Secondary Disinformation: How Russia Exploits the 2022 Gas Supply Cutoff in Ongoing Propaganda
In early November 2024, posts appeared on Arabic-language propaganda accounts promoting Russian narratives. These posts suggested that Poland, followed by Bulgaria and Austria, had agreed to pay for Russian gas in rubles. According to these claims, the European Commission allegedly authorized EU member states to purchase gas in Russian currency amidst a so-called crisis. However, this information referred to past events, specifically April 2022, when Russia indeed halted gas supplies to Poland and Bulgaria due to their refusal to pay in rubles. In reality, since then, Poland and Bulgaria have significantly reduced their dependence on Russian gas by investing in alternative energy sources. Why, then, has this narrative resurfaced? What objective does the Kremlin aim to achieve by portraying historical events as current facts? This article analyzes the mechanisms of Russian disinformation and examines its goals in the new geopolitical context. This case study provides insights into how Russia uses disinformation as a tool in its information warfare to manipulate public opinion and strengthen its political position. Mechanism of Disinformation Russian propaganda narratives referencing past events, such as those from April 2022, are a striking example of the strategic use of disinformation in the Kremlin’s ongoing information warfare. The mechanism employed in this case can be analyzed in several key contexts. The first is the manipulation of the perception of time and events. Russian propaganda deliberately presents old events as current, effectively creating informational chaos. Recipients, who may vaguely recall events from several years ago, often struggle to remember specific details or dates. This creates confusion and hinders the accurate assessment of event chronology. As a result, disinformation leads some recipients to believe false claims, such as Poland, Bulgaria, and other EU countries currently changing their stance toward Russia and agreeing to Kremlin-imposed conditions, such as paying for gas in rubles. The second critical aspect of this strategy is undermining European solidarity. The narrative suggesting that EU countries agreed to pay in Russian currency aims to erode unity within the EU’s joint energy policy. Such messages portray member states as inconsistent and susceptible to Moscow’s pressure, weakening trust in Europe’s efforts to diversify energy supply sources. Breaking the common EU front against Russia remains one of the main goals of Russian disinformation regarding energy policy. Another context for this narrative is creating an illusion of the effectiveness of Russian policy. In this way, Russia seeks to bolster its image as a powerful geopolitical player that, despite international isolation and economic sanctions, still possesses leverage over European countries. This narrative presents Russia as an independent and dominant actor in global politics, effectively opposing Western „imperialism.” In particular, such messages resonate well in the Arab media space, which historically harbors skepticism toward U.S. and European actions in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Furthermore, Russia seeks to generate sympathy and build its image as a reliable partner, contrasting with U.S. and European policies. Depicting EU countries as supposedly „humiliated” by Russia and forced into concessions, such as ruble payments, aims to undermine the credibility of the West while positioning the Kremlin as a more stable alternative economic and political partner in the eyes of Global South nations. This type of disinformation is not a random act but a carefully orchestrated element of a broader Russian information warfare strategy aimed at destabilizing Europe while strengthening Russian influence on the international stage. Propaganda Goals The dissemination of disinformation, such as the narrative about ruble payments, primarily aims to divert attention from Russia’s current challenges. At the turn of October and November 2024, the Kremlin faced significant difficulties both internationally and domestically. One of the key challenges was the geopolitical tension stemming from the ongoing war in Ukraine, which consumed substantial financial and human resources while tarnishing Russia’s image on the global stage. Additionally, the U.S. presidential elections could influence decisions on continued Western support for Ukraine. Russia also grappled with increasing political and economic isolation due to sanctions that effectively restricted its access to global markets and technologies. Creating narratives about alleged successes in gas policy allowed Russia to distract from these difficulties. Propaganda suggesting that European countries had supposedly re-accepted Russian payment conditions in rubles aimed to overshadow the symbolic blows to Russia’s energy strategy caused by Europe’s energy diversification efforts, initiated after the 2022 gas supply cutoffs to Poland and Bulgaria. While initially perceived as an act of strength by the Kremlin, these events ultimately demonstrated the effectiveness of Europe’s strategy to reduce reliance on Russian energy resources. However, propaganda sought to undermine the success of these efforts by creating a false image of Europe’s dependence on Russia. The narrative also targeted audiences in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, intending to build Russia’s prestige among Global South countries. The Kremlin aimed to present itself as an effective mediator and defender of the region’s interests, contrasting with the image of the West, often perceived in these countries as interventionist and imperialist. By highlighting Europe’s alleged vulnerabilities to its pressure, Russia reinforced the argument that cooperation with Moscow is more stable and beneficial than alliances with Western nations. This narrative supported the Kremlin’s political and economic objectives on two key fronts. First, it aimed to undermine the credibility of the West and its ability to conduct effective energy policy while simultaneously weakening EU unity. Second, it enhanced Russia’s image as a reliable partner in the MENA region, bolstering its influence and position in the Global South. This type of disinformation not only advanced Russia’s international goals but also helped deflect attention from internal issues, reinforcing the image of Russia as a strong country capable of effective action on the global stage. Propaganda Techniques in the Kremlin’s Arsenal In this disinformation operation, the Kremlin employed several characteristic manipulation techniques that are staple elements of its propaganda playbook. One of the most commonly used methods is „information recycling,” i.e., re-presenting past events in a way that makes them appear current. These narratives rely on the assumption that recipients may not
Russian Disinformation on “Jewish Colonization of Ukraine” as a Propaganda Tool
The Russian Federation employs complex disinformation techniques to influence public opinion, particularly in Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries. One example of such disinformation is the manipulation of images showing Jews traveling to Uman, Ukraine, where annual Rosh Hashanah (Jewish New Year) celebrations are held. Images of the Hasidic pilgrimage have been used by pro-Russian propaganda centers to fabricate a narrative about an alleged “mass immigration of Jews through Poland to Ukraine” and the construction of a “new Ukraine” as a “Jewish state” under the protection of President Volodymyr Zelensky. Kremlin Hypocrisy: “Nazi” Ukraine and “Jewish Colonization” Russia’s use of anti-Semitism as a propaganda tool has a long history, as detailed in the article “Anti-Semitism in Russia” (https://infoops.pl/antysemityzm-w-rosji/) and confirmed in this year’s U.S. State Department report (https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/GEC-Special-Report-More-than-a-Century-of-Antisemitism.pdf). On one hand, the Kremlin and pro-Russian media consistently portray Ukraine as a state supposedly overrun by Nazis, anti-Semites, and Russophobes, invoking emotionally charged rhetoric about “denazification” of Ukraine as a goal of the Russian invasion. In this narrative, Zelensky – who is of Jewish descent – is hypocritically depicted as a leader supporting anti-Semitic groups. On the other hand, Russian propaganda employs a completely different tactic by portraying Zelensky as a Jew who allegedly opens Ukraine to mass Jewish immigration, suggesting that they are “colonizing” the country to establish a new Jewish state. This version of disinformation finds particular use in Arab countries, where anti-Semitism is sometimes rooted in certain segments of society. Pro-Russian channels and social media, often with fake accounts or bots, spread images of Uman pilgrims as “evidence” of this false narrative. Objective of Disinformation This kind of dual disinformation strategy aims to: Additionally, the intensification of repression against the opposition and civil society in Russia following the invasion of Ukraine, as noted in the BESA Center analysis, may also impact the sense of security among Russian Jews, even if they are not directly targeted by these actions. Impact on MENA Communities Pro-Russian messages in the MENA region are intentionally manipulated to exploit existing hostilities and prejudices. In Arab countries, disinformation about “Jewish colonization of Ukraine” may find fertile ground and strengthen anti-Western and anti-Israeli sentiments. This disinformation serves to inflame emotions and divisions, which Russia can exploit to weaken international solidarity with Ukraine. Summary The Kremlin’s propaganda surrounding the alleged “Jewish colonization of Ukraine” exemplifies an advanced disinformation strategy that uses anti-Semitism, lies, and manipulation to achieve political goals. This approach seeks both to undermine the credibility of Ukraine and Zelensky and to silence internal opposition to the war. By using double standards and manipulating historical biases, the Kremlin aims to create confusion and destabilization on the international stage, diverting attention from its own aggressive actions. Author: Wojciech Pokora – INFO OPS Poland Foundation
Disinformation: Belarus and Russia Defend Ukraine from Aggressive Poland.
Disinformation: Belarus and Russia Defend Ukraine from Aggressive Poland Recently, social media and news channels linked to Russia and China have been intensifying their propaganda campaign aimed at MENA countries, presenting Poland as the aggressor and Belarus and Russia as defenders of Ukraine. There is a clear narrative line in propaganda sources linked to Moscow and Beijing, which is intended to cause confusion and undermine the credibility of Poland and its allies.The media coverage attempts to present Belarus and Russia as forces defending the stability of the region from Poland’s “imperialist ambitions.” This narrative fits into the broader context of Russia and China’s strategic influence on audiences in Arab countries, who may be less familiar with the actual events in Eastern Europe. Creating an alternative reality, where Poland is the aggressor towards Ukraine, and Belarus (in alliance with Russia) defends its weaker neighbour, is an example of manipulation, which exploits information gaps and ignorance of recipients in MENA countries. Manipulation Method This is a classic example of a disinformation manipulation strategy, known as a “false flag”. By reversing roles and suggesting that Poland is planning aggression, Russian and Chinese propaganda undermines the image of the West as a stable and democratic defender of freedom. This type of disinformation aims to create distrust towards European countries, while strengthening the position of Russia and its allies as stabilizers in the international arena. Campaign Goal The goal of this campaign is to arouse sympathy for Russia and Belarus and discourage public opinion in MENA countries from supporting Poland and the West more broadly. Such messages can affect diplomatic and political relations, as well as the perception of the Ukrainian conflict. Russia and China are using these narratives to strengthen their influence in the MENA region, building an image of themselves as defenders of international stability and opponents of “Western aggression.” Such disinformation manipulations can lead to a distorted geopolitical picture in regions far from Europe, which is part of a long-term strategy to undermine the West’s international alliances and influence. A public task financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland within the frame of “Public Diplomacy 2024-2025: The European Dimension and Countering Disinformation” contest.
Kutrashev distorts history
Russian Ambassador to Iraq, Elbrus Kutrashev, in an interview with Al-Sharqiyah television, promotespropaganda narratives that blame the West for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. To justify thisaggression, Kutrashev distorts history, claiming that it was the West that instigated World War II,whereas the responsibility lay with both Hitler and Stalin, as confirmed by the Ribbentrop-MolotovPact. Kutrashev’s False Claims: → “The West planned World War II.”Reality: It was Hitler and Stalin who led to World War II by signing one of the most treacherousinternational agreements, the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, on August 23, 1939. → “The same countries [that caused World War II] have now planned a war against Russia.”Reality: Neo-imperialist and neo-colonial Russia invaded Ukraine because it does not respect thesovereignty of other countries and consistently seeks to expand both its territory and influence. → “Poland and the Baltic countries are non-sovereign and follow the will of the USA.”Reality: Poland and the Baltic states—following Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea, invasion ofUkraine, and numerous threats—have legitimate grounds for concern and an assertive stancetowards Russia. Learn history as it truly is. Don’t let yourself be manipulated! Public task financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland under the competition “Public Diplomacy 2024-2025 – European dimension and counter-disinformation.” The publication expresses only the views of the author and cannot be identified with the official position of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland.