“Poland Is Organising a Caliphate”: A Provocation by the Federal Security Service (FSB)
“The accused, acting on the instructions of a foreign emissary of an international terrorist organisation based in Poland, were spreading terrorist ideology among local Muslims and migrant workers,” reads the official statement of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB). In another part of the statement, the FSB refers to “a covert cell of an international terrorist organisation which was planning a violent takeover of power and the establishment of a so-called global caliphate.” At first glance, this may appear to be a report of a genuine threat to the security of the Russian Federation. In reality, however, it is yet another episode in the long-running series of Russian propaganda, in which Poland—alongside NATO and the European Union—plays the role of the principal villain. We asked experts from the INFO OPS laboratory to analyse the footage prepared by the FSB. Thanks to a frame-by-frame examination, we obtained evidence indicating that this is a crude provocation. The video appears to be a staged media operation—and this for several reasons. Signs of a Provocation – Elements of Staging Lack of Operational Dynamics: In many shots, the officers are seen standing in loose groups, moving slowly and without any evident time pressure. In genuine counterterrorism operations, swift, coordinated action dominates, with immediate securing of the area and neutralisation of threats. The footage is recorded from multiple convenient angles—both close-up and wide—as if the purpose were to produce visually appealing scenes for propaganda purposes. One of the officers deliberately turns to face the camera, allowing his face to be recorded—an act that contradicts the protocols of intelligence services, which require the protection of personnel identities. Absence of Basic Security Measures: The video does not show any buffer zone or perimeter patrols securing the location of the operation. Under standard conditions, such an area would be cordoned off with tape, vehicles, or physical barriers. Officers are seen moving with their weapons lowered, with fingers resting on the triggers rather than indexed along the frame—an elementary firearms safety breach. One purported FSB member is shown standing with his back to a potential threat, engaging in casual conversation with another officer instead of monitoring his assigned sector. There is no visible division into operational roles such as assault, perimeter security, or communication, which suggests a lack of genuine tactical preparation. Deviations from Operational Doctrine: At no point is a commanding officer visible overseeing the operation. In professional settings, the commander—or at least a designated radio operator—is responsible for controlling the tempo, coordinating communication, and managing the distinct phases of the arrest. After the alleged suspects are detained, no standard procedure is followed to check for explosives, concealed weapons, or potential links to a broader network. Officers stand near the suspects in an unstructured formation, with no designated observation sectors and without the use of specialist reconnaissance or security equipment. Absence of Psychophysical Features Typical of Real Operations Lack of Adrenaline Response: In genuine counterterrorism operations, one typically observes tense muscles, rapid movements, and short, urgent verbal commands. In the footage under analysis, the movements of the officers are slow, no audible commands are issued, and conversations take place in a calm, unhurried tone. No Signs of Situational Stress Among the Detainees: The individuals being detained show no typical signs of arrest-related stress. They do not resist, panic, attempt to flee, or make any sudden movements. They remain seated calmly, which clearly indicates that this is a staged scenario. The video, which was intended to convey the effectiveness of the FSB and the menace of alleged “Polish terrorism,” reveals itself as a poorly staged performance. The slow pace, lack of professionalism, and deliberately aestheticised shots suggest a piece of propaganda rather than documentation of an actual operation. This is yet another example of how the Kremlin utilises audiovisual media to construct a narrative of a “besieged fortress” while demonising the West—this time with Poland cast as the principal antagonist. The Kremlin’s Script: Poland as an Instigator of Chaos The accusation that Warsaw is inspiring terrorism in Russia is no coincidence. It constitutes yet another step in the broader framework of the Kremlin’s information strategy, which for months has been intensifying narratives that portray Poland as a “provocateur”, a “puppet of Washington”, and a “source of regional destabilisation.” This narrative has now been reinforced with the addition of a terrorism motif—a key term in the Russian propaganda lexicon that immediately triggers fear and a sense of threat within society. It is no accident that this message is being repeated across Russian social media and news platforms, including the Arabic-language version of Sputnik: “The discovery of a Central Asian extremist cell in the Nizhny Novgorod region promoting terrorist ideology on the orders of Poland.” Such a sentence is a textbook example of disinformation: it is simple, emotionally charged, and easy to disseminate further across the media space, including beyond Russia’s borders. The amplification of this narrative by Sputnik Arabic indicates an effort to reach audiences in the Middle East and Asia, where accusations against the West of fomenting chaos may find a receptive audience. A Psychological Operation Targeting the Domestic Audience Why has the Kremlin chosen to take this step now? It is worth viewing this decision within a broader context. Russia is currently grappling with the escalating costs of the war in Ukraine, severe economic sanctions, and mounting social tensions. In such conditions, a classic mechanism for managing public sentiment is the diversion of attention by designating an “external enemy”. In its official statement, the Federal Security Service not only lays the blame on Poland but also highlights the effectiveness of its own actions: “The FSB in the Nizhny Novgorod region has thwarted the activities of a covert cell of an international terrorist organisation banned in Russia, consisting of seven citizens from a Central Asian country.” The message is unequivocal: had it not been for the vigilance of the security services, Russian citizens would have fallen victim to a foreign plot. This type of communication serves not only to
Why Does Iran Need a “Partner” Like Russia?
Why Does Iran Need a “Partner” Like Russia? The Russian ambassador to Iraq, Elbrus Kutrashev, in an interview recently conducted with him by Husham Ali on Al Sharqiyah TV, accidentally revealed what Russia’s “partners” can count on when they need help: nothing. The war between Israel and Iran quickly confirmed these words, although Iran had already received evidence of Russia’s betrayal earlier. It is worth recalling that already in January 2025, the Iranian agency Tabnak revealed that Russia had been “playing in favor of Israel” in Syria, among other things by switching off radars during an Israeli attack on Iranian commanders in that country. As the Iranian agency emphasized, this indicated clear cooperation between Russia and the Israeli project. Russia also sabotaged Iranian aid to Bashar al-Assad during the jihadist offensive, which led to his downfall. The Israeli intelligence network in the Syrian army, loyal to Russia, betrayed the Iranian commander of Aleppo’s defense, Gen. Pourhamshemi, helping in his assassination. If they did it then, can Iran be certain that the Russians did not help Israel target objectives during the twelve-day war? Many indications suggest they did. Iran should ask itself why Russia – despite having received important support from Iran in the form of Shahed drones – did not reciprocate by delivering the S-400 air defense system and Su-35 aircraft, which would have been very useful during the war with Israel. The answer lies in the aforementioned interview with Kutrashev, in which he states that “Russia does not support attacks on Israel because there are 1 million Israelis of Russian origin there.” It is worth adding that among them are pro-Kremlin oligarchs (e.g., Roman Abramovich), who moved a significant part of their assets to Israel to protect themselves from American sanctions. But wasn’t the Russian-Iranian Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership signed in Moscow in January? Kutrashev revealed, however, what a strategic partnership means according to Russia. He emphasized that it is not an alliance, and that Iran cannot count on help in case of an attack – only on the fact that Russia would not support the aggressor. One must admit His Excellency told the truth – and Iran could not count on any assistance from Russia after Israel’s attack. The only question remains: who needs a “strategic partnership” of the kind Russia offers? This also applies to the muqawama in Iraq. If they joined the war, as Kutrashev stated, the only help would consist of “praying for the resistance.” The Israeli-Iranian war was a gift for Russia, but ultimately Iran’s agreement to de-escalation was a blow for it. Russia had counted on Iran to block the Strait of Hormuz, and on the Iraqi muqawama to strike the American embassy and the Al-Asad base. So what if Iraq would then go up in flames, and Iran would face a long and devastating war? The most important thing was that the United States would be drawn into the war and become bogged down in the Middle East. Such a war would not be beneficial for the US, Iraq, or Iran – but it would be very beneficial for Russia. It would divert American forces and resources from Ukraine and Central and Eastern Europe, enabling Moscow to invade the Baltic states. And the ones paying the price would be the Iranians and Iraqis. In addition, oil and gas prices would skyrocket. After all, Russia does not use the Strait of Hormuz. Iran, however, would gain nothing from these price increases except destruction. The same applies to Iraq. In whose interest is Russia acting? Perhaps it is time for some people to finally answer that question. Author: Witlod Repetowicz
Information Warfare Online: Digital Disinformation in Egypt and African Countries
The development of digital technologies has revolutionized the way information is created, disseminated, and consumed worldwide. In the African context—particularly in Egypt—this transformation has opened new opportunities for the advancement of civil societies, while simultaneously giving rise to serious challenges related to information abuse. Increasingly, the digital space is becoming the primary battlefield for political, ideological, and social influence. Disinformation has emerged as a key instrument in this struggle. This analysis explores the phenomenon of digital disinformation in selected African countries, with a particular focus on Egypt, which—due to its geopolitical position, media structure, and mechanisms of state control—offers a uniquely compelling context for research. In the book Digital Disinformation in Africa: Hashtag Politics, Power and Propaganda, edited by Tony Roberts and George H. Karekwaivanane, the authors identify disinformation as one of the fundamental threats to democratic institutions and civil rights on the continent. Disinformation contributes to the distortion of electoral processes, fuels social tensions, and hinders rational public debate on issues such as public health, women’s rights, and migration. In conditions marked by limited transparency and low levels of media literacy, the effects of disinformation tend to be particularly profound and difficult to reverse. This phenomenon has intensified in Africa due to the rapid growth in the number of internet and social media users. Over the past decade, approximately 300 million new individuals have come online, bringing the total number of regular internet users on the continent to around 600 million, with 400 million using social media platforms. However, this development has been highly uneven. For instance, in 2022, more than 70% of the populations in Egypt, Morocco, and the Seychelles had internet access, compared to just 7% in the Central African Republic. Egypt stands out with a relatively high internet penetration rate (over 75%), yet this access remains sharply unequal—concentrated in urban centers and limited in rural areas. Egypt and Africa in the Digital Information Battleground Digital inequalities, limited educational and technological infrastructure, and deficits in media literacy create an environment highly susceptible to information manipulation. In Egypt, an additional key factor is the political model of control over the information space. According to a report by African Arguments, regulations ostensibly aimed at countering disinformation are in practice used to suppress public debate and criminalize independent journalism. Security agencies are authorized to censor online content and penalize users, leading to increased levels of self-censorship and the marginalization of critical voices. From a research perspective, various theoretical approaches are employed to analyze this phenomenon. One of the most widely recognized is the so-called “4D model” proposed by Ben Nimmo of the Atlantic Council’s DFRLab, which identifies four core disinformation strategies: Dismiss, Distort, Distract, and Dismay. The literature also emphasizes the importance of taking historical context into account. According to the analysis by Tony Roberts and George Hamandishe Karekwaivanane, “the legacy of colonialism is a defining feature of African disinformation—a tool of colonial power transposed into the practices of post-independence states.” In the case of Egypt, the history of propaganda dates back to the era of the monarchy, intensified during the Nasser period, and continues today in digital forms. State-run media, controlled platforms, and repressive legislation still play a significant role in managing information narratives. As noted in the 2024 report by CIPESA, despite the presence of independent fact-checking initiatives, their impact remains limited—largely due to the dominance of state or government-affiliated media, the lack of algorithmic transparency, and an atmosphere of fear among internet users. Both historical and contemporary information operations—such as the Cambridge Analytica campaign in Kenya—demonstrate the continuity of this phenomenon and point to its evolution toward increasingly technologically sophisticated methods of influence. The authors of Digital Disinformation in Africa emphasize, however, that it is not the technology itself that generates disinformation, but rather the people and institutions who use it as a tool for manipulation. Its reach and effectiveness grow in direct proportion to social inequalities, legal constraints, and the weaknesses of democratic institutions. Cases of Information and Psychological Operations In Egypt, the government of President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has been actively using digital channels to shape public opinion by promoting nationalist narratives and delegitimizing political and social opponents. These campaigns often combine disinformation techniques with elements of psychological operations, making them particularly effective. A notable example is the targeting of the Sudanese refugee community, carried out as a campaign aimed at fostering social distance and hostility. An investigation by Beam Reports revealed that social media in Egypt had been flooded with content dehumanizing refugees. This included the dissemination of a manipulated video featuring a supposed “historian” who compared the presence of Sudanese people to an occupation in ancient Egypt. The campaign was associated with hashtags such as #Deportation_of_Sudanese and #Egypt_for_Egyptians, which gained widespread popularity and were promoted by well-known journalists and influencers, including Hala Sarhan. Refugees were portrayed as the cause of the economic crisis, a threat to Egyptian identity, and an “external force destabilizing the state.” Alongside anti-immigration campaigns, the Egyptian authorities have also carried out actions targeting women involved in social activism. As noted in the chapter dedicated to gendered disinformation in the book Digital Disinformation in Africa, Egyptian activists, journalists, and female politicians were regularly attacked on social media using sexist messages, suggestions of immorality, or a “lack of patriotism.” The aim was often to discredit women as incapable of representing the national interest or as “Western agents.” This points to the use of disinformation to maintain social and gender hierarchies, which fits into a broader trend on the continent. These types of actions are supported by state structures. The Egyptian Ministry of Communications and Information Technology (MOCIET) cooperates with national security services and the Public Prosecutor’s Office in identifying and prosecuting social media users accused of “spreading false information.” The 2018 media laws, including the so-called Cybercrime Law, make it possible to block accounts and detain individuals who publish content considered to be contrary to “national security.” This system is supplemented by the use of advanced tools to monitor digital
A Thousand-Year Conflict? Russia’s Historical Narrative as a Tool of Propaganda in the Arab World
The Russian documentary “Russia – Poland. A Conflict Lasting a Thousand Years” presents the history of Polish–Russian relations as an unbroken chain of hostility and conflict, stretching from the medieval era to the present day. Right from the start, the narrator emphasizes an alleged eternal enmity, stating that “Russians and Poles are two Slavic nations that have lived side by side for centuries… but since the 10th century, Poland and Russia have been in conflict.” This fatalistic claim is further developed by attributing the division between the two nations to religious differences: Poland, the narrator states, was “baptized by the Vatican,” while Russia was “baptized by Byzantium.” In doing so, the film immediately constructs a vision of a historical clash of civilizations—Catholic Western Europe represented by Poland, and Orthodox Eastern Europe embodied by Russia. However, this historical framing does not serve as a reliable analysis of the past; rather, it is part of a broader propaganda strategy. The Kremlin employs an emotionally charged and compelling historical narrative to influence the Arab information space. Historical references are carefully selected and interpreted in a way that resonates with the lived experiences and emotional sensitivities of audiences across the MENA region. Historical Narrative in the Service of Kremlin Propaganda The narrator employs a form of historical fatalism, presenting the conflict as inevitable and centuries-old. This framing is intended to suggest a simple conclusion to Arab viewers: that Poles and Russians have always been enemies, and therefore, current tensions are merely a natural continuation of an age-old war. Such a deterministic narrative leaves no room for alternative interpretations and ignores long periods of peaceful coexistence and cooperation between the two nations. Importantly, the very assumption of a “thousand-year” Polish–Russian neighborhood is historically inaccurate. Russian statehood in the Muscovite sense—commonly recognized as the direct predecessor of the modern Russian Federation—emerged only in the 14th century. Regular diplomatic relations and conflicts with Poland did not begin until the 15th or 16th century. The earlier history of Kievan Rus’ bears no direct connection to Moscow, either geographically or politically. Nevertheless, the film deliberately blurs the lines between Kievan Rus’, the Grand Duchy of Moscow, the Tsardom of Russia, the Soviet Union, and today’s Russian Federation—treating them as a single, continuous political and geopolitical entity. This narrative device is designed to create the illusion that Russia has always existed as a unified actor on the European stage. In reality, this is a deeply misleading oversimplification. To the uninformed viewer in the Arab world, unfamiliar with the intricacies of Eastern European history, this storyline may appear coherent and convincing. But in fact, it is one of the most insidious distortions used to conceal the truth: that Russia, as an imperial structure, entered the European political landscape centuries after the establishment of the Kingdom of Poland. Moreover, from its very first minutes, the documentary deliberately blends historical narrative with current political messaging. Contemporary Poland is portrayed as “the vanguard of NATO aimed at Russia”—a country portrayed as blindly hostile toward Russia, allegedly due to Western propaganda. The narrator claims that “Poland is now one of the most hostile countries toward Russia,” a country on whose territory military bases were established after World War II, and where American forces are now stationed. The film even cites a specific figure—over 100 military bases—which the United States is allegedly planning to deploy in Poland in the coming years. Such exaggerated claims are intended to give Arab viewers the impression that Poland is heavily militarized and poses a direct threat to Russia. As the narrator concludes, “the Russian people see this as a serious threat coming from Poland—a threat backed by the United States.” This portrayal of Poland—as a puppet of the West and a forward operating base for an anti-Russian offensive—deliberately taps into themes that are deeply familiar to audiences in the Arab world. The emphasis on NATO and “overseas partners” (namely, the U.S.) resonates with widespread anti-Western sentiment and suspicion of foreign intervention across the MENA region. Many Arab viewers, shaped by their own historical experiences with Western interference, are likely to interpret this narrative as a modern analogue to imperial policy—casting NATO as a contemporary colonizer and Poland as its local proxy. In this way, the Kremlin’s messaging cleverly exploits existing stereotypes and lingering resentments: if NATO and the U.S. are seen as destabilizing forces, then any country hosting their bases—such as Poland—is, by association, suspect. This implied association may trigger an instinctive aversion toward Poland among Arab audiences, even before they are exposed to any factual or balanced information. It is worth noting that Russian historical propaganda does not avoid invoking the theme of “brotherly nations.” The film, despite its overall antagonistic tone, does mention that Poles and Russians share many characteristics as Slavs. However, this motif of brotherhood is immediately contrasted with scenes of conflict. This contrast is likely intentional: in the Middle East, stories of feuding brothers are deeply familiar. Despite shared language and religion, the Arab world has also experienced divisions and internal wars. Arab viewers may subconsciously relate the Catholic-Orthodox Slavic split to their own lived experiences—such as rivalries between Arab states or conflicts rooted in sectarian divisions. These kinds of cultural references, particularly those involving “fraternal” disputes, make the Russian narrative more relatable and seemingly credible to a MENA audience. History is thus used here as a universal parable, with a moral drawn from the Kremlin’s perspective—crafted to guide the viewer toward certain political conclusions. In summary, the Kremlin is consciously rewriting history for a specific audience. It employs a calculated blend of facts, half-truths, and emotionally resonant interpretations to produce a compelling narrative. The objective is clear: to generate among Arab viewers a sense of understanding—or even justification—for Russia’s current stance toward Poland and the broader region, by framing it as the natural outcome of a thousand-year-old history. Before diving into concrete examples of such manipulation, it is important to examine the general mechanisms of disinformation deployed throughout the film. Mechanisms of Manipulation
Kutrashev’s Middle East Messaging Unravels Under Pressing Questions
During a live interview on Iraq’s Al Sharqiyah TV, Russian Ambassador to Iraq Elbrus Kutrashev struggled to address challenging questions, often avoiding clear answers or resorting to statements that appeared dismissive of the audience’s intelligence. Accustomed to more favorable media treatment, Kutrashev attempted to undermine journalist Husham Ali by labeling him a “friend of Russia,” implying that this would put him under American surveillance. The journalist rejected this insinuation, emphasizing his commitment to maintaining a balanced and neutral approach with all interviewees. Denying Involvement in Assad’s Inner Circle The interview began with questions about Syria and the country’s ousted leader, Bashar al-Assad. When asked about an alleged attempt to poison Assad in Moscow, Kutrashev responded that he “knew nothing about it” and claimed that if it had happened, he would “almost certainly” be aware of it. When questioned about whether Russia’s embassy in Iraq had assisted Assad’s brother, Maher, in leaving the country, Kutrashev replied mockingly, asking, “Does he have no other friends in Iraq?” He then added that such assistance would have been impossible because it would contradict diplomatic protocols. Kutrashev also stated that the Russian embassy is guarded by Iraqi security forces and is under constant surveillance by both American drones and British intelligence services. At the same time, Kutrashev claimed that Russia does not conduct surveillance on anyone in Iraq because it lacks the technological capability—such as drones—and because, according to him, Russia “does not settle scores with other countries” in Iraq, unlike the United States, which, he alleged, “gathers information on various politicians.” However, he refused to specify what kind of information is allegedly being collected or about whom, raising questions about how he could have such knowledge if, as he claims, Russian intelligence operates no activities in Iraq. This exchange highlighted the contradictions in Kutrashev’s statements, as the journalist continued to press him, forcing the ambassador to either evade the questions or trivialize the topic. Ultimately, when asked again about Maher al-Assad, Kutrashev stated that the embassy had no contact with him and that he did not know whether Maher was currently in Moscow. A Selective Moral Compass: Assad Versus Tsurkov When asked about the possibility of reaching an agreement with Syria’s new authorities on the extradition of Bashar al-Assad, Kutrashev stated that Russia “does not participate in immoral deals.” This statement stood in stark contrast to his later response regarding Russia’s inaction in the case of Elisabeth Tsurkov, an Israeli journalist with Russian citizenship who was kidnapped in March 2023 in Iraq by armed groups known as the muqawama—Shiite militias linked to Iran, supported by Russia, and with whom Kutrashev reportedly maintains close relations. Kutrashev explained that Russia had taken no action because it had not received any official, written notification about her abduction. This suggests that, according to Kutrashev, handing over a dictator responsible for the mass killing of his own people would be “immoral,” while taking action to protect a kidnapped Russian citizen is “impossible” without paperwork. Against this backdrop, Kutrashev’s earlier claim that Russia prioritizes its international reputation comes across as highly cynical and disingenuous. Russia’s Embrace of “Resistance” and Its Colonial Legacy As for the muqawama itself (a term meaning “resistance” in Arabic), Kutrashev claimed that Russia does not support the muqawama as an organization, but rather the idea of “resistance” in general, which, as he put it, “is in our soul and blood.” He further asserted that “since the days of the USSR, we have supported resistance against occupation, colonialism, and imperialism. We played a key role in the collapse of colonialism. And now we continue the same efforts against neo-colonialism.” However, such statements stand in stark contrast to historical reality. Russia remains one of the last colonial empires and openly embraces this identity, as widely reflected in Russian state media and political discourse. Throughout the 19th century, and later under the Soviet Union in the 20th century, Russia expanded its borders by conquering numerous nations and states, colonizing them with ethnic Russians. The USSR also occupied nearly all of Central Europe for over 45 years. Kutrashev’s claim that “Russia was not a colonial power in the Middle East or anywhere” and that “whenever we enter a country, we establish equal relations” presents a distorted narrative that is characteristic of the propaganda tactics he employs. Justifying Attacks on U.S. Bases as “Resistance” Kutrashev’s evasive responses to questions about supporting the muqawama reflect Russia’s desire to maintain ties with these groups without openly endorsing their attacks on U.S. bases in Iraq—bases that operate with the official authorization of the Iraqi government. At the same time, Kutrashev dismissed any comparison between the U.S. military presence in Iraq and Russia’s presence in Syria, framing the former as an occupation. This was a deliberate manipulation, as U.S. forces, which entered Iraq in 2003, were withdrawn in 2011, formally ending the occupation. The current U.S. military presence is based on Iraq’s 2014 request for international assistance in the fight against ISIS. Nevertheless, this narrative allowed Kutrashev to justify muqawama attacks on U.S. facilities as legitimate acts of resistance under the UN Charter. He further claimed that Russia’s response to U.S. airstrikes against muqawama groups is that “150 million Russians are praying” for their fighters. Kutrashev also implied that Russia would express similar solidarity if Iran were to come under attack. In the context of developments in Syria, Kutrashev was also asked why Russia appears to be abandoning its long-time partners, such as Bashar al-Assad in Syria and Saddam Hussein in Iraq. The Russian ambassador strongly rejected this accusation, claiming that Assad’s downfall was the result of Syria’s internal dynamics. He added that “Russia was the last to carry out airstrikes against opposition forces in Idlib.” However, when asked about the transfer of Russian heavy military equipment from Syria to Libya, Kutrashev stated that this equipment was needed in Libya because of ongoing fighting there and the need to target terrorists. This response directly contradicted his earlier claim that Russia had already ceased
Egypt as an Arena of Information Operations – Analysis of Contemporary Influence Strategies
* * * * * * In an era of constant change in the global communication sphere, the Egyptian media environment is becoming a place where advanced influence operations acquire a new dimension. Among the numerous narratives and messages that shape public opinion, the actions undertaken by Russia and China attract particular attention. Can the mechanisms used by these states influence the perception of reality in a region where emotions and historical experiences constitute a significant element in shaping social attitudes? Analysis of Information Operations Russian Influence Operations Destabilisation of the Image of the West and Poland Russian narratives systematically portray NATO, the EU and the USA as aggressors, destabilisers and neo-imperial forces. Particular attention is paid to Poland – presented as a key member of NATO and a state bordering Ukraine – which is attributed the role of a participant in the alleged plan to divide Ukraine. Such messages aim to undermine the trust of Egyptian society in Western structures and to create the image of Western states as aggressive instruments of imperialism. Creating a Positive Image of Russia In contrast to the negative portrait of the West, Russian propaganda builds the image of Russia as a stable and friendly partner. Examples of such actions include, inter alia, promoting cooperation with Egypt within the framework of BRICS, showcasing infrastructure projects such as the Dabaa nuclear power plant, as well as presenting initiatives such as collections of gifts for soldiers, which are intended to suggest broad international support for Russian aggressive actions in Ukraine. Chinese Information Strategies Emphasis on Economic and Technological Aspects Chinese information activities in Egypt are characterised by a lower level of confrontationalism than those of the Russians, and their main emphasis is placed on economic issues and the modernisation of infrastructure. Key elements of the message include, inter alia, the intensive promotion of Chinese investments in the Suez Canal Economic Zone (SCZone), subtle support for anti-Western narratives through references to the alleged threat posed by NATO infrastructure in Poland, and the creation of an image of China as a reliable partner in Egypt’s energy and technological transformation. Mechanisms of Psychological Operations and Propaganda Techniques Use of Emotional Manipulations Both strategies – Russian and Chinese – employ advanced persuasive techniques that affect the emotions of recipients. Among the key mechanisms are: Fear and mistrust: Messages that create an impression of threat from Western interventions and military alliances. Anger and frustration: Narratives accusing the West of economic exploitation and imposing unfavourable economic conditions. Cultural identity: Emphasising cultural differences that are intended to suggest the imposition by the West of values incompatible with the region’s traditions. Agenda Setting and Framing Propaganda also employs techniques of selective topic emphasis: Agenda setting: Pro-Russian media, such as Sputnik Arabic and RT Arabic, select topics that dominate the message, giving them strategic priority. Framing: International events, such as military operations or political interventions, are presented in a manner that imposes a specific interpretation on the audience – often emphasising the positive image of the actions of Russia and China and the negative character of Western interventions. Use of Traditional and Digital Media In the Egyptian information space, a clear symbiosis is observed between state media and modern digital platforms. The dominance of state-controlled channels enables the widespread distribution of propaganda messages. Furthermore, social media activity is utilised, where, through repetitive narratives and engaging formats (e.g. memes, videos), younger audiences are reached. Operations Targeting the Perception of Poland and NATO Particular attention is also paid to narratives aimed against Poland and NATO. Example techniques include, for instance, creating false accusations of the division of Ukraine and portraying Poland as an aggressor, utilising events such as the closure of the Russian Consulate General in Poznań to build an image of Poland as an instrument of Western imperial ambitions, and the mobilisation of negative emotions, such as fear of destabilisation and anger towards external interference, which is intended to undermine the credibility of Western institutions. Analysing the Egyptian information sphere, it can be stated that the information operations carried out by Russia and China are highly complex and precisely targeted. The mechanisms employed in these campaigns – from the selective choice of topics, through the repetition of the message, to the profound manipulation of emotions – can have a significant impact on shaping public opinion in Egypt. In the context of local social and economic conditions, the propagandistic actions aimed against Western states may lead to lasting changes in the perception of international alliances and political relations. Source and Background of the Analysis This analysis is based on the chapter of the report “Study of the Egyptian Information Environment”, developed within the framework of the Albatros II – MENA – Counteracting Disinformation and Information Threats to Democratic Values and Institutions, which adversely affects international relations and negatively influences the image of Poland in Lebanon, Iraq and Egypt. The report “Study of the Impact of Disinformation and Propaganda on MENA Societies — Report, Defence Strategies and Implementation of Recommendations” constitutes a multifaceted analysis of the Egyptian media environment, in which the structure and characteristics of the media, the information habits of society, and the influence mechanisms employed by external entities are presented in detail. We invite you to familiarise yourself with the full version of the report, which provides valuable information and recommendations for analysts and experts involved in information security in the MENA region.
Failure of the Russian influence operation? The Shia admit that Russia was “playing with Israel” behind their backs
* * * * * * Since the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, there has been a sharp decline in the public activity of the Russian ambassador to Iraq, Elbrus Kutrashev. An analysis of pro-Iranian Shia media in Iraq, which had previously actively promoted Russia, indicates disappointment with Russia, which may explain its decision to temporarily lie low. The Shia television channel Al-Ahad, affiliated with the Asaib Ahl al-Haq group and its leader Qais al-Khazali, published a report on 8 January accusing Russia of “playing in favour of Israel” in Syria and “abandoning the Iranian strategy” regarding the fight against jihadists from HTS, who took control in Syria. This report refers to a conversation broadcast by the Iranian news agency Tabnak between Iranian commanders and General Staff officials, revealing that Assad’s army was corrupt and not only avoided combat but also, under pressure from Russia and others, sabotaged Iranian forces’ attempts to undertake military action in Syria. The report cited by Al-Ahad also states that the Syrian army did not provide any weaponry to Iranian forces stationed in Aleppo, which led to the rapid capture of the city by HTS and the killing of the Iranian forces’ commander, General Kiomars Purhashemi. The Al-Ahad report also indicates that Russia supported Israel’s actions following Iran’s strike on the country in April 2024. Citing Tabnak, Al-Ahad states that “Russia turned off Russian radars during Israel’s attack on Iranian commanders in Syria, which is clear evidence of Russia’s cooperation with Israel.” The report further quotes a commander of Iran’s Sepah, who claims that “Russia abandoned Iran’s land strategy aimed at defeating terrorist groups, promising to carry out airstrikes. However, it turned out that the airstrikes targeted residential homes and desert areas rather than the military targets of the Tahrir al-Sham organisation.” Reports that Assad regime officials, acting on Russian orders, provided Israel with data on the deployment of Iranian forces in Syria to facilitate their bombing emerged as early as mid-December. These reports were based on leaked documents detailing contacts between the Syrian Ministry of Defence and an Israeli intelligence officer overseeing the operation, known by the codename “Mousa.” This revelation was not particularly surprising, as it had long been known that Russia forbade Assad from activating Syria’s air defence systems during Israeli airstrikes on Iranian positions in Syria. The only real surprise was that, despite this, Iran supplied Russia with drones, which it later used in Ukraine, while media outlets like Al-Ahad continued to promote Kutrashev’s absurd narratives about Europe, the world wars, and the war in Ukraine. The Al-Ahad report may signal the beginning of a shift in the narrative of pro-Iranian Shia media regarding the situation in Syria. Until now, they had promoted a conspiracy theory attributing Assad’s downfall to a coalition of Israel, jihadists, Turkey, and the West. To some extent, this narrative aligned with Russia’s efforts to frame Assad’s overthrow within the context of its so-called “lone struggle” against “Western aggression” on multiple fronts, including Ukraine and the Middle East. The recent report exposes the falsehood of this narrative. The open question remains what strategy Russia will now adopt to rebuild its influence among Iraqi Shia groups and whether, by playing on anti-Western sentiments, it will once again succeed in deceiving these circles. * * * Compiled by: Witold Repetowicz | shafafiyat.com * * *
Propaganda activities targeting perceptions of the West and democratic values in Egypt
* * * * * * Egypt, situated in a strategic location at the crossroads of Africa and the Middle East, has long been a pivotal reference point for various political and social initiatives. Due to its geopolitical significance, the country has found itself at the centre of complex and often competing propaganda efforts aimed at shaping public opinion towards distrust of the West and democratic values. Here, the influences of global powers such as Russia and China, striving to strengthen their positions in the region, collide with those of traditional Western allies who continue to play a significant role in Egypt’s politics and economy. At the same time, Egyptian society, having been shaped over the years by external influences and numerous internal tensions, demonstrates a susceptibility to narratives favouring conservative, authoritarian models of governance. In the face of economic uncertainty and the lingering memories of the colonial era, anti-Western messaging easily finds fertile ground, further bolstered by both state and non-state media. While the sense of threat posed by the West remains a prominent theme, it is impossible to overlook cultural and historical factors that influence the distribution of political sympathies. Understanding these phenomena is crucial to devising effective strategies for countering disinformation and promoting more open and democratic attitudes in the region. The following material constitutes one of the chapters of the Report: Study of the Information Environment in Egypt and outlines the scale, context, and specific elements of disinformation activities targeting democratic values and perceptions of the West in Egypt. The observations and recommendations presented herein are significant not only for communication and security professionals but also for non-governmental organisations, academic circles, and citizens interested in Egypt’s future. Key Propaganda Narratives The West as an Aggressor The West, including the USA and NATO, is portrayed as a provocateur of global conflicts, particularly in the context of the war in Ukraine. This is exemplified by narratives framing it as “forcing Russia to defend itself” against NATO. These narratives highlight Western interventions in the Middle East (Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan), portraying them as actions motivated solely by economic and geopolitical interests. Democracy as a Tool of Control Democracy and human rights are depicted as instruments of neo-colonial control, used by the West to interfere in the internal affairs of Egypt and other developing countries. For example, criticism is directed at Western financial institutions (IMF, World Bank), which are portrayed as tools of economic exploitation. Double Standards The West is accused of hypocrisy, advocating for human rights in selected regions while ignoring violations in allied states, such as Israel. This selective approach generates particular frustration in Egypt. Cultural Domination Western media are presented as promoting Islamophobia and fuelling antagonism against Muslims and refugees. At the same time, emphasis is placed on Western attempts to impose cultural values that conflict with Egypt’s national identity. Criticism of Western Foreign Policy Russian Arabic-language media portray the United States as a country striving to maintain global hegemony through financial and political manipulation, aimed at weakening other nations and keeping them dependent on American interests. The European Union is depicted as following U.S. policies, even at the expense of its own economic and energy interests, leading to internal crises and weakening Europe’s position on the global stage. Undermining NATO’s Unity and Effectiveness NATO is portrayed as an alliance incapable of effectively addressing contemporary challenges, with its actions often inconsistent and inefficient. Russian media suggest that internal divisions and a lack of consensus within NATO undermine its position as a global security guarantor. Negative Portrayal of Western Leaders Western leaders are sometimes depicted as incompetent or acting against the interests of their own citizens. This aims to undermine their authority and legitimacy. These narratives highlight political mistakes and failures, both internationally and domestically, to foster distrust in Western leaders. Promoting Alternative Alliances and Agreements Initiatives such as BRICS are promoted as a viable alternative to Western economic and political structures, suggesting that cooperation with non-Western countries offers greater benefits and stability. Russian media emphasise the successes of partnerships with countries like China, presenting them as a model of effective cooperation in contrast to relations with the West. The analysis of content disseminated by Russian Arabic-language media highlights the dominance of narratives critical of the foreign and domestic policies of Western countries, undermining NATO’s unity and effectiveness, and promoting alternative alliances as more beneficial for countries like Egypt. Western leaders are often portrayed in a negative light, aiming to weaken their authority in the eyes of the Egyptian public. Propaganda Mechanisms 1. Channels and Sources Traditional and Social Media: State-controlled Russian agencies (e.g., Sputnik, RT) and Chinese platforms such as @mog_china disseminate content aimed at undermining NATO and Western positions. Local Media: Some Egyptian media outlets replicate foreign narratives, reinforcing their impact by emphasising historical grievances against colonialism. 2. Techniques Manipulation of Facts: Information is taken out of context, such as tragic events involving migrants, to portray the West as a destabilising force. Narratives about “Western plans to control Egypt through debt and interference in domestic politics” are amplified. Emotional Narratives: Sensitive topics, such as Palestinian rights, are exploited to deepen mistrust towards the West. Impact on Public Opinion 1. Perception of the West The West is perceived as a dominant power imposing its political and economic interests on Egypt. Admiration for the “strong leadership” of Vladimir Putin in opposing the West enhances the positive perception of Russia, particularly among conservative social groups. 2. Influence on Democratic Values Propaganda fosters scepticism towards democracy as a political system, promoting alternative governance models, such as “stable authoritarianism.” 3. Social Tensions Propagated narratives exacerbate divisions between proponents of pro-Western reforms and traditionalists who view democracy as a threat to Egypt’s cultural identity. Expert Opinion Consultations with a local partner reveal that Egyptian society exhibits a deep susceptibility to anti-Western narratives due to a historical lack of trust in external powers and a widespread belief in Western interference in regional affairs. The expert emphasises that social media, particularly among young people,
Egypt as a Target of Russia’s and China’s Information Operations
* * * * * * Egypt as a Target of Russia’s and China’s Information Operations During the analyzed period (September–December 2024), the Egyptian information environment was marked by intense propaganda and disinformation activities by Russia, alongside a more subtle but consistent presence by China. These actions aimed to influence Egyptian public opinion, political elites, as well as regional and international audiences. The main vector of influence was an attempt to portray Russia and China as stable partners promoting an alternative global order, opposing Western dominance, while simultaneously undermining the credibility and intentions of Western countries, including Poland, NATO, and the United States. The analysis demonstrates that Egypt represents a key arena for informational penetration by these powers due to its strategic location, economic significance, and regional position within MENA. Information operations conducted by Russia and China in Egypt exploit existing tensions, economic and energy pressures, and the country’s limited media freedom to construct narratives favorable to Beijing and Moscow and detrimental to the image of the West, including Poland. Russian narratives aggressively undermine trust in NATO and EU countries, depicting them as aggressors and forces striving for hegemony. Chinese activities are subtler but reinforce this line of argumentation while simultaneously promoting economic alternatives and a multipolar order. Consequently, Egyptian society receives a distorted view of geopolitical reality, which may influence Cairo’s long-term strategic decisions. To counteract this influence, Poland and Western countries must actively engage in public diplomacy, strengthen independent media, support information pluralism, and promote positive, fact-based narratives concerning economic, technological, and cultural cooperation. Without coordinated efforts, Russian and Chinese disinformation activities will continue to hinder effective collaboration with Egypt and the MENA region. Directions and Narratives of Russian Influence Operations Anti-Western and Anti-NATO Narratives: Russia consistently promotes a narrative portraying NATO, the EU, and the USA as aggressors, destabilizers, and neo-imperial forces. Poland, as one of NATO’s key members and a neighboring country to Ukraine, frequently appears in Russian messaging as a purported initiator or beneficiary of a “plan” to divide Ukraine. Russian propaganda in Arabic-language Egyptian media (e.g., through Sputnik Arabic) has depicted Poland and Western countries as forces seeking to occupy Ukraine under the guise of a “peace mission,” aiming to solidify the belief that the West operates with double standards and pursues hidden imperial goals. These anti-Western and anti-NATO narratives aim to erode Egyptian society’s trust in Western countries (the EU, the USA), organizations such as NATO, and their allies (including Poland). Russian propaganda portrays the West as aggressive and imperialist, imposing its will on other countries. In this framing, NATO is not a defensive alliance but a tool of political and military domination. In the Egyptian context, these narratives exploit the region’s sensitivity to Western interventions (e.g., the wars in Iraq, Libya, or Western support for Israel) and Egypt’s challenging economic and energy situation. They create an image of a world where Russia and China offer an alternative to the current “unjust” Western hegemony. Anti-Western Exploitation of Anti-Israel Sentiments: Given the importance of the Palestinian issue and the role of Israel in Middle Eastern narratives, Russian propaganda and its sympathetic sources in the region link criticism of the West with anti-Israel rhetoric. They construct an image of the West as a protector of Israel, which, in the eyes of many audiences in Egypt and the broader Arab world, reinforces the negative perception of NATO and the USA. Poland and the Eastern Flank NATO Countries as “Tools” and “Puppets” of the West: NATO is portrayed as an organization deliberately expanding eastward, threatening the security of other states. Alleged plans to deploy Western troops to Ukraine as “peacekeeping forces” are presented as a pretext for the de facto occupation of the country. Poland, Romania, and the Baltic states are depicted as extensions of U.S. and NATO policies, lacking autonomy, with the aim of weakening their image as independent political actors. This creates the impression that these countries are executing American ambitions, such as supposed plans to divide Ukraine, annex territories, or militarize the eastern border. Demonizing Western Aid to Ukraine: Military and financial aid to Ukraine is framed as a step toward integrating the country into Western structures to subordinate it to EU and U.S. interests. This narrative omits the actual reasons for the support (Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the desire to defend Ukrainian sovereignty) and instead emphasizes alleged plans for the “colonization” of Ukraine or the exploitation of its resources. Exploiting Anti-Semitism and Conspiracy Theories: Russian propagandists have spread false narratives about alleged mass immigration of Jews to Ukraine via Poland. The aim was to stir mistrust and animosity in Arab societies, which are sensitive to issues related to Palestine and Israel. In this way, Russia sought to link anti-Israeli rhetoric with anti-Western sentiment, reinforcing a negative image of Poland in the eyes of Egyptians as a co-conspirator in purported colonial or manipulative actions. Creating a False Image of Russia as a Stable and Friendly Partner: Russia positions itself as a reliable and friendly partner, contrasting its alleged stability and respect for sovereignty with the purported aggressiveness and double standards of the West. This narrative seeks to appeal to societies and governments in the region by promoting Russia as a counterbalance to Western “imperialism” and an advocate of a multipolar world order. Building Russia’s Image as a Defender of a Multipolar Order: Russian narratives emphasized cooperation with Egypt within the BRICS framework, with a focus on independence from the dollar and Western institutions. Russian diplomats and state media highlighted infrastructure projects, such as the Dabaa nuclear power plant, as evidence of the durability and benefits of the Moscow-Cairo partnership. Russian stories about collections of gifts for soldiers fighting in Ukraine, allegedly from various countries, including Poland, aimed to demonstrate international support for Russia. This messaging reinforced the narrative that, despite official criticism from the West, there is grassroots support for Russian policies, even in countries perceived as aligned with NATO. Key Directions and Narratives of Chinese Information Operations: China operates less confrontationally than
Debunking Russian Narratives on Neocolonialism: An Analysis for MENA Countries
* * * * * * Debunking Russian Narratives on Neocolonialism: An Analysis for MENA Countries Russian propaganda in the MENA region, particularly in media and diplomatic spaces such as the Russian embassy’s website in Cairo, promotes narratives of a “struggle against neocolonialism” to position Russia as a defender of global justice. This rhetoric often centers on criticizing Western powers—namely the United States, France, and the United Kingdom—blaming them for historical and contemporary colonial crimes. This article juxtaposes Russian narratives with historical truths, exposing Moscow’s hypocrisy and its actual role in colonial and imperial systems, both in the past and in the present. Russia and the Berlin Conference: Concealed Responsibility for Colonialism Russia was an active participant in the Berlin Conference (1884–1885), during which European powers delineated the division of Africa. Although Russian propaganda often omits its involvement in this narrative, Moscow signed and ratified the General Act of the Conference, which established the principles for the colonization of Africa, including: The Principle of Effective Occupation – requiring actual control over colonies. Free Trade on the Congo River and its Basin – ensuring open commercial access. The Ban on Slave Trade – a seemingly humanitarian measure that legitimized colonial exploitation of Africa’s resources. It is important to emphasize that the United States, present at the conference only as an observer, did not sign these agreements. In contrast, Russia fully accepted the European colonial order established at the conference. Russia and the USSR as Imperial Powers: Expansion and Colonization Over Centuries Like other colonial powers, Russia pursued an aggressive policy of expansion and colonization from the 18th century onward, with effects that are still felt today. During the era of the Russian Empire and later the Soviet Union, Moscow’s actions toward subjugated nations were imperialistic in nature, leading to systematic exploitation of resources, Russification, and the destruction of local cultures. In the modern era, Russia continues to regard these territories as part of its “sphere of influence,” exemplifying its neocolonial ambitions. Examples of Russia’s Imperial Policy: Central Asia: Colonization of Nations: Nations such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan were colonized as part of Russia’s eastward expansion. Kazakhstan was colonized starting in the mid-18th century, Uzbekistan from the mid-19th century (with Russia capturing Tashkent in 1865), and Turkmenistan was ultimately conquered in 1884. Russification and Economic Exploitation: These regions were subjected to Russification and economic exploitation, with their economies subordinated to the needs of the empire. Contemporary Neocolonial Influence: To this day, Russia seeks to maintain its influence in Central Asia through economic and political dependencies, such as control over energy resources and military alliances. This reflects Russia’s ongoing neocolonial ambitions in the region. 2. The Caucasus: Annexation and Militarization: In the 19th century, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan were annexed by the Russian Empire, initiating a process of assimilation and military domination over the region. Repression and Forced Displacement: Russian policies included repression of local traditions and identities, as well as mass deportations of populations, particularly in Muslim-majority areas such as Chechnya and Dagestan. Modern Neocolonial Approach: Contemporary Russia views the Caucasus as a strategically crucial region and treats it through a neocolonial lens. This is evident in its suppression of local independence movements, such as those in Chechnya. 3. Poland and the Baltic States: Territorial Annexation: Following the partitions of Poland (late 18th century), Russia seized Polish territories as well as present-day Lithuania, Belarus, and right-bank Ukraine. The territories of present-day Latvia and Estonia were incorporated into the Russian Empire after the Great Northern War (1700–1721). Russification Policies: In the 19th century, Russia implemented forced Russification, introducing the Russian language in schools and administration, suppressing local religions (e.g., Catholicism in Poland), and imposing harsh reprisals on efforts to regain independence. Contemporary Neocolonial Ambitions: Despite these nations regaining independence after the fall of the USSR, Russia continues to regard them as part of its historical sphere of influence. This is evident in ongoing attempts at political interference, economic pressure, and disinformation campaigns. The USSR – A Colonial Empire Disguised as Internationalism Although the Soviet Union proclaimed anti-colonial ideals, it effectively pursued imperialist policies toward nations within its sphere of influence: Forced Relocations: Millions of people from the Caucasus, Crimean Tatars, and other ethnic groups were deported to Siberia or Central Asia. Economic Exploitation: Peripheral regions were exploited as sources of raw materials for the center (Moscow), while remaining economically underdeveloped. Russification: The imposition of the Russian language and suppression of national identities mirrored Western colonial practices in Africa. Modern Hypocrisy of Russia Russian propaganda leverages anti-colonial slogans to gain support in the MENA region, accusing the West of colonialism. However, the facts reveal that: Russia’s Neocolonial Policy Towards Its Republics and Peripheries: For years, Russia has pursued policies that can be described as internal neocolonialism, characterized by the exploitation of natural resources in its republics and resource-rich regions inhabited by nations with distinct cultural and ethnic identities. The profits from this exploitation flow primarily to the center of power—Moscow—while local communities remain impoverished, marginalized, and deprived of autonomy. A closer examination of Russia’s current colonial policies reveals: Economic Exploitation: Resource-rich regions, such as Siberia and the North Caucasus, are heavily mined and drilled, with revenues channeled to Moscow while local infrastructure and living standards lag behind. Suppression of Autonomy: Efforts to centralize control prevent regional governments from independently managing their resources or political systems, maintaining systemic inequality. Cultural Assimilation: The imposition of Russian language and culture continues to erode local identities, mirroring colonial practices. By promoting an anti-colonial narrative abroad while engaging in neocolonial practices at home, Russia exposes the contradictions and hypocrisy of its propaganda. Key Regions and Resources: Sakha Republic (Yakutia) Natural Resources: Diamonds: Yakutia is Russia’s largest diamond producer, accounting for approximately 95% of the country’s output and 25% of the global supply. Other Resources: The region is also rich in oil, natural gas, coal, and metals such as gold and uranium. Neocolonial Exploitation: Revenue Distribution: Profits from resource extraction flow to the central Russian budget, leaving local