted channels, where narratives move faster than diplomats and where a single clip can displace thousands. Since the latest round of Israel–Hezbollah hostilities, both sides have treated the information domain as a battlefield in its own right. The objective is not merely to report events but to set their meaning in stone before facts can be established. For a country with a fragile media ecosystem and strained institutions, this shift is strategic, not cosmetic. What distinguishes the present phase is the premium placed on speed over certainty. Viral videos of downed aircraft or destroyed regiments appear within minutes, often spliced from old footage or video games, stripped of context and pushed through accounts that vanish as quickly as they arrived. By the time verification catches up, the intended audience has already migrated into closed channels where counter-arguments struggle to penetrate. The physics of attention are unforgiving: the lie is optimised for frictionless sharing; the correction must climb a hill of fatigue and distrust. Hezbollah and affiliated outlets have professionalised their use of Telegram, building a rhythm of messaging that bundles combat clips with social governance content: reconstruction shots, funeral eulogies, community handouts. The sequencing is deliberate. In the aftermath of losses, the narrative leans into resilience and civil legitimacy; during tactical gains, it pivots to deterrence and celebration. The intent is to present a state-within-a-state that not only fights but also cares, positioning the movement as the only reliable service provider in the South when formal mechanisms feel absent or paralysed. Across the border, Israel’s information operations against Lebanese audiences combine open broadcasting with targeted psychological pressure. Spoofed text messages, opportunistic advertisements and precisely timed bursts of rumour are designed to unsettle communities, generate flight and, critically, erode confidence in the Lebanese Armed Forces and municipal authorities. In a country where broadband is patchy and power cuts are routine, the result is a choppy public sphere: sudden spikes of panic, followed by periods of numbness in which anything can be believed because everything has been tried. Facts Under Fire: How Disinformation Shapes the South The credibility of UNIFIL has become a particular target. The mission’s value hinges on impartial observation and freedom of movement; undermine either in the public eye and operational effectiveness degrades. Fabricated stories about patrols, insinuations of collusion and choreographed confrontations seek to brand the mission as either partisan or inert. The method is crude yet effective: seed a false incident, accelerate outrage and make even routine verification look like back-pedalling. In that sense, information attacks become operational attacks; they fence in patrol routes, chill cooperation and complicate de-escalation. Lebanon’s experience mirrors a wider playbook: Dismiss, Distort, Distract, Dismay. Unfavourable reports are dismissed as enemy fabrications; images are distorted through re-captioning or selective edits; attention is distracted by tangential scandals whenever civilian harm risks becoming the story; and targeted intimidation aims to induce dismay in border villages already hollowed out by displacement. Each tactic on its own might be manageable; in concert, they overwhelm editorial capacity and fracture social trust, leaving citizens to navigate crisis with nothing more than identity and instinct. Diplomatic initiatives are duly pre-contested online. Any proposal that touches Hezbollah’s arms, Israeli postures or the role of the Lebanese Armed Forces enters a hall of mirrors before it reaches a negotiating table. Anonymous channels claim to leak drafts; partisan accounts circulate forged “annexes”; poll numbers appear with no methodology attached. By the time officials speak, many minds are closed. The stakes are obvious. If the public sphere is primed to disbelieve, negotiators lose room to manoeuvre and spoilers gain an unearned veto at negligible cost. Generative tools have thickened the fog. Synthetic audio of battlefield orders, fabricated statements in familiar voices and night-vision montages with metadata scrubbed now arrive at industrial scale. The barrier to entry is minimal; the impact on verification workflows is brutal. In a media culture habituated to forwarded clips on WhatsApp and Telegram, provenance dies at source. The result is an ambient uncertainty in which the most emotive or identity-affirming explanation wins by default. Lebanese media and civil society retain considerable resilience, but capacity is stretched. Staffing attrition, legal pressure and energy insecurity erode editorial standards precisely when they are most needed. Into these gaps step partisan channels with slick production values and legally deniable ties, promising instant updates and moral clarity. The immediate casualty is the middle ground: cautious, conditioned reporting that admits uncertainty. Once audiences default to the belief that “everyone lies”, the informational high ground is ceded to whoever shouts with the greatest conviction. The Information War for Lebanon: From Telegram to the Blue Line A credible response does not require grandiose “strategic communications”; it demands boring, disciplined habits done quickly and in concert. Newsrooms and NGOs can pool verification into a standing, round-the-clock desk producing ultra-short debunks in Arabic and English, time-stamped and written for screens, not archives. Provenance labels—date captured, source, verification status—should become default on broadcast footage. A direct, on-record channel linking UNIFIL, the Lebanese Armed Forces and editors would allow for prompt, factual incident notes in the South, reducing the oxygen available to rumours without straying into advocacy. Platforms also have responsibilities commensurate with their influence. During escalations, temporary friction on message forwarding in affected districts can blunt virality without imposing blanket bans. Crisis-surge moderation crews with Levantine Arabic competence are not a luxury but an operational necessity. Transparency around takedown rationales, even if partial, matters more in a small, highly networked country than in a continental market; opacity feeds the very narratives that disinformation operators cultivate. Policy-makers, for their part, should treat attribution as a tool of deterrence. When state-linked actors target Lebanese civilians with intimidation campaigns, even partial public attributions raise the cost of repetition. A modest investment in cyber-civics—two-hour, phone-based modules embedded in schools and municipalities—offers compounding returns by normalising scepticism, not cynicism. The aim is not
How “Human Rights” Became a Western Weapon. Deconstructing the “Western Weapon” Narrative
Klarenberg’s article on the 50th anniversary of the Helsinki Accords, exploring how the West transformed the concept of “human rights” into an instrument of subversion, regime change, and intervention. In the evolving landscape of political and information warfare, narratives surrounding “human rights” have often been used to shape legitimacy and delegitimise adversaries. In an article published on the anniversary of the Helsinki Accords, investigative journalist Kit Klarenberg advances a provocative thesis: that the West appropriated “human rights” after 1975, converting them from a universal principle into a political weapon. By privileging civil and political freedoms while ignoring socio-economic rights, and by embedding monitoring bodies within Eastern Bloc societies, the West is presented as having engineered a Trojan horse that contributed to the eventual downfall of the Soviet Union and its allies. This analysis deconstructs Klarenberg’s argument, situating it within the broader strategic repertoire of Cold War subversion, and considers its implications for today’s information environment. Deconstructing the “Western Weapon” Narrative Klarenberg highlights how the Helsinki Final Act focused on freedoms of expression, assembly, and movement, while excluding guarantees central to socialist systems, such as housing, employment, and education. This emphasis institutionalised a Western-centric rights framework. Creation of Monitoring Mechanisms He traces the rise of Helsinki Watch (later Human Rights Watch), which monitored Eastern Bloc compliance, forged ties with dissident groups, and broadcast findings globally. By contrast, no reciprocal oversight of the United States or NATO states was envisaged. Dissident Networks and Western Support The article details how Solidarity in Poland and Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia grew into mass movements underpinned by covert Western aid. Klarenberg cites declassified US National Security Directives which explicitly tasked Washington with loosening Soviet control, promoting liberalisation, and reintegrating Eastern Europe into the Western order. Transition and Shock Therapy Klarenberg emphasises that the fall of Communism was followed not by universal prosperity but by traumatic economic transitions. Rapid privatisation produced unemployment, inequality, and social insecurity, which the Western “human rights” framework dismissed as outside its scope. Interpretative Commentary Klarenberg’s construction of the narrative reflects several disinformation and framing techniques: False Equivalence: Eastern Bloc social guarantees are presented as equal or superior to Western civil rights, overlooking systemic repression and lack of pluralism. Cherry-Picking and Omission: Western support for dissidents is heavily emphasised, but the grassroots agency of local activists and the stifling control of Communist regimes are minimised. Emotional Framing: By linking “human rights” directly to the disillusionment of the 1990s, the narrative stokes nostalgia and resentment, portraying the West as both manipulative and hypocritical. The West’s Geopolitical Playbook Klarenberg frames the Helsinki process as a deliberate Western strategy of political warfare: – Delegitimisation: By codifying rights selectively, the West could indict adversaries while immunising itself from scrutiny. – Instrumentalisation: Dissident groups became vectors of Western influence, supported with printing presses, communications equipment, and covert funds. – Democracy Promotion as Intervention: US programmes channelled millions into sustaining movements that eventually displaced Communist governments. – Strategic Objective: Declassified directives confirmed the goal of integrating Eastern Europe into the Western political and economic system, undercutting Moscow’s sphere of influence. Interpretative Commentary This narrative portrays “human rights” as an early form of cognitive and political warfare. It suggests that the moral power of rights was weaponised to delegitimise adversaries, destabilise regimes, and advance systemic transformation aligned with US interests. By cloaking subversion in the language of morality, Western states blurred the line between advocacy and intervention. Conclusion Kit Klarenberg’s article reframes the Helsinki Accords as a turning point in the weaponisation of human rights. By privileging civil and political rights while excluding socio-economic guarantees, the West is depicted as having built an ideological framework for destabilisation, exploited through dissident networks and covert funding, culminating in the collapse of the Eastern Bloc. The narrative is compelling because it blends archival truth – US directives, covert funding, shock therapy outcomes – with omissions that erase the pervasive repression, censorship, and lack of freedoms that defined life under Communist regimes. For today’s defence community, the lesson is clear: – Human rights discourse remains contested terrain in information warfare. – Historical reinterpretations can delegitimise the post-1989 order and strengthen authoritarian counter-narratives. – Effective defence requires integrating socio-economic and civil-political dimensions of rights to prevent adversaries from exploiting accusations of hypocrisy. In the era of cognitive conflict, history itself has become a weapon. Countering these narratives requires not only factual correction but also the reaffirmation of a consistent, universal human rights framework – one that adversaries cannot so easily recast as an instrument of domination. The weaponisation of “human rights” illustrates how even the noblest concepts can be repurposed as instruments of power. By reframing Helsinki as a covert offensive rather than a diplomatic compromise, this narrative seeks to erode trust in Western legitimacy and present democracy promotion as merely a façade for imperial ambition. Such reinterpretations, while persuasive to disillusioned publics, risk obscuring the lived reality of repression under the Eastern Bloc and weakening the universal claim of rights themselves. For policymakers and defence communities, the task is not only to expose selective histories but to demonstrate coherence between values and practice. Only through consistency, integrating political freedoms with socio-economic protections, can democracies neutralise adversarial disinformation and preserve the credibility of the international order in an age where history itself has become a battlefield.
RT Arabic uses anonymous “Polish” voices to spread anti-Ukrainian narratives
At the beginning of September 2025, there was a serious violation of Polish airspace. During a Russian attack on Ukraine, a group of drones, identified by the Polish side as Russian, flew into the territory of the Republic of Poland. They were neutralized by Polish air defense forces in cooperation with NATO. Prime Minister Donald Tusk declared that the incident was intentional and called on citizens not to succumb to Russian disinformation. He rejected the emerging accusations directed against Ukraine, clearly stating that the responsibility lay with the Russian Federation. This statement was part of Poland’s broader effort to maintain solidarity with Ukraine and to assure both public opinion and allies that Moscow’s provocations would not lead to divisions. The Russian reaction was defensive and predictable. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov described the prime minister’s statement as “nothing new,” accusing Warsaw and other European capitals of making baseless accusations. The Russian Ministry of Defense denied that the attack was aimed at Poland, claiming that no targets were planned on its territory. It was also argued that the range of the drones used did not exceed 700 kilometers, which was meant to suggest the accidental nature of the violation. Meanwhile, the Belarusian General Staff put forward the thesis that Ukrainian electronic warfare had “pushed” the drones into Belarusian airspace, presenting this as an alleged provocation by Kyiv rather than Moscow’s actions. Such claims fit into a coordinated disinformation campaign designed to blur the facts and shift responsibility away from Russia. A strange RT Arabic article about “reactions on social media” Against the backdrop of official communiqués and government positions, particular attention was drawn to an article published by RT Arabic (the Arabic-language branch of Russia Today). The piece did not focus on analyzing statements by authorities or experts, but on alleged reactions from Polish social media users. The article, titled “The Polish prime minister’s statements set social media platforms against him”, suggested that Donald Tusk’s warnings against Russian disinformation had sparked wide-ranging debate in Poland’s digital space. RT Arabic illustrated this thesis by citing several anonymous comments, allegedly from the X platform. The highlighted quotes aligned with key Russian propaganda themes: they criticized Ukraine, relativized Russia’s responsibility, and undermined the credibility of the West. One of the cited posts stated that “the real harm to the Polish state does not come from Russian propaganda, but from Ukrainian, German and Anglo-Saxon propaganda.” This directly inverted the narrative presented by the prime minister and exemplified the blame-shifting technique. The strategy used by RT Arabic departed from the typical pattern of Russian state media, which usually base their message on statements from officials, experts, or institutions—even if biased or controlled. In this case, the material relied solely on anonymous posts whose authors were unverifiable. Such an approach allowed for arbitrary content selection and created the impression that the Polish government’s position was met with widespread opposition from citizens. It cannot be ruled out that some of the cited comments came from real Polish internet users. However, the probability that they were the work of pro-Russian trolls or bots is high. This method fits into the technique of astroturfing—creating a semblance of public debate using anonymous or fictitious voices. Combined with the mechanism of false balance, suggesting that such posts were equivalent to official state positions, it illustrates the growing flexibility of Russian disinformation directed at Arab audiences. The novelty here is the departure from conventions used in earlier RT coverage of Poland. Previous reports drew on comments from politicians or experts, while the current article was constructed entirely from anonymous, unverifiable sources. This may signal experimentation with new narrative formats, granting the Kremlin greater freedom to tailor messages to the expectations of Arab recipients. Propaganda through anonymous accounts: What was quoted? The content of the posts cited by RT Arabic fit neatly into the main lines of Russian propaganda. For example, the claim that “the real harm to the Polish state does not come from Russian propaganda, but from Ukrainian, German and Anglo-Saxon propaganda” reflected classic blame shifting. The implication was that Poland’s troubles stemmed from its Western allies, not Russia’s aggression. Other parts of the article quoted comments mocking Prime Minister Tusk and NATO, stressing that Poland allegedly “overreacts” and “accuses Russia out of habit.” RT Arabic also underscored that the prime minister “described the drones as Russian but presented no evidence”—a textbook example of denialism and an attempt to undermine the credibility of government communications. This construction served several propaganda goals at once. First, it blurred Russia’s responsibility for violating Polish airspace, diverting attention toward alleged Ukrainian or Western guilt. As noted in our earlier analyses (compare: https://disinfodigest.pl/2025/09/12/prorosyjskie-narracje-w-polsce-dezinformacja-wokol-incydentu-z-dronami/), the identical narrative—accusing Ukraine of provocation—was actively promoted in pro-Russian media within Poland. RT Arabic thus employed false balance, presenting unverifiable posts as proof of widespread opposition to government policy. Second, the selected quotes undermined trust in Polish institutions and leaders. By portraying anonymous comments as “the voice of Poles,” RT Arabic suggested that the prime minister did not represent the public but acted against it. This is a clear example of astroturfing: manufacturing apparent grassroots debate through anonymous accounts, trolls, or bots. Third, the quotes reinforced anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western disinformation. The claim that “Ukrainian and Anglo-Saxon propaganda” posed the real threat to Poland echoed the Kremlin’s broader strategy of eroding trust in Polish-Ukrainian relations. The insinuation that Ukraine might have provoked the incident was intended to weaken solidarity with Kyiv and frame the situation as a ploy to drag NATO into war. Finally, some cited posts targeted NATO directly, portraying the alliance as ineffective and passive in the face of Russian actions. This classic technique of discrediting international institutions sought to weaken Western defense cohesion. By contrasting this with Belarus’s supposedly “responsible” stance, RT Arabic created a false image of Russia and its allies as stabilizing actors. In sum, every element of the RT Arabic article—from blaming Ukraine, to ridiculing Polish leaders, to questioning NATO—formed part of a coordinated disinformation operation. The use
“Western” voice in the service of Russian propaganda: the case of Warren Thornton in the Arab infoshere
On the night of September 9-10, 2025, there was an unprecedented violation of Polish and NATO airspace. During a massive Russian drone attack on Ukraine, several unmanned aerial vehicles entered the territory of Poland. Some of them were neutralized by Polish anti-aircraft defense and NATO fighters, and fragments of the falling machines caused material damage in the eastern part of the country. This was the first such clear confirmation that Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is entering the security space of the Alliance itself. The reaction was not long in coming. Russian and Belarusian propaganda channels immediately began to blur the authorship and suggest that the incident was the result of “an accidental deviation from the course”. At the same time, comments from informal actors appeared in the Polish public space (commentators and politicians known for sharing the Kremlin’s narrative) who, without any evidence, began to accuse Ukraine of a “provocation” and an alleged attempt to draw Poland into the war. Similar voices also began to be exposed in the West. Particularly publicized was the comment of Warren Thornton, presented as a British journalist, who wrote on social media: “The hysterical scream that the EU caused resembles the screams of children fainting because they were denied a piece of chocolate before dinner. God only knows how they would react if an ordinary Russian citizen approached their border with a stick.” In another part of the same post, Thornton added: “Russia did everything in its power to prevent other countries from being drawn into this conflict, despite all European provocations.” It was precisely such narratives, downplaying the incident, shifting the blame to the West and using the figures of “Western voices” that became, within a few hours, an element of a larger information operation of the Kremlin. The following analysis shows how Russian propaganda uses actors such as Thornton to legitimize messages in the Arab world, what manipulative techniques are used and how they can be recognized and neutralized. “Western” voice in the service of Russian propaganda: the case of Warren Thornton in the Arab infoshere On the night of September 9-10, 2025, there was an unprecedented violation of Polish and NATO airspace. During a massive Russian drone attack on Ukraine, several unmanned aerial vehicles entered the territory of Poland. Some of them were neutralized by Polish anti-aircraft defense and NATO fighters, and fragments of the falling machines caused material damage in the eastern part of the country. This was the first such clear confirmation that Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is entering the security space of the Alliance itself. The reaction was not long in coming. Russian and Belarusian propaganda channels immediately began to blur the authorship and suggest that the incident was the result of “an accidental deviation from the course”. At the same time, comments from informal actors appeared in the Polish public space (commentators and politicians known for sharing the Kremlin’s narrative) who, without any evidence, began to accuse Ukraine of a “provocation” and an alleged attempt to draw Poland into the war. Similar voices also began to be exposed in the West. Particularly publicized was the comment of Warren Thornton, presented as a British journalist, who wrote on social media: “The hysterical scream that the EU caused resembles the screams of children fainting because they were denied a piece of chocolate before dinner. God only knows how they would react if an ordinary Russian citizen approached their border with a stick.” In another part of the same post, Thornton added: “Russia did everything in its power to prevent other countries from being drawn into this conflict, despite all European provocations.” It was precisely such narratives, downplaying the incident, shifting the blame to the West and using the figures of “Western voices” that became, within a few hours, an element of a larger information operation of the Kremlin. The following analysis shows how Russian propaganda uses actors such as Thornton to legitimize messages in the Arab world, what manipulative techniques are used and how they can be recognized and neutralized. Thesis and context The statement of the “British journalist” Warren Thornton, who described Europe’s reaction to the drone incident over Poland as “ridiculous”, was quickly seized and amplified by Kremlin-controlled or affiliated media, also in Arabic versions. This is a classic example of privileged citation of actors from the West in order to lend credibility to Russian narratives in the MENA region. RT Arabic published a material signaling this opinion and embedded it in a broader stream of content downplaying the incident and undermining the credibility of Poland and NATO. The above actions are an element of a coordinated influence operation, whose goal is interpretive dominance: blurring Russia’s authorship, insinuating “Ukrainian provocation”, ridiculing the reaction of Warsaw and the Alliance. Who is Warren Thornton? Thornton is a niche commentator and a pro-Kremlin blogger, and not a recognizable British journalist, as suggested by Russian propaganda channels. He has a documented history of spreading disinformation about Ukraine (he was detained in the UK in 2023 in connection with publications deemed by the police as misleading). In 2025, he became famous for the thesis about “1.8 million” Ukrainian soldiers killed (a number without a basis), which the Russian media turned into a “news story”. How do Russian (including Arabic-language) media use Thornton? Fast amplification: materials in Russian services (Runews24, OSN, aggregators) expose quotes from Thornton, titling him as a “British journalist”, which is intended to give the appearance of external impartiality. Embedding in the Arabic content stream: RT Arabic amplifies the statement and at the same time publishes lines consistent with the Kremlin’s message (“Poland accuses without evidence”, “maybe it’s a mistake”), creating for the recipient the impression of a consensus. Recycling of earlier theses: the same “person from the West” previously provided catchy, extreme narratives, which were duplicated by pro-Russian media and niche portals as the “voice of a British journalist”. Identified manipulative techniques Appeal to (false) authority / testimony of an authority – giving credibility to the message by