Alshafafya Szaffaf/szaffafiat

Information Warfare Online: Digital Disinformation in Egypt and African Countries

The development of digital technologies has revolutionized the way information is created, disseminated, and consumed worldwide. In the African context—particularly in Egypt—this transformation has opened new opportunities for the advancement of civil societies, while simultaneously giving rise to serious challenges related to information abuse. Increasingly, the digital space is becoming the primary battlefield for political, ideological, and social influence. Disinformation has emerged as a key instrument in this struggle. This analysis explores the phenomenon of digital disinformation in selected African countries, with a particular focus on Egypt, which—due to its geopolitical position, media structure, and mechanisms of state control—offers a uniquely compelling context for research. In the book Digital Disinformation in Africa: Hashtag Politics, Power and Propaganda, edited by Tony Roberts and George H. Karekwaivanane, the authors identify disinformation as one of the fundamental threats to democratic institutions and civil rights on the continent. Disinformation contributes to the distortion of electoral processes, fuels social tensions, and hinders rational public debate on issues such as public health, women's rights, and migration. In conditions marked by limited transparency and low levels of media literacy, the effects of disinformation tend to be particularly profound and difficult to reverse. This phenomenon has intensified in Africa due to the rapid growth in the number of internet and social media users. Over the past decade, approximately 300 million new individuals have come online, bringing the total number of regular internet users on the continent to around 600 million, with 400 million using social media platforms. However, this development has been highly uneven. For instance, in 2022, more than 70% of the populations in Egypt, Morocco, and the Seychelles had internet access, compared to just 7% in the Central African Republic. Egypt stands out with a relatively high internet penetration rate (over 75%), yet this access remains sharply unequal—concentrated in urban centers and limited in rural areas. Egypt and Africa in the Digital Information Battleground Digital inequalities, limited educational and technological infrastructure, and deficits in media literacy create an environment highly susceptible to information manipulation. In Egypt, an additional key factor is the political model of control over the information space. According to a report by African Arguments, regulations ostensibly aimed at countering disinformation are in practice used to suppress public debate and criminalize independent journalism. Security agencies are authorized to censor online content and penalize users, leading to increased levels of self-censorship and the marginalization of critical voices. From a research perspective, various theoretical approaches are employed to analyze this phenomenon. One of the most widely recognized is the so-called "4D model" proposed by Ben Nimmo of the Atlantic Council’s DFRLab, which identifies four core disinformation strategies: Dismiss, Distort, Distract, and Dismay. The literature also emphasizes the importance of taking historical context into account. According to the analysis by Tony Roberts and George Hamandishe Karekwaivanane, “the legacy of colonialism is a defining feature of African disinformation—a tool of colonial power transposed into the practices of post-independence states.” In the case of Egypt, the history of propaganda dates back to the era of the monarchy, intensified during the Nasser period, and continues today in digital forms. State-run media, controlled platforms, and repressive legislation still play a significant role in managing information narratives. As noted in the 2024 report by CIPESA, despite the presence of independent fact-checking initiatives, their impact remains limited—largely due to the dominance of state or government-affiliated media, the lack of algorithmic transparency, and an atmosphere of fear among internet users. Both historical and contemporary information operations—such as the Cambridge Analytica campaign in Kenya—demonstrate the continuity of this phenomenon and point to its evolution toward increasingly technologically sophisticated methods of influence. The authors of Digital Disinformation in Africa emphasize, however, that it is not the technology itself that generates disinformation, but rather the people and institutions who use it as a tool for manipulation. Its reach and effectiveness grow in direct proportion to social inequalities, legal constraints, and the weaknesses of democratic institutions. Cases of Information and Psychological Operations In Egypt, the government of President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has been actively using digital channels to shape public opinion by promoting nationalist narratives and delegitimizing political and social opponents. These campaigns often combine disinformation techniques with elements of psychological operations, making them particularly effective. A notable example is the targeting of the Sudanese refugee community, carried out as a campaign aimed at fostering social distance and hostility. An investigation by Beam Reports revealed that social media in Egypt had been flooded with content dehumanizing refugees. This included the dissemination of a manipulated video featuring a supposed "historian" who compared the presence of Sudanese people to an occupation in ancient Egypt. The campaign was associated with hashtags such as #Deportation_of_Sudanese and #Egypt_for_Egyptians, which gained widespread popularity and were promoted by well-known journalists and influencers, including Hala Sarhan. Refugees were portrayed as the cause of the economic crisis, a threat to Egyptian identity, and an “external force destabilizing the state.” Alongside anti-immigration campaigns, the Egyptian authorities have also carried out actions targeting women involved in social activism. As noted in the chapter dedicated to gendered disinformation in the book Digital Disinformation in Africa, Egyptian activists, journalists, and female politicians were regularly attacked on social media using sexist messages, suggestions of immorality, or a “lack of patriotism.” The aim was often to discredit women as incapable of representing the national interest or as “Western agents.” This points to the use of disinformation to maintain social and gender hierarchies, which fits into a broader trend on the continent. These types of actions are supported by state structures. The Egyptian Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (MOCIET) cooperates with national security services and the Public Prosecutor’s Office in identifying and prosecuting social media users accused of “spreading false information.” The 2018 media laws, including the so-called Cybercrime Law, make it possible to block accounts and detain individuals who publish content considered to be contrary to “national security.” This system is supplemented by the use of advanced tools to monitor digital content, including artificial intelligence technologies used to automatically detect specific keywords or terms. The application of the 4D model – which classifies disinformation strategies as Dismiss, Distort, Distract, and Dismay – makes it possible to precisely describe the Egyptian case: • Dismiss (dismissal and delegitimization): stigmatizing activists, women, and journalists as “foreign agents” or “traitors to the nation”; • Distort (distortion): fabricating stories (e.g., comparing refugees to occupiers), reinterpretation of economic facts; • Distract (distraction): creating an external enemy (Sudan, NGOs, the West) as a cover for internal problems; • Dismay (intimidation): legal threats, repression of social media users, detentions based on posts. This four-part pattern illustrates the systemic nature of Egypt’s information and psychological operations, which combine elements of state control, legal repression, and emotional mobilization—often using digital techniques with a high degree of effectiveness. Between Censorship and Propaganda: African Examples of Information Operations Mozambique In the Cabo Delgado province, the government of Mozambique, led by the Frelimo party, organized an extensive disinformation campaign aimed at controlling the narrative about the conflict with Islamist militants. State-run websites (Notícias de Defesa and Defesa MZ) were used, along with a network of digital propagandists referred to as “digital firefighters.” Pro-government accounts denied independent reports about the conflict's casualties, while labeling journalists as “enemies of the nation” and “foreign agents.” The state's role in controlling media coverage during the conflict clearly had the characteristics of a psychological operation. Zimbabwe During the 2023 elections, the state-sponsored digital army “Varakashi” (loyal to ZANU-PF) and pro-government accounts dominated the information space, marginalizing opposition messages. Although political opponents also employed narrative campaigns (e.g., “Chamisa Nerorists”), research shows that the state apparatus was primarily responsible for instrumentalizing legislation to fight “fake news” in order to persecute activists and journalists. As a result, disinformation increased and public trust in institutions—including electoral commissions—declined. Ethiopia During the civil war in Tigray, there was intense use of hashtag campaigns led by the Ethiopian diaspora on both sides of the conflict. Platforms such as Unity for Ethiopia and Stand With Tigray instructed users on how to frame messages and which institutions to tag. These actions were massive in scale and influenced international discourse, contributing to the escalation of antagonistic narratives and making it more difficult to objectively assess the situation in the country. Who Is Behind It? Disinformation Actors in Egypt and Across the Continent The range of techniques used in disinformation campaigns in Africa is diverse and includes both simple content manipulation and advanced networked operations. Among the most commonly observed methods are: mass dissemination of content by network-linked accounts (mass sharing), the use of paid influencers, and so-called keyboard armies—organized groups of commentators often connected to consulting firms or governmental structures. One of the key tactics remains astroturfing, which involves posing as supposedly grassroots, citizen-led initiatives that are in fact centrally directed. This phenomenon is well documented, for example, in the chapter on Zimbabwe in Digital Disinformation in Africa, where political parties used fictitious civic movements to legitimize their own actions. Similarly, brigading—the coordinated targeting of specific individuals or institutions by thousands of users—is used to escalate hate and suppress dissenting opinions in the digital space. In the Egyptian context, a dominant role in disinformation campaigns is played by prominent publicists, media commentators, and individuals affiliated with state-run media. During the aforementioned smear campaign targeting Sudanese refugees, popular television journalists spoke out, systematically spreading disinformation—often enriched with emotional language and pseudo-scientific arguments. Such activities, supported by official media channels, significantly contributed to reinforcing social stereotypes and deepening ethnic divisions. Egyptian digital campaigns combine traditional persuasive techniques with technologically advanced tools. The increasing use of automated accounts (bots) and troll accounts linked to state apparatuses has been observed. These accounts function as narrative amplifiers, creating a false impression of widespread public support. Although the widespread use of deepfake materials has not yet been confirmed in Egypt, experts point out that the development of generative AI tools poses a real threat to future campaigns—especially during periods of social unrest, elections, or security crises. Social Consequences of Disinformation: Trust, Elections, Divisions According to research by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (2024), nearly 60% of documented disinformation campaigns in Africa were sponsored by foreign actors—mainly Russia, China, and the Gulf States. In the case of Egypt, although the state apparatus plays a dominant role, the existence of links with regional centers of influence cannot be ruled out—such as through the funding of Middle Eastern media outlets or the coordination of narratives on issues like the war in Gaza, the conflict in Sudan, or the presence of China in the Red Sea region. In addition to states and their security structures, private entities also play an important role in the disinformation ecosystem. A source of inspiration for many local and regional actions were the strategies known from the operations of the company Cambridge Analytica in Kenya and Nigeria, where social media user data was analyzed for the purpose of micro-targeting emotional and propaganda-based content. In Egypt, similar mechanisms are observed in the form of contracting digital PR services by state-affiliated organizations or connected businessmen. Social media platforms—particularly Facebook, Twitter (X), WhatsApp, and TikTok—serve as the primary channels for the distribution of disinformation. The lack of adequate content moderation mechanisms in the Arabic language, along with the weak presence of local fact-checking centers, means that false information spreads rapidly and with impunity. This is especially true for socially polarizing topics such as migration, the COVID-19 pandemic, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and domestic economic issues. Consequences for Democracy, Civil Society, and Human Rights The findings of research and analyses conducted within the African Digital Rights Network, as well as reports by organizations such as CIPESA, clearly indicate that digital disinformation poses a serious threat to the foundations of democracy in African countries. Above all, it leads to the erosion of social trust, which in turn undermines the legitimacy of state institutions and representative mechanisms. As CIPESA states, “disinformation undermines trust in democratic institutions and hinders citizens’ ability to make informed decisions,” thereby limiting their capacity for genuine participation in public debate. Censorship or Protection? Egypt’s Information Policy In Egypt, this process takes on a particularly dangerous form. False narratives—especially those related to the “foreign threat” (e.g., migration, terrorism, foreign-funded NGOs)—are consistently used by the state to justify restrictions on freedom of expression and to stigmatize groups critical of the authorities. Examples such as disinformation campaigns targeting refugees, opposition journalists, or human rights organizations reinforce a climate of suspicion and social atomization, while simultaneously weakening trust in independent sources of information. During election periods, disinformation—whether originating from the authorities or spread by non-state actors—significantly increases the risk of political violence, particularly when fabricated reports of alleged electoral fraud, manipulated polls, or “national betrayal” begin to circulate. In countries such as Zimbabwe or Mozambique, these consequences have taken the form of ethnic and tribal antagonisms, amplified by digital media. In the case of Egypt, the structure of conflict is more ideological and institutional in nature, yet it similarly serves to deepen social divisions—particularly through the systematic delegitimization of pro-democratic organizations as “tools of state destabilization.” Disinformation also affects the way the space for civil liberties is shaped. The official rhetoric of combating “fake news” is often, in practice, used as a pretext for introducing repressive legislation. In Egypt, particular significance was attached to the introduction of the so-called Cybercrime Law in 2018, which allows for the blocking of websites, accounts, and applications, as well as the penalization of actions deemed to involve “spreading false information.” In practice, this leads to arrests, acts of symbolic violence, show trials, and the confiscation of digital equipment. The Digital Disinformation in Africa report highlights that in such states, information surveillance takes on a structural character—that is, it combines the monitoring of social media, the overinterpretation of criminal laws, and the use of investigative technologies to control individuals. As a result, a climate of self-censorship emerges, in which citizens restrict their online statements, delete posts, and refrain from participating in debates out of fear of surveillance or repression. Common repressive strategies also include: • cutting off internet access during moments of political crisis or protests (practiced, for example, in Ethiopia and Nigeria, and in Egypt in a limited form during mass demonstrations); • deliberately restricting the reach of specific accounts and hashtags through pressure exerted on digital platform operators; • the use of preventive detentions targeting users of TikTok, Instagram, and Twitter, increasingly affecting young women who post content that deviates from the state’s ideological line. A particularly vulnerable group to information manipulation in Egypt consists of younger users of mobile applications—especially TikTok—where disinformation is disseminated in a visually appealing, emotional format, often using humor, irony, or identity-based narratives. The lack of sufficient moderation resources in the Arabic language, combined with algorithmic opacity, further exacerbates the scale of the phenomenon. As a result, civil society—understood both as organized NGOs and individual citizens—faces new barriers to public engagement. On the one hand, transparent public debate is disappearing; on the other, the space for independent organizations to operate is shrinking. False narratives become a tool of symbolic power and, at the same time, a means by which the state apparatus consolidates its real political dominance. Information Pushback: Fact-Checking, Law, and Social Activism In response to the growing wave of disinformation, African states, civil society organizations, and international partners are implementing a variety of counterstrategies. Among the most widespread are independent fact-checking initiatives, educational activities, and legal regulations undertaken at the national and supranational levels. In Egypt, despite the high level of control over the digital space, certain forms of response to disinformation are also developing, although they are significantly constrained by political realities and legal frameworks that enable repression. Independently operating fact-checking projects, such as Daftar Ahwal or collaborations with regional networks (e.g., the Arab Fact-Checkers Network), attempt to neutralize widely circulated false content, although they often function on the margins of official discourse. The fact that many of these entities operate from abroad or rely on grant support makes them vulnerable to accusations of acting “against the interests of the state.” At the same time, traditional Egyptian media—mostly controlled by the state or linked to political elites—have implemented limited information verification mechanisms, but their public credibility remains low. The situation differs in some Sub-Saharan African countries; for instance, Africa Check in South Africa and PesaCheck in East Africa are active both online and in the educational sphere, offering open-access resources and cooperating with local journalists. In Egypt—similar to Ghana and Kenya—state digital content monitoring centers function primarily as instruments of internal security rather than as transparent tools for combating disinformation. The 2024 CIPESA report notes that although such institutions claim to be fighting fake news, they lack independence, transparency, and public trust, which significantly undermines their effectiveness. Education and Resilience: How to Counter Disinformation in Egypt and Africa Civil society plays a key role in building information resilience, particularly through media campaigns, workshops, and support for victims of disinformation. In Egypt, a positive example is the work of organizations such as the Association for Freedom of Thought and Expression (AFTE), which combines research on digital rights with legal interventions and the monitoring of censorship cases. Meanwhile, educational initiatives targeting women and people from smaller communities—modeled after Uganda’s Her Internet—exist in Egypt primarily within the diaspora or as informal support networks. At the legislative level, the main challenge lies in balancing protection against disinformation with the safeguarding of civil rights. Egypt’s 2018 Cybercrime Law, although intended to protect society from information manipulation, has in practice become a tool of repression. It enables the arbitrary blocking of websites, surveillance of social media, and penalization of so-called “harmful content.” The lack of clear criteria and appeal mechanisms makes these regulations incompatible with international standards (e.g., the African Declaration on Internet Rights and Freedoms and UN Resolution 522 on digital violence against women). Regional organizations such as the ACHPR, along with international partners (e.g., UNESCO, the EU), promote more balanced approaches, encouraging states to adopt legal frameworks that: • provide clear definitions of disinformation, • introduce independent oversight mechanisms for the implementation of laws, • enable public and judicial oversight of administrative decisions, such as content blocking. In practice, however—as shown by the case of Egypt—the implementation of these guidelines is highly selective and often marginalized by national security interests. Despite their declarations to combat disinformation, digital technology platforms continue to fail when it comes to content moderation in North Africa. There is a lack of dedicated teams analyzing content in Arabic (and its dialects), algorithms do not recognize cultural context, and abuse reporting systems are ineffective. As a result, local mechanisms for reporting abuse, the creation of national fact-checking networks, and the building of partnerships between public media, NGOs, and tech platforms are recommended. Among the priority recommendations by experts for countries in the region (including Egypt) are: • developing media and digital literacy among youth and marginalized groups, • promoting transparency in algorithms and recommendation data, • creating cross-sectoral alliances for information resilience that include various stakeholder groups: schools, media, civil society organizations, religious leaders, and government representatives. Conclusions: The Digital Future and Informational Responsibility Digital disinformation in Africa—and particularly in Egypt and the North African region—remains one of the central challenges of contemporary digital transformation. As clearly demonstrated in the book Digital Disinformation in Africa, the rapid development of social media and access to mobile telephony has opened up new avenues for civic expression, but at the same time has become a tool for manipulation, censorship, and symbolic violence. State authorities, private companies, and foreign actors use these channels to pursue political and geostrategic interests, thereby undermining citizens’ trust in institutions and democratic processes. The conclusions drawn from this analysis lead to several core recommendations: First, there is a pressing need to intensify media and digital literacy education, especially among youth, women, and marginalized groups. The Egyptian experience points to a lack of reliable training programs in this area, which contributes to vulnerability to manipulation. The involvement of civil society organizations in educational efforts—as seen in initiatives such as Her Internet in Uganda—could yield similar benefits in countries like Egypt. Second, sustainable and inclusive partnerships are needed between governments, media, NGOs, and technology platforms to develop standards of accountability and transparency in the digital environment. Egyptian experiences show that the absence of independent oversight mechanisms over platforms and the lack of local ethical standards for content moderation exacerbate the problem of disinformation, particularly during periods of social unrest. Third, legal regulations must be balanced and consistent with international human rights standards. As noted by African Arguments (2024), Egypt’s anti-disinformation legislation has, in practice, become a tool of repression rather than protection. Therefore, reforms are needed that on the one hand enable the identification and counteraction of disinformation campaigns, while on the other hand guarantee the rights to freedom of expression, pluralism, and due process. Fourth, the role of the state should not be limited to enforcing regulations; it must also include active support for independent media, fact-checking initiatives, and access to reliable sources of information. In Egypt, the lack of transparent support for such mechanisms results in an information vacuum that is filled by unverified content, propaganda, and so-called keyboard armies. Finally, a digital policy is needed that rests on four pillars: civic education, public participation, strong and resilient institutions, and effective protection of human rights in the online environment. Only then will it be possible to transform technological potential into a real force supporting democratization and social cohesion—instead of, as is currently the case, a source of tension, division, and repression.

The development of digital technologies has revolutionized the way information is created, disseminated, and consumed worldwide. In the African context—particularly in Egypt—this transformation has opened new opportunities for the advancement of civil societies, while simultaneously giving rise to serious challenges related to information abuse. Increasingly, the digital space is becoming the primary battlefield for political, ideological, and social influence. Disinformation has emerged as a key instrument in this struggle. This analysis explores the phenomenon of digital disinformation in selected African countries, with a particular focus on Egypt, which—due to its geopolitical position, media structure, and mechanisms of state control—offers a uniquely compelling context for research. In the book Digital Disinformation in Africa: Hashtag Politics, Power and Propaganda, edited by Tony Roberts and George H. Karekwaivanane, the authors identify disinformation as one of the fundamental threats to democratic institutions and civil rights on the continent. Disinformation contributes to the distortion of electoral processes, fuels social tensions, and hinders rational public debate on issues such as public health, women’s rights, and migration. In conditions marked by limited transparency and low levels of media literacy, the effects of disinformation tend to be particularly profound and difficult to reverse. This phenomenon has intensified in Africa due to the rapid growth in the number of internet and social media users. Over the past decade, approximately 300 million new individuals have come online, bringing the total number of regular internet users on the continent to around 600 million, with 400 million using social media platforms. However, this development has been highly uneven. For instance, in 2022, more than 70% of the populations in Egypt, Morocco, and the Seychelles had internet access, compared to just 7% in the Central African Republic. Egypt stands out with a relatively high internet penetration rate (over 75%), yet this access remains sharply unequal—concentrated in urban centers and limited in rural areas. Egypt and Africa in the Digital Information Battleground Digital inequalities, limited educational and technological infrastructure, and deficits in media literacy create an environment highly susceptible to information manipulation. In Egypt, an additional key factor is the political model of control over the information space. According to a report by African Arguments, regulations ostensibly aimed at countering disinformation are in practice used to suppress public debate and criminalize independent journalism. Security agencies are authorized to censor online content and penalize users, leading to increased levels of self-censorship and the marginalization of critical voices. From a research perspective, various theoretical approaches are employed to analyze this phenomenon. One of the most widely recognized is the so-called “4D model” proposed by Ben Nimmo of the Atlantic Council’s DFRLab, which identifies four core disinformation strategies: Dismiss, Distort, Distract, and Dismay. The literature also emphasizes the importance of taking historical context into account. According to the analysis by Tony Roberts and George Hamandishe Karekwaivanane, “the legacy of colonialism is a defining feature of African disinformation—a tool of colonial power transposed into the practices of post-independence states.” In the case of Egypt, the history of propaganda dates back to the era of the monarchy, intensified during the Nasser period, and continues today in digital forms. State-run media, controlled platforms, and repressive legislation still play a significant role in managing information narratives. As noted in the 2024 report by CIPESA, despite the presence of independent fact-checking initiatives, their impact remains limited—largely due to the dominance of state or government-affiliated media, the lack of algorithmic transparency, and an atmosphere of fear among internet users. Both historical and contemporary information operations—such as the Cambridge Analytica campaign in Kenya—demonstrate the continuity of this phenomenon and point to its evolution toward increasingly technologically sophisticated methods of influence. The authors of Digital Disinformation in Africa emphasize, however, that it is not the technology itself that generates disinformation, but rather the people and institutions who use it as a tool for manipulation. Its reach and effectiveness grow in direct proportion to social inequalities, legal constraints, and the weaknesses of democratic institutions. Cases of Information and Psychological Operations In Egypt, the government of President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has been actively using digital channels to shape public opinion by promoting nationalist narratives and delegitimizing political and social opponents. These campaigns often combine disinformation techniques with elements of psychological operations, making them particularly effective. A notable example is the targeting of the Sudanese refugee community, carried out as a campaign aimed at fostering social distance and hostility. An investigation by Beam Reports revealed that social media in Egypt had been flooded with content dehumanizing refugees. This included the dissemination of a manipulated video featuring a supposed “historian” who compared the presence of Sudanese people to an occupation in ancient Egypt. The campaign was associated with hashtags such as #Deportation_of_Sudanese and #Egypt_for_Egyptians, which gained widespread popularity and were promoted by well-known journalists and influencers, including Hala Sarhan. Refugees were portrayed as the cause of the economic crisis, a threat to Egyptian identity, and an “external force destabilizing the state.” Alongside anti-immigration campaigns, the Egyptian authorities have also carried out actions targeting women involved in social activism. As noted in the chapter dedicated to gendered disinformation in the book Digital Disinformation in Africa, Egyptian activists, journalists, and female politicians were regularly attacked on social media using sexist messages, suggestions of immorality, or a “lack of patriotism.” The aim was often to discredit women as incapable of representing the national interest or as “Western agents.” This points to the use of disinformation to maintain social and gender hierarchies, which fits into a broader trend on the continent. These types of actions are supported by state structures. The Egyptian Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (MOCIET) cooperates with national security services and the Public Prosecutor’s Office in identifying and prosecuting social media users accused of “spreading false information.” The 2018 media laws, including the so-called Cybercrime Law, make it possible to block accounts and detain individuals who publish content considered to be contrary to “national security.” This system is supplemented by the use of advanced tools to monitor digital

A Thousand-Year Conflict? Russia’s Historical Narrative as a Tool of Propaganda in the Arab World

The Russian documentary “Russia – Poland. A Conflict Lasting a Thousand Years” presents the history of Polish–Russian relations as an unbroken chain of hostility and conflict, stretching from the medieval era to the present day. Right from the start, the narrator emphasizes an alleged eternal enmity, stating that “Russians and Poles are two Slavic nations that have lived side by side for centuries… but since the 10th century, Poland and Russia have been in conflict.” This fatalistic claim is further developed by attributing the division between the two nations to religious differences: Poland, the narrator states, was “baptized by the Vatican,” while Russia was “baptized by Byzantium.” In doing so, the film immediately constructs a vision of a historical clash of civilizations—Catholic Western Europe represented by Poland, and Orthodox Eastern Europe embodied by Russia. However, this historical framing does not serve as a reliable analysis of the past; rather, it is part of a broader propaganda strategy. The Kremlin employs an emotionally charged and compelling historical narrative to influence the Arab information space. Historical references are carefully selected and interpreted in a way that resonates with the lived experiences and emotional sensitivities of audiences across the MENA region. Historical Narrative in the Service of Kremlin Propaganda The narrator employs a form of historical fatalism, presenting the conflict as inevitable and centuries-old. This framing is intended to suggest a simple conclusion to Arab viewers: that Poles and Russians have always been enemies, and therefore, current tensions are merely a natural continuation of an age-old war. Such a deterministic narrative leaves no room for alternative interpretations and ignores long periods of peaceful coexistence and cooperation between the two nations. Importantly, the very assumption of a “thousand-year” Polish–Russian neighborhood is historically inaccurate. Russian statehood in the Muscovite sense—commonly recognized as the direct predecessor of the modern Russian Federation—emerged only in the 14th century. Regular diplomatic relations and conflicts with Poland did not begin until the 15th or 16th century. The earlier history of Kievan Rus’ bears no direct connection to Moscow, either geographically or politically. Nevertheless, the film deliberately blurs the lines between Kievan Rus’, the Grand Duchy of Moscow, the Tsardom of Russia, the Soviet Union, and today’s Russian Federation—treating them as a single, continuous political and geopolitical entity. This narrative device is designed to create the illusion that Russia has always existed as a unified actor on the European stage. In reality, this is a deeply misleading oversimplification. To the uninformed viewer in the Arab world, unfamiliar with the intricacies of Eastern European history, this storyline may appear coherent and convincing. But in fact, it is one of the most insidious distortions used to conceal the truth: that Russia, as an imperial structure, entered the European political landscape centuries after the establishment of the Kingdom of Poland. Moreover, from its very first minutes, the documentary deliberately blends historical narrative with current political messaging. Contemporary Poland is portrayed as “the vanguard of NATO aimed at Russia”—a country portrayed as blindly hostile toward Russia, allegedly due to Western propaganda. The narrator claims that “Poland is now one of the most hostile countries toward Russia,” a country on whose territory military bases were established after World War II, and where American forces are now stationed. The film even cites a specific figure—over 100 military bases—which the United States is allegedly planning to deploy in Poland in the coming years. Such exaggerated claims are intended to give Arab viewers the impression that Poland is heavily militarized and poses a direct threat to Russia. As the narrator concludes, “the Russian people see this as a serious threat coming from Poland—a threat backed by the United States.” This portrayal of Poland—as a puppet of the West and a forward operating base for an anti-Russian offensive—deliberately taps into themes that are deeply familiar to audiences in the Arab world. The emphasis on NATO and “overseas partners” (namely, the U.S.) resonates with widespread anti-Western sentiment and suspicion of foreign intervention across the MENA region. Many Arab viewers, shaped by their own historical experiences with Western interference, are likely to interpret this narrative as a modern analogue to imperial policy—casting NATO as a contemporary colonizer and Poland as its local proxy. In this way, the Kremlin’s messaging cleverly exploits existing stereotypes and lingering resentments: if NATO and the U.S. are seen as destabilizing forces, then any country hosting their bases—such as Poland—is, by association, suspect. This implied association may trigger an instinctive aversion toward Poland among Arab audiences, even before they are exposed to any factual or balanced information. It is worth noting that Russian historical propaganda does not avoid invoking the theme of “brotherly nations.” The film, despite its overall antagonistic tone, does mention that Poles and Russians share many characteristics as Slavs. However, this motif of brotherhood is immediately contrasted with scenes of conflict. This contrast is likely intentional: in the Middle East, stories of feuding brothers are deeply familiar. Despite shared language and religion, the Arab world has also experienced divisions and internal wars. Arab viewers may subconsciously relate the Catholic-Orthodox Slavic split to their own lived experiences—such as rivalries between Arab states or conflicts rooted in sectarian divisions. These kinds of cultural references, particularly those involving “fraternal” disputes, make the Russian narrative more relatable and seemingly credible to a MENA audience. History is thus used here as a universal parable, with a moral drawn from the Kremlin’s perspective—crafted to guide the viewer toward certain political conclusions. In summary, the Kremlin is consciously rewriting history for a specific audience. It employs a calculated blend of facts, half-truths, and emotionally resonant interpretations to produce a compelling narrative. The objective is clear: to generate among Arab viewers a sense of understanding—or even justification—for Russia’s current stance toward Poland and the broader region, by framing it as the natural outcome of a thousand-year-old history. Before diving into concrete examples of such manipulation, it is important to examine the general mechanisms of disinformation deployed throughout the film. Mechanisms of Manipulation

Kutrashev’s Middle East Messaging Unravels Under Pressing Questions

During a live interview on Iraq’s Al Sharqiyah TV, Russian Ambassador to Iraq Elbrus Kutrashev struggled to address challenging questions, often avoiding clear answers or resorting to statements that appeared dismissive of the audience's intelligence. Accustomed to more favorable media treatment, Kutrashev attempted to undermine journalist Husham Ali by labeling him a “friend of Russia,” implying that this would put him under American surveillance. The journalist rejected this insinuation, emphasizing his commitment to maintaining a balanced and neutral approach with all interviewees. Denying Involvement in Assad’s Inner Circle The interview began with questions about Syria and the country's ousted leader, Bashar al-Assad. When asked about an alleged attempt to poison Assad in Moscow, Kutrashev responded that he "knew nothing about it" and claimed that if it had happened, he would "almost certainly" be aware of it. When questioned about whether Russia’s embassy in Iraq had assisted Assad’s brother, Maher, in leaving the country, Kutrashev replied mockingly, asking, “Does he have no other friends in Iraq?” He then added that such assistance would have been impossible because it would contradict diplomatic protocols. Kutrashev also stated that the Russian embassy is guarded by Iraqi security forces and is under constant surveillance by both American drones and British intelligence services. At the same time, Kutrashev claimed that Russia does not conduct surveillance on anyone in Iraq because it lacks the technological capability—such as drones—and because, according to him, Russia "does not settle scores with other countries" in Iraq, unlike the United States, which, he alleged, "gathers information on various politicians." However, he refused to specify what kind of information is allegedly being collected or about whom, raising questions about how he could have such knowledge if, as he claims, Russian intelligence operates no activities in Iraq. This exchange highlighted the contradictions in Kutrashev's statements, as the journalist continued to press him, forcing the ambassador to either evade the questions or trivialize the topic. Ultimately, when asked again about Maher al-Assad, Kutrashev stated that the embassy had no contact with him and that he did not know whether Maher was currently in Moscow. A Selective Moral Compass: Assad Versus Tsurkov When asked about the possibility of reaching an agreement with Syria's new authorities on the extradition of Bashar al-Assad, Kutrashev stated that Russia "does not participate in immoral deals." This statement stood in stark contrast to his later response regarding Russia’s inaction in the case of Elisabeth Tsurkov, an Israeli journalist with Russian citizenship who was kidnapped in March 2023 in Iraq by armed groups known as the muqawama—Shiite militias linked to Iran, supported by Russia, and with whom Kutrashev reportedly maintains close relations. Kutrashev explained that Russia had taken no action because it had not received any official, written notification about her abduction. This suggests that, according to Kutrashev, handing over a dictator responsible for the mass killing of his own people would be "immoral," while taking action to protect a kidnapped Russian citizen is "impossible" without paperwork. Against this backdrop, Kutrashev’s earlier claim that Russia prioritizes its international reputation comes across as highly cynical and disingenuous. Russia’s Embrace of “Resistance” and Its Colonial Legacy As for the muqawama itself (a term meaning "resistance" in Arabic), Kutrashev claimed that Russia does not support the muqawama as an organization, but rather the idea of "resistance" in general, which, as he put it, "is in our soul and blood." He further asserted that "since the days of the USSR, we have supported resistance against occupation, colonialism, and imperialism. We played a key role in the collapse of colonialism. And now we continue the same efforts against neo-colonialism." However, such statements stand in stark contrast to historical reality. Russia remains one of the last colonial empires and openly embraces this identity, as widely reflected in Russian state media and political discourse. Throughout the 19th century, and later under the Soviet Union in the 20th century, Russia expanded its borders by conquering numerous nations and states, colonizing them with ethnic Russians. The USSR also occupied nearly all of Central Europe for over 45 years. Kutrashev’s claim that "Russia was not a colonial power in the Middle East or anywhere" and that "whenever we enter a country, we establish equal relations" presents a distorted narrative that is characteristic of the propaganda tactics he employs. Justifying Attacks on U.S. Bases as “Resistance” Kutrashev’s evasive responses to questions about supporting the muqawama reflect Russia’s desire to maintain ties with these groups without openly endorsing their attacks on U.S. bases in Iraq—bases that operate with the official authorization of the Iraqi government. At the same time, Kutrashev dismissed any comparison between the U.S. military presence in Iraq and Russia’s presence in Syria, framing the former as an occupation. This was a deliberate manipulation, as U.S. forces, which entered Iraq in 2003, were withdrawn in 2011, formally ending the occupation. The current U.S. military presence is based on Iraq’s 2014 request for international assistance in the fight against ISIS. Nevertheless, this narrative allowed Kutrashev to justify muqawama attacks on U.S. facilities as legitimate acts of resistance under the UN Charter. He further claimed that Russia’s response to U.S. airstrikes against muqawama groups is that "150 million Russians are praying" for their fighters. Kutrashev also implied that Russia would express similar solidarity if Iran were to come under attack. In the context of developments in Syria, Kutrashev was also asked why Russia appears to be abandoning its long-time partners, such as Bashar al-Assad in Syria and Saddam Hussein in Iraq. The Russian ambassador strongly rejected this accusation, claiming that Assad's downfall was the result of Syria’s internal dynamics. He added that "Russia was the last to carry out airstrikes against opposition forces in Idlib." However, when asked about the transfer of Russian heavy military equipment from Syria to Libya, Kutrashev stated that this equipment was needed in Libya because of ongoing fighting there and the need to target terrorists. This response directly contradicted his earlier claim that Russia had already ceased military operations in Syria. Kutrashev further argued that Russia no longer has any military targets in Syria because, according to him, there is no ongoing war and the groups previously targeted by Russian forces have now formed the Syrian government. He dismissed the suggestion that this represented a failure for Russia, stating that Syria has experienced many regime changes in the past and that Russia has always managed to build relations with successive governments. He added that "our relations are not only with regimes but, first and foremost, with people, so the fall of a regime does not change our attitude towards a country." Notably, Kutrashev did not explain whether by "people" he meant those whom Russia had previously bombed for years, labeling them as terrorists—only to later recognize them as legitimate partners once they took power. Claiming Victory Over ISIS While Avoiding Real Engagement In this context, Kutrashev was also asked about Russia’s role in combating the ongoing presence of ISIS in Syria. He responded that, at present, no one had officially requested Russia’s assistance. Nevertheless, he insisted that Russia was fighting ISIS "with all its might" and claimed that it was thanks to Russia that ISIS had been defeated in Syria. In reality, however, ISIS was largely defeated by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a coalition dominated by Kurdish fighters and supported by the United States—not by Russia. Kutrashev further asserted that, in Iraq, the fight against ISIS would have lasted much longer if not for Russia’s involvement. He also argued that the perception of U.S. and coalition airstrikes as decisive in defeating ISIS was the result of people "listening to U.S. media instead of Russian media." Kutrashev added that Russia is not part of the international anti-ISIS coalition because, according to him, "it was not invited." Taken together, these statements seemed aimed at portraying Russia as a marginalized actor unfairly excluded by the international community—framing it as a victim of global politics. The Russian ambassador also avoided answering the question about Russia’s official position on Syria’s new leader, Ahmed Ash-Shara. This evasion appeared to reflect Russia’s attempt to balance two conflicting interests: on the one hand, maintaining constructive relations with the new Syrian leadership, and on the other hand, preserving its close ties with the muqawama, which considers Ash-Shara a terrorist. This diplomatic balancing act serves as yet another example of Russia’s contradictory and opportunistic foreign policy, bordering on hypocrisy. Kutrashev also avoided answering questions about Saddam Hussein, since Russia had supported him until the very end, and his execution was carried out by the same Shiite factions that Russia now seeks to engage as partners to expand its influence in Iraq. At the same time, Russia does not want to alienate the large Arab audience—both in Iraq and beyond—that still views Saddam as a hero and martyr. In the end, Kutrashev responded that there were both positive and negative aspects to this issue, but that it happened a long time ago and was better left in the past. He added that national reconciliation was more important than seeking punishment. "I am a friend of Iraq," he stated, "and I don’t want my words to offend my Iraqi friends. I avoid commenting on certain issues because they are sensitive for Iraqis." In doing so, Kutrashev effectively acknowledged that Russia delivers contradictory messages, carefully crafted to appeal to different audiences. When challenged to provide a clear position, however, Russia opts to evade the issue. This kind of diplomatic maneuvering borders on hypocrisy, making it all the more important to critically scrutinize and expose such tactics. Downplaying Strategic Ties with Iran and China Kutrashev also denied the existence of an alliance between Russia, Iran, and China. He emphasized that BRICS is not a military or political alliance, but rather a group of countries with shared economic interests—which is factually correct. He further claimed that Russia does not maintain a "sphere of influence" in the Middle East, describing it as an imperialist concept supposedly foreign to Russian policy. Kutrashev described the "strategic partnership" signed with Iran in January 2025 as a strong signal to the international community. However, as journalist Husham Ali pointed out, the agreement merely states that Russia will not assist countries that attack Iran, rather than providing any direct commitment to defend Iran if it comes under military attack. When asked why Russia had not signed a similar agreement with Iraq, Kutrashev once again portrayed Russia as a victim of American dominance, claiming that the United States had allegedly blocked such a partnership. In response to a question about whether Russia supports the pro-Iranian "Axis of Resistance"—which includes Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis—Kutrashev once again avoided a clear answer, stating that Russia supports the general "idea of resistance." He added, however, that Russia does not support attacks on Israel, citing the presence of one million Israelis of Russian descent as a reason for this position. Whitewashing Russian Aggression in Ukraine Kutrashev’s statements on Ukraine reflected familiar patterns of Russian rhetoric. Responding to a quote from Russian ideologue Alexander Dugin, cited by Husham Ali, suggesting that "Ukraine is a path to an agreement on spheres of influence," Kutrashev dismissed the idea as "a Western, imperialist notion," claiming that "we don’t think that way." Kutrashev stated that Russia wants Ukraine to remain a single, neutral country serving as a buffer between NATO and Russia, and that Russia "will not allow Ukraine to be divided." When Husham Ali asked whether Russia’s annexation of Ukrainian territories constitutes a division of the country, Kutrashev argued that it does not, because those territories are now recognized as part of Russia under the Russian constitution. The journalist then challenged him further, asking whether, since Kyiv could also be declared part of Russia in the same way, Russia might seek to capture it. Kutrashev responded by claiming that Russia had the opportunity to enter Kyiv twice, in 2015 and 2022, but "did not want to launch an invasion," because it supposedly does not wish "for Ukraine to collapse as an independent state." Kutrashev further argued that Russia’s problem is not whether President Zelensky is aligned with the United States, the European Union, or Israel (the latter mentioned likely to provoke anti-Israel sentiment among Iraqi viewers, despite the fact that Israel does not provide substantial support to Ukraine), but rather that "Zelensky was elected in democratic elections promising normalization with Russia and later became its enemy." These statements exemplify Russia’s contradictory and misleading narrative on the war in Ukraine. Claiming that the occupation of parts of Ukraine does not violate its territorial integrity—simply because Russia unilaterally declared those territories as its own—reflects an imperialist logic that disregards international law and the sovereignty of other nations. Moreover, suggesting that Russia had no intention of occupying Kyiv contradicts the reality of the 2022 invasion, during which Russian forces advanced toward the Ukrainian capital but were ultimately repelled. Such claims undermine the credibility of the Russian ambassador’s narrative.

  During a live interview on Iraq’s Al Sharqiyah TV, Russian Ambassador to Iraq Elbrus Kutrashev struggled to address challenging questions, often avoiding clear answers or resorting to statements that appeared dismissive of the audience’s intelligence. Accustomed to more favorable media treatment, Kutrashev attempted to undermine journalist Husham Ali by labeling him a “friend of Russia,” implying that this would put him under American surveillance. The journalist rejected this insinuation, emphasizing his commitment to maintaining a balanced and neutral approach with all interviewees. Denying Involvement in Assad’s Inner Circle The interview began with questions about Syria and the country’s ousted leader, Bashar al-Assad. When asked about an alleged attempt to poison Assad in Moscow, Kutrashev responded that he “knew nothing about it” and claimed that if it had happened, he would “almost certainly” be aware of it. When questioned about whether Russia’s embassy in Iraq had assisted Assad’s brother, Maher, in leaving the country, Kutrashev replied mockingly, asking, “Does he have no other friends in Iraq?” He then added that such assistance would have been impossible because it would contradict diplomatic protocols. Kutrashev also stated that the Russian embassy is guarded by Iraqi security forces and is under constant surveillance by both American drones and British intelligence services. At the same time, Kutrashev claimed that Russia does not conduct surveillance on anyone in Iraq because it lacks the technological capability—such as drones—and because, according to him, Russia “does not settle scores with other countries” in Iraq, unlike the United States, which, he alleged, “gathers information on various politicians.” However, he refused to specify what kind of information is allegedly being collected or about whom, raising questions about how he could have such knowledge if, as he claims, Russian intelligence operates no activities in Iraq. This exchange highlighted the contradictions in Kutrashev’s statements, as the journalist continued to press him, forcing the ambassador to either evade the questions or trivialize the topic. Ultimately, when asked again about Maher al-Assad, Kutrashev stated that the embassy had no contact with him and that he did not know whether Maher was currently in Moscow. A Selective Moral Compass: Assad Versus Tsurkov When asked about the possibility of reaching an agreement with Syria’s new authorities on the extradition of Bashar al-Assad, Kutrashev stated that Russia “does not participate in immoral deals.” This statement stood in stark contrast to his later response regarding Russia’s inaction in the case of Elisabeth Tsurkov, an Israeli journalist with Russian citizenship who was kidnapped in March 2023 in Iraq by armed groups known as the muqawama—Shiite militias linked to Iran, supported by Russia, and with whom Kutrashev reportedly maintains close relations. Kutrashev explained that Russia had taken no action because it had not received any official, written notification about her abduction. This suggests that, according to Kutrashev, handing over a dictator responsible for the mass killing of his own people would be “immoral,” while taking action to protect a kidnapped Russian citizen is “impossible” without paperwork. Against this backdrop, Kutrashev’s earlier claim that Russia prioritizes its international reputation comes across as highly cynical and disingenuous. Russia’s Embrace of “Resistance” and Its Colonial Legacy As for the muqawama itself (a term meaning “resistance” in Arabic), Kutrashev claimed that Russia does not support the muqawama as an organization, but rather the idea of “resistance” in general, which, as he put it, “is in our soul and blood.” He further asserted that “since the days of the USSR, we have supported resistance against occupation, colonialism, and imperialism. We played a key role in the collapse of colonialism. And now we continue the same efforts against neo-colonialism.” However, such statements stand in stark contrast to historical reality. Russia remains one of the last colonial empires and openly embraces this identity, as widely reflected in Russian state media and political discourse. Throughout the 19th century, and later under the Soviet Union in the 20th century, Russia expanded its borders by conquering numerous nations and states, colonizing them with ethnic Russians. The USSR also occupied nearly all of Central Europe for over 45 years. Kutrashev’s claim that “Russia was not a colonial power in the Middle East or anywhere” and that “whenever we enter a country, we establish equal relations” presents a distorted narrative that is characteristic of the propaganda tactics he employs. Justifying Attacks on U.S. Bases as “Resistance” Kutrashev’s evasive responses to questions about supporting the muqawama reflect Russia’s desire to maintain ties with these groups without openly endorsing their attacks on U.S. bases in Iraq—bases that operate with the official authorization of the Iraqi government. At the same time, Kutrashev dismissed any comparison between the U.S. military presence in Iraq and Russia’s presence in Syria, framing the former as an occupation. This was a deliberate manipulation, as U.S. forces, which entered Iraq in 2003, were withdrawn in 2011, formally ending the occupation. The current U.S. military presence is based on Iraq’s 2014 request for international assistance in the fight against ISIS. Nevertheless, this narrative allowed Kutrashev to justify muqawama attacks on U.S. facilities as legitimate acts of resistance under the UN Charter. He further claimed that Russia’s response to U.S. airstrikes against muqawama groups is that “150 million Russians are praying” for their fighters. Kutrashev also implied that Russia would express similar solidarity if Iran were to come under attack. In the context of developments in Syria, Kutrashev was also asked why Russia appears to be abandoning its long-time partners, such as Bashar al-Assad in Syria and Saddam Hussein in Iraq. The Russian ambassador strongly rejected this accusation, claiming that Assad’s downfall was the result of Syria’s internal dynamics. He added that “Russia was the last to carry out airstrikes against opposition forces in Idlib.” However, when asked about the transfer of Russian heavy military equipment from Syria to Libya, Kutrashev stated that this equipment was needed in Libya because of ongoing fighting there and the need to target terrorists. This response directly contradicted his earlier claim that Russia had already ceased

Egypt as an Arena of Information Operations – Analysis of Contemporary Influence Strategies

Egypt as an Arena of Information Operations – Analysis of Contemporary Influence Strategies

* * * * * * In an era of constant change in the global communication sphere, the Egyptian media environment is becoming a place where advanced influence operations acquire a new dimension. Among the numerous narratives and messages that shape public opinion, the actions undertaken by Russia and China attract particular attention. Can the mechanisms used by these states influence the perception of reality in a region where emotions and historical experiences constitute a significant element in shaping social attitudes? Analysis of Information Operations Russian Influence Operations Destabilisation of the Image of the West and Poland Russian narratives systematically portray NATO, the EU and the USA as aggressors, destabilisers and neo-imperial forces. Particular attention is paid to Poland – presented as a key member of NATO and a state bordering Ukraine – which is attributed the role of a participant in the alleged plan to divide Ukraine. Such messages aim to undermine the trust of Egyptian society in Western structures and to create the image of Western states as aggressive instruments of imperialism. Creating a Positive Image of Russia In contrast to the negative portrait of the West, Russian propaganda builds the image of Russia as a stable and friendly partner. Examples of such actions include, inter alia, promoting cooperation with Egypt within the framework of BRICS, showcasing infrastructure projects such as the Dabaa nuclear power plant, as well as presenting initiatives such as collections of gifts for soldiers, which are intended to suggest broad international support for Russian aggressive actions in Ukraine. Chinese Information Strategies Emphasis on Economic and Technological Aspects Chinese information activities in Egypt are characterised by a lower level of confrontationalism than those of the Russians, and their main emphasis is placed on economic issues and the modernisation of infrastructure. Key elements of the message include, inter alia, the intensive promotion of Chinese investments in the Suez Canal Economic Zone (SCZone), subtle support for anti-Western narratives through references to the alleged threat posed by NATO infrastructure in Poland, and the creation of an image of China as a reliable partner in Egypt’s energy and technological transformation. Mechanisms of Psychological Operations and Propaganda Techniques Use of Emotional Manipulations Both strategies – Russian and Chinese – employ advanced persuasive techniques that affect the emotions of recipients. Among the key mechanisms are: Fear and mistrust: Messages that create an impression of threat from Western interventions and military alliances. Anger and frustration: Narratives accusing the West of economic exploitation and imposing unfavourable economic conditions. Cultural identity: Emphasising cultural differences that are intended to suggest the imposition by the West of values incompatible with the region’s traditions. Agenda Setting and Framing Propaganda also employs techniques of selective topic emphasis: Agenda setting: Pro-Russian media, such as Sputnik Arabic and RT Arabic, select topics that dominate the message, giving them strategic priority. Framing: International events, such as military operations or political interventions, are presented in a manner that imposes a specific interpretation on the audience – often emphasising the positive image of the actions of Russia and China and the negative character of Western interventions. Use of Traditional and Digital Media In the Egyptian information space, a clear symbiosis is observed between state media and modern digital platforms. The dominance of state-controlled channels enables the widespread distribution of propaganda messages. Furthermore, social media activity is utilised, where, through repetitive narratives and engaging formats (e.g. memes, videos), younger audiences are reached. Operations Targeting the Perception of Poland and NATO Particular attention is also paid to narratives aimed against Poland and NATO. Example techniques include, for instance, creating false accusations of the division of Ukraine and portraying Poland as an aggressor, utilising events such as the closure of the Russian Consulate General in Poznań to build an image of Poland as an instrument of Western imperial ambitions, and the mobilisation of negative emotions, such as fear of destabilisation and anger towards external interference, which is intended to undermine the credibility of Western institutions. Analysing the Egyptian information sphere, it can be stated that the information operations carried out by Russia and China are highly complex and precisely targeted. The mechanisms employed in these campaigns – from the selective choice of topics, through the repetition of the message, to the profound manipulation of emotions – can have a significant impact on shaping public opinion in Egypt. In the context of local social and economic conditions, the propagandistic actions aimed against Western states may lead to lasting changes in the perception of international alliances and political relations. Source and Background of the Analysis This analysis is based on the chapter of the report “Study of the Egyptian Information Environment”, developed within the framework of the Albatros II – MENA – Counteracting Disinformation and Information Threats to Democratic Values and Institutions, which adversely affects international relations and negatively influences the image of Poland in Lebanon, Iraq and Egypt. The report “Study of the Impact of Disinformation and Propaganda on MENA Societies — Report, Defence Strategies and Implementation of Recommendations” constitutes a multifaceted analysis of the Egyptian media environment, in which the structure and characteristics of the media, the information habits of society, and the influence mechanisms employed by external entities are presented in detail. We invite you to familiarise yourself with the full version of the report, which provides valuable information and recommendations for analysts and experts involved in information security in the MENA region.

Failure of the Russian influence operation? The Shia admit that Russia was “playing with Israel” behind their backs

Failure of the Russian influence operation? The Shia admit that Russia was "playing with Israel" behind their backs

* * * * * * Since the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, there has been a sharp decline in the public activity of the Russian ambassador to Iraq, Elbrus Kutrashev. An analysis of pro-Iranian Shia media in Iraq, which had previously actively promoted Russia, indicates disappointment with Russia, which may explain its decision to temporarily lie low. The Shia television channel Al-Ahad, affiliated with the Asaib Ahl al-Haq group and its leader Qais al-Khazali, published a report on 8 January accusing Russia of “playing in favour of Israel” in Syria and “abandoning the Iranian strategy” regarding the fight against jihadists from HTS, who took control in Syria. This report refers to a conversation broadcast by the Iranian news agency Tabnak between Iranian commanders and General Staff officials, revealing that Assad’s army was corrupt and not only avoided combat but also, under pressure from Russia and others, sabotaged Iranian forces’ attempts to undertake military action in Syria. The report cited by Al-Ahad also states that the Syrian army did not provide any weaponry to Iranian forces stationed in Aleppo, which led to the rapid capture of the city by HTS and the killing of the Iranian forces’ commander, General Kiomars Purhashemi. The Al-Ahad report also indicates that Russia supported Israel’s actions following Iran’s strike on the country in April 2024. Citing Tabnak, Al-Ahad states that “Russia turned off Russian radars during Israel’s attack on Iranian commanders in Syria, which is clear evidence of Russia’s cooperation with Israel.” The report further quotes a commander of Iran’s Sepah, who claims that “Russia abandoned Iran’s land strategy aimed at defeating terrorist groups, promising to carry out airstrikes. However, it turned out that the airstrikes targeted residential homes and desert areas rather than the military targets of the Tahrir al-Sham organisation.” Reports that Assad regime officials, acting on Russian orders, provided Israel with data on the deployment of Iranian forces in Syria to facilitate their bombing emerged as early as mid-December. These reports were based on leaked documents detailing contacts between the Syrian Ministry of Defence and an Israeli intelligence officer overseeing the operation, known by the codename “Mousa.” This revelation was not particularly surprising, as it had long been known that Russia forbade Assad from activating Syria’s air defence systems during Israeli airstrikes on Iranian positions in Syria. The only real surprise was that, despite this, Iran supplied Russia with drones, which it later used in Ukraine, while media outlets like Al-Ahad continued to promote Kutrashev’s absurd narratives about Europe, the world wars, and the war in Ukraine. The Al-Ahad report may signal the beginning of a shift in the narrative of pro-Iranian Shia media regarding the situation in Syria. Until now, they had promoted a conspiracy theory attributing Assad’s downfall to a coalition of Israel, jihadists, Turkey, and the West. To some extent, this narrative aligned with Russia’s efforts to frame Assad’s overthrow within the context of its so-called “lone struggle” against “Western aggression” on multiple fronts, including Ukraine and the Middle East. The recent report exposes the falsehood of this narrative. The open question remains what strategy Russia will now adopt to rebuild its influence among Iraqi Shia groups and whether, by playing on anti-Western sentiments, it will once again succeed in deceiving these circles. * * * Compiled by: Witold Repetowicz | shafafiyat.com * * *

Propaganda activities targeting perceptions of the West and democratic values in Egypt

Propaganda activities targeting perceptions of the West and democratic values in Egypt

* * * * * * Egypt, situated in a strategic location at the crossroads of Africa and the Middle East, has long been a pivotal reference point for various political and social initiatives. Due to its geopolitical significance, the country has found itself at the centre of complex and often competing propaganda efforts aimed at shaping public opinion towards distrust of the West and democratic values. Here, the influences of global powers such as Russia and China, striving to strengthen their positions in the region, collide with those of traditional Western allies who continue to play a significant role in Egypt’s politics and economy. At the same time, Egyptian society, having been shaped over the years by external influences and numerous internal tensions, demonstrates a susceptibility to narratives favouring conservative, authoritarian models of governance. In the face of economic uncertainty and the lingering memories of the colonial era, anti-Western messaging easily finds fertile ground, further bolstered by both state and non-state media. While the sense of threat posed by the West remains a prominent theme, it is impossible to overlook cultural and historical factors that influence the distribution of political sympathies. Understanding these phenomena is crucial to devising effective strategies for countering disinformation and promoting more open and democratic attitudes in the region. The following material constitutes one of the chapters of the Report: Study of the Information Environment in Egypt and outlines the scale, context, and specific elements of disinformation activities targeting democratic values and perceptions of the West in Egypt. The observations and recommendations presented herein are significant not only for communication and security professionals but also for non-governmental organisations, academic circles, and citizens interested in Egypt’s future. Key Propaganda Narratives The West as an Aggressor The West, including the USA and NATO, is portrayed as a provocateur of global conflicts, particularly in the context of the war in Ukraine. This is exemplified by narratives framing it as “forcing Russia to defend itself” against NATO. These narratives highlight Western interventions in the Middle East (Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan), portraying them as actions motivated solely by economic and geopolitical interests. Democracy as a Tool of Control Democracy and human rights are depicted as instruments of neo-colonial control, used by the West to interfere in the internal affairs of Egypt and other developing countries. For example, criticism is directed at Western financial institutions (IMF, World Bank), which are portrayed as tools of economic exploitation. Double Standards The West is accused of hypocrisy, advocating for human rights in selected regions while ignoring violations in allied states, such as Israel. This selective approach generates particular frustration in Egypt. Cultural Domination Western media are presented as promoting Islamophobia and fuelling antagonism against Muslims and refugees. At the same time, emphasis is placed on Western attempts to impose cultural values that conflict with Egypt’s national identity. Criticism of Western Foreign Policy Russian Arabic-language media portray the United States as a country striving to maintain global hegemony through financial and political manipulation, aimed at weakening other nations and keeping them dependent on American interests. The European Union is depicted as following U.S. policies, even at the expense of its own economic and energy interests, leading to internal crises and weakening Europe’s position on the global stage. Undermining NATO’s Unity and Effectiveness NATO is portrayed as an alliance incapable of effectively addressing contemporary challenges, with its actions often inconsistent and inefficient. Russian media suggest that internal divisions and a lack of consensus within NATO undermine its position as a global security guarantor. Negative Portrayal of Western Leaders Western leaders are sometimes depicted as incompetent or acting against the interests of their own citizens. This aims to undermine their authority and legitimacy. These narratives highlight political mistakes and failures, both internationally and domestically, to foster distrust in Western leaders. Promoting Alternative Alliances and Agreements Initiatives such as BRICS are promoted as a viable alternative to Western economic and political structures, suggesting that cooperation with non-Western countries offers greater benefits and stability. Russian media emphasise the successes of partnerships with countries like China, presenting them as a model of effective cooperation in contrast to relations with the West. The analysis of content disseminated by Russian Arabic-language media highlights the dominance of narratives critical of the foreign and domestic policies of Western countries, undermining NATO’s unity and effectiveness, and promoting alternative alliances as more beneficial for countries like Egypt. Western leaders are often portrayed in a negative light, aiming to weaken their authority in the eyes of the Egyptian public. Propaganda Mechanisms 1. Channels and Sources Traditional and Social Media: State-controlled Russian agencies (e.g., Sputnik, RT) and Chinese platforms such as @mog_china disseminate content aimed at undermining NATO and Western positions. Local Media: Some Egyptian media outlets replicate foreign narratives, reinforcing their impact by emphasising historical grievances against colonialism. 2. Techniques Manipulation of Facts: Information is taken out of context, such as tragic events involving migrants, to portray the West as a destabilising force. Narratives about “Western plans to control Egypt through debt and interference in domestic politics” are amplified. Emotional Narratives: Sensitive topics, such as Palestinian rights, are exploited to deepen mistrust towards the West. Impact on Public Opinion 1. Perception of the West The West is perceived as a dominant power imposing its political and economic interests on Egypt. Admiration for the “strong leadership” of Vladimir Putin in opposing the West enhances the positive perception of Russia, particularly among conservative social groups. 2. Influence on Democratic Values Propaganda fosters scepticism towards democracy as a political system, promoting alternative governance models, such as “stable authoritarianism.” 3. Social Tensions Propagated narratives exacerbate divisions between proponents of pro-Western reforms and traditionalists who view democracy as a threat to Egypt’s cultural identity. Expert Opinion Consultations with a local partner reveal that Egyptian society exhibits a deep susceptibility to anti-Western narratives due to a historical lack of trust in external powers and a widespread belief in Western interference in regional affairs. The expert emphasises that social media, particularly among young people,

Egypt as a Target of Russia’s and China’s Information Operations

* * * * * * Egypt as a Target of Russia’s and China’s Information Operations During the analyzed period (September–December 2024), the Egyptian information environment was marked by intense propaganda and disinformation activities by Russia, alongside a more subtle but consistent presence by China. These actions aimed to influence Egyptian public opinion, political elites, as well as regional and international audiences. The main vector of influence was an attempt to portray Russia and China as stable partners promoting an alternative global order, opposing Western dominance, while simultaneously undermining the credibility and intentions of Western countries, including Poland, NATO, and the United States. The analysis demonstrates that Egypt represents a key arena for informational penetration by these powers due to its strategic location, economic significance, and regional position within MENA. Information operations conducted by Russia and China in Egypt exploit existing tensions, economic and energy pressures, and the country’s limited media freedom to construct narratives favorable to Beijing and Moscow and detrimental to the image of the West, including Poland. Russian narratives aggressively undermine trust in NATO and EU countries, depicting them as aggressors and forces striving for hegemony. Chinese activities are subtler but reinforce this line of argumentation while simultaneously promoting economic alternatives and a multipolar order. Consequently, Egyptian society receives a distorted view of geopolitical reality, which may influence Cairo’s long-term strategic decisions. To counteract this influence, Poland and Western countries must actively engage in public diplomacy, strengthen independent media, support information pluralism, and promote positive, fact-based narratives concerning economic, technological, and cultural cooperation. Without coordinated efforts, Russian and Chinese disinformation activities will continue to hinder effective collaboration with Egypt and the MENA region. Directions and Narratives of Russian Influence Operations Anti-Western and Anti-NATO Narratives: Russia consistently promotes a narrative portraying NATO, the EU, and the USA as aggressors, destabilizers, and neo-imperial forces. Poland, as one of NATO’s key members and a neighboring country to Ukraine, frequently appears in Russian messaging as a purported initiator or beneficiary of a “plan” to divide Ukraine. Russian propaganda in Arabic-language Egyptian media (e.g., through Sputnik Arabic) has depicted Poland and Western countries as forces seeking to occupy Ukraine under the guise of a “peace mission,” aiming to solidify the belief that the West operates with double standards and pursues hidden imperial goals. These anti-Western and anti-NATO narratives aim to erode Egyptian society’s trust in Western countries (the EU, the USA), organizations such as NATO, and their allies (including Poland). Russian propaganda portrays the West as aggressive and imperialist, imposing its will on other countries. In this framing, NATO is not a defensive alliance but a tool of political and military domination. In the Egyptian context, these narratives exploit the region’s sensitivity to Western interventions (e.g., the wars in Iraq, Libya, or Western support for Israel) and Egypt’s challenging economic and energy situation. They create an image of a world where Russia and China offer an alternative to the current “unjust” Western hegemony. Anti-Western Exploitation of Anti-Israel Sentiments: Given the importance of the Palestinian issue and the role of Israel in Middle Eastern narratives, Russian propaganda and its sympathetic sources in the region link criticism of the West with anti-Israel rhetoric. They construct an image of the West as a protector of Israel, which, in the eyes of many audiences in Egypt and the broader Arab world, reinforces the negative perception of NATO and the USA. Poland and the Eastern Flank NATO Countries as “Tools” and “Puppets” of the West: NATO is portrayed as an organization deliberately expanding eastward, threatening the security of other states. Alleged plans to deploy Western troops to Ukraine as “peacekeeping forces” are presented as a pretext for the de facto occupation of the country. Poland, Romania, and the Baltic states are depicted as extensions of U.S. and NATO policies, lacking autonomy, with the aim of weakening their image as independent political actors. This creates the impression that these countries are executing American ambitions, such as supposed plans to divide Ukraine, annex territories, or militarize the eastern border. Demonizing Western Aid to Ukraine: Military and financial aid to Ukraine is framed as a step toward integrating the country into Western structures to subordinate it to EU and U.S. interests. This narrative omits the actual reasons for the support (Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the desire to defend Ukrainian sovereignty) and instead emphasizes alleged plans for the “colonization” of Ukraine or the exploitation of its resources. Exploiting Anti-Semitism and Conspiracy Theories: Russian propagandists have spread false narratives about alleged mass immigration of Jews to Ukraine via Poland. The aim was to stir mistrust and animosity in Arab societies, which are sensitive to issues related to Palestine and Israel. In this way, Russia sought to link anti-Israeli rhetoric with anti-Western sentiment, reinforcing a negative image of Poland in the eyes of Egyptians as a co-conspirator in purported colonial or manipulative actions. Creating a False Image of Russia as a Stable and Friendly Partner: Russia positions itself as a reliable and friendly partner, contrasting its alleged stability and respect for sovereignty with the purported aggressiveness and double standards of the West. This narrative seeks to appeal to societies and governments in the region by promoting Russia as a counterbalance to Western “imperialism” and an advocate of a multipolar world order. Building Russia’s Image as a Defender of a Multipolar Order: Russian narratives emphasized cooperation with Egypt within the BRICS framework, with a focus on independence from the dollar and Western institutions. Russian diplomats and state media highlighted infrastructure projects, such as the Dabaa nuclear power plant, as evidence of the durability and benefits of the Moscow-Cairo partnership. Russian stories about collections of gifts for soldiers fighting in Ukraine, allegedly from various countries, including Poland, aimed to demonstrate international support for Russia. This messaging reinforced the narrative that, despite official criticism from the West, there is grassroots support for Russian policies, even in countries perceived as aligned with NATO. Key Directions and Narratives of Chinese Information Operations: China operates less confrontationally than

Debunking Russian Narratives on Neocolonialism: An Analysis for MENA Countries

* * * * * * Debunking Russian Narratives on Neocolonialism: An Analysis for MENA Countries Russian propaganda in the MENA region, particularly in media and diplomatic spaces such as the Russian embassy’s website in Cairo, promotes narratives of a “struggle against neocolonialism” to position Russia as a defender of global justice. This rhetoric often centers on criticizing Western powers—namely the United States, France, and the United Kingdom—blaming them for historical and contemporary colonial crimes. This article juxtaposes Russian narratives with historical truths, exposing Moscow’s hypocrisy and its actual role in colonial and imperial systems, both in the past and in the present. Russia and the Berlin Conference: Concealed Responsibility for Colonialism Russia was an active participant in the Berlin Conference (1884–1885), during which European powers delineated the division of Africa. Although Russian propaganda often omits its involvement in this narrative, Moscow signed and ratified the General Act of the Conference, which established the principles for the colonization of Africa, including: The Principle of Effective Occupation – requiring actual control over colonies. Free Trade on the Congo River and its Basin – ensuring open commercial access. The Ban on Slave Trade – a seemingly humanitarian measure that legitimized colonial exploitation of Africa’s resources. It is important to emphasize that the United States, present at the conference only as an observer, did not sign these agreements. In contrast, Russia fully accepted the European colonial order established at the conference. Russia and the USSR as Imperial Powers: Expansion and Colonization Over Centuries Like other colonial powers, Russia pursued an aggressive policy of expansion and colonization from the 18th century onward, with effects that are still felt today. During the era of the Russian Empire and later the Soviet Union, Moscow’s actions toward subjugated nations were imperialistic in nature, leading to systematic exploitation of resources, Russification, and the destruction of local cultures. In the modern era, Russia continues to regard these territories as part of its “sphere of influence,” exemplifying its neocolonial ambitions. Examples of Russia’s Imperial Policy: Central Asia: Colonization of Nations: Nations such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan were colonized as part of Russia’s eastward expansion. Kazakhstan was colonized starting in the mid-18th century, Uzbekistan from the mid-19th century (with Russia capturing Tashkent in 1865), and Turkmenistan was ultimately conquered in 1884. Russification and Economic Exploitation: These regions were subjected to Russification and economic exploitation, with their economies subordinated to the needs of the empire. Contemporary Neocolonial Influence: To this day, Russia seeks to maintain its influence in Central Asia through economic and political dependencies, such as control over energy resources and military alliances. This reflects Russia’s ongoing neocolonial ambitions in the region. 2. The Caucasus: Annexation and Militarization: In the 19th century, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan were annexed by the Russian Empire, initiating a process of assimilation and military domination over the region. Repression and Forced Displacement: Russian policies included repression of local traditions and identities, as well as mass deportations of populations, particularly in Muslim-majority areas such as Chechnya and Dagestan. Modern Neocolonial Approach: Contemporary Russia views the Caucasus as a strategically crucial region and treats it through a neocolonial lens. This is evident in its suppression of local independence movements, such as those in Chechnya. 3. Poland and the Baltic States: Territorial Annexation: Following the partitions of Poland (late 18th century), Russia seized Polish territories as well as present-day Lithuania, Belarus, and right-bank Ukraine. The territories of present-day Latvia and Estonia were incorporated into the Russian Empire after the Great Northern War (1700–1721). Russification Policies: In the 19th century, Russia implemented forced Russification, introducing the Russian language in schools and administration, suppressing local religions (e.g., Catholicism in Poland), and imposing harsh reprisals on efforts to regain independence. Contemporary Neocolonial Ambitions: Despite these nations regaining independence after the fall of the USSR, Russia continues to regard them as part of its historical sphere of influence. This is evident in ongoing attempts at political interference, economic pressure, and disinformation campaigns. The USSR – A Colonial Empire Disguised as Internationalism Although the Soviet Union proclaimed anti-colonial ideals, it effectively pursued imperialist policies toward nations within its sphere of influence: Forced Relocations: Millions of people from the Caucasus, Crimean Tatars, and other ethnic groups were deported to Siberia or Central Asia. Economic Exploitation: Peripheral regions were exploited as sources of raw materials for the center (Moscow), while remaining economically underdeveloped. Russification: The imposition of the Russian language and suppression of national identities mirrored Western colonial practices in Africa. Modern Hypocrisy of Russia Russian propaganda leverages anti-colonial slogans to gain support in the MENA region, accusing the West of colonialism. However, the facts reveal that: Russia’s Neocolonial Policy Towards Its Republics and Peripheries: For years, Russia has pursued policies that can be described as internal neocolonialism, characterized by the exploitation of natural resources in its republics and resource-rich regions inhabited by nations with distinct cultural and ethnic identities. The profits from this exploitation flow primarily to the center of power—Moscow—while local communities remain impoverished, marginalized, and deprived of autonomy. A closer examination of Russia’s current colonial policies reveals: Economic Exploitation: Resource-rich regions, such as Siberia and the North Caucasus, are heavily mined and drilled, with revenues channeled to Moscow while local infrastructure and living standards lag behind. Suppression of Autonomy: Efforts to centralize control prevent regional governments from independently managing their resources or political systems, maintaining systemic inequality. Cultural Assimilation: The imposition of Russian language and culture continues to erode local identities, mirroring colonial practices. By promoting an anti-colonial narrative abroad while engaging in neocolonial practices at home, Russia exposes the contradictions and hypocrisy of its propaganda. Key Regions and Resources: Sakha Republic (Yakutia) Natural Resources: Diamonds: Yakutia is Russia’s largest diamond producer, accounting for approximately 95% of the country’s output and 25% of the global supply. Other Resources: The region is also rich in oil, natural gas, coal, and metals such as gold and uranium. Neocolonial Exploitation: Revenue Distribution: Profits from resource extraction flow to the central Russian budget, leaving local

Russian disinformation on the situation in Syria – an attempt to link jihadists to Ukraine

* * * * * * For some time now, Russia has been trying to link Ukraine and the West with jihadists in its narrative, in order to accuse them of supporting terrorism. In doing so, Russia relies on the mechanism described in Vladimir Volkoff’s theory of disinformation, exploiting the poor knowledge of a large part of Western public opinion about the Middle East and its fully justified negative assessment of Russia’s role. The idea is to use the critical attitude towards Russia to propagate a narrative that seemingly attacks Russia (“Russia is losing”), but in fact supports the Russian narrative (“Russia is defending Syria from jihadists supported by Ukraine and the West” – the main theme of the Russian narrative). The target group of this message is both residents of the Middle East and Europeans. In doing so, Russia uses the naive and ignorant image of jihadists, widespread in the West, as alleged fighters for the freedom of Syria, whose fight is part of stopping Russian imperialism. On November 29, 2024, the Arabic-language account @mog_Russ on the X.com portal, which is one of the main tools of Russian disinformation on this portal, aimed at the Arabic-speaking population (498.5 thousand followers), published an “analysis” of the alleged links between the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham offensive and Ukraine. The main topic was stated there in the first of 15 tweets as “The United States, Israel, and Ukraine are leading the new conflict in Syria.” The addition of Israel is intended to exploit the negative perception of this country in the Arab-Muslim world, resulting from Israel’s actions in Palestine and Lebanon. Russian propaganda has been trying to attribute responsibility for the civilian casualties of this war to the so-called “collective West.” The aim of these actions is to provoke hostility among hundreds of millions of Arab Muslims towards Europe and to lead to riots by activating this hostility in Arab-Muslim communities living in Europe. This is therefore a classic element of hybrid warfare. @mog_Russ’s narrative is built on manipulated photos, their montages, and absurd interpretations of some photos. For example, the ties of jihadists to Ukraine are supposedly evidenced by the fact that some of them have yellow headbands, while others have blue ones. This is supposedly evidence of the participation of “Ukrainian drone operators” in the offensive on Aleppo. The next photo shows a group of men, one of whom has an ISIS patch. Although this is probably a photomontage and it is not known where the photo was taken, the thread states that these are “anti-Russian Chechen militias fighting in Ukraine”, for which there is no evidence. This, however, leads to another manipulation, i.e. linking this photo to recordings of people with ISIS patches in Aleppo and stating that jihadists in Syria were wearing both yellow and blue stripes (in reality, no one in the photos is wearing yellow and blue markings, only multi-colored armbands, including yellow or blue, but not yellow and blue) and ISIS markings (here, too, the authenticity is questionable because HTS originates from Al Qaeda and has never used ISIS symbols – ISIS uses a black flag with the Arabic inscription “There is no god but Allah” and the words “Allah, the prophet, Mohammad”, while Al Qaeda uses a white flag with the calligraphy of Shahada). Here, there is a direct suggestion that this is supposedly an implementation of Zelensky’s policy of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”, which is supposed to mean that he perceives ISIS as a friend. The subsequent photos deepen this manipulation in a very suggestive way, but in reality not based on any logical chain of evidence. The photo of a group of jihadists, again taken unknown where, suggests that extremists from all over the world are fighting on the side of the jihadists in Syria (which is partly true), but this is supposed to lead to the conclusion (it is unknown on what basis) that the same is true in Ukraine. The manipulation is complemented by a screenshot of an article from the English-language Kyiv Independent, suggesting the participation of Ukrainians in the Tuareg fights against the Wagnerians in Mali, which of course has nothing to do with Syria, but is supposed to lend credibility to the previous theses by psychologically affecting the recipient’s perception. Then Russian propagandists return to Syria and refer to a Kyiv Post video allegedly presenting the participation of Ukrainians in the fights in Syria, although in reality it is a montage of scenes of some attacks, from which it is completely unclear who, where and when they are depicted. The next posts are devoted to Turkey’s alleged involvement in the HTS attack on Aleppo, which supposedly automatically implies US involvement, which is completely absurd, because the interests of Turkey and the US in Syria are not consistent and have been the subject of disputes between these countries many times. After which Russian propagandists return to Ukraine again, showing videos of the use of drones and stating that “it is obvious that drone operators trained or fought in Ukraine”. Nothing of the sort follows from the previous posts, but they created a psychological background for the recipient to believe it. The next posts intensify this impression by presenting alleged Syrian rebels with the flags of the Syrian revolution and Ukraine, and a screenshot of an article from Newsweek, which refers to an earlier article by the Kyiv Post about the presence of Ukrainians in Syria. This is supposed to give the impression that this “information” has been confirmed by various sources, when in reality it is not. The whole thread is very suggestive, but it lacks any evidence of Ukraine’s participation in the fighting in Syria. Moreover, apart from the US-Turkey connection, there is no evidence of US involvement, which in fact considers HTS a terrorist organization and has offered a reward for the capture of its leader. Moreover, although Israel also appears in the first entry, it does not appear in the subsequent

Disinformation in the Lebanese information space after the ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israel

* * * * * * Disinformation in the Lebanese information space after the ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israel – examples The ongoing conflict between Hezbollah and Israel, and especially the ceasefire signed on November 27, 2024, is associated with many unknowns. On the one hand, the messages addressed to the Lebanese were full of hope and encouraged to return home, especially after reaching an agreement. On the other hand, almost at the same time, the media reported new attacks and violations of the ceasefire by both sides. EXAMPLES OF DISINFORMATION ACTIVITIES: 1. A photo appeared on social media showing an Israeli helicopter allegedly shot down in the Al-Khiyam area in southern Lebanon. According to the posts, the helicopter was supposed to be transporting several dead and wounded Israeli soldiers. A Facebook user shared the photo with the caption: “An Israeli helicopter was just shot down in the #Al-Khiyam area, in southern Lebanon, while transporting several dead and wounded Zionist army soldiers.” Source: https://www.newsmobile.in/nm-fact-checker/fact-check-post-claiming-israeli-helicopter-shot-down-in-lebanon-is-misleading/ Fact check: FALSE. When we Google the image using Reverse Image Search, we come across a report by The Times of Israel from May 20, 2019 with the title: “Hamas fighters tried to shoot down Israeli military helicopter in latest round of fighting.” According to the report, the Israeli helicopter fired flares after a Hamas cell tried to shoot down a military helicopter in the Gaza Strip during clashes in 2019. Sometimes something as simple as using Google’s image search tool allows for quick fact-checking. Report link: https://www.timesofisrael.com/hamas-tried-to-down-an-idf-helicopter-during-fighting-this-month-report/ 2. Social media users have circulated a photo that allegedly shows explosions in Haifa on November 26, 2024, following rocket attacks by Hezbollah. Source: https://misbar.com/en/factcheck/2024/11/28/this-image-does-not-show-explosions-in-haifa-caused-by-hezbollah-rocket-strikes The photo gained popularity after the Israeli military announced that the air force had intercepted rockets fired from Lebanon towards Israeli territory, in the Haifa area. Hezbollah has claimed responsibility for shelling the city of Nahariya and Israeli military positions, as well as two camps in the occupied Golan Heights. Fact check: FALSE. Media outlets published a photo on October 8, 2023, showing an explosion in Rishon Lezion, south of Tel Aviv, after rockets fired by the Palestinian resistance from the Gaza Strip struck. Link to article: https://espanol.almayadeen.net/noticias/politica/1754038/resistencia-palestina-marca-con-fuego-a–tel-aviv * * * A public task financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland within the frame of “Public Diplomacy 2024-2025: The European Dimension and Countering Disinformation” contest The publication expresses only the views of the author and cannot be identified with the official position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland.