Lebanon in the Crosshairs: Disinformation as a Weapon in the Israel–Hezbollah Standoff
Lebanon’s security crisis is no longer confined to artillery ranges and border belts. The decisive contests now unfold on screens, feeds and encrypted channels, where narratives move faster than diplomats and where a single clip can displace thousands. Since the latest round of Israel–Hezbollah hostilities, both sides have treated the information domain as a battlefield in its own right. The objective is not merely to report events but to set their meaning in stone before facts can be established. For a country with a fragile media ecosystem and strained institutions, this shift is strategic, not cosmetic. What distinguishes the present phase is the premium placed on speed over certainty. Viral videos of downed aircraft or destroyed regiments appear within minutes, often spliced from old footage or video games, stripped of context and pushed through accounts that vanish as quickly as they arrived. By the time verification catches up, the intended audience has already migrated into closed channels where counter-arguments struggle to penetrate. The physics of attention are unforgiving: the lie is optimised for frictionless sharing; the correction must climb a hill of fatigue and distrust. Hezbollah and affiliated outlets have professionalised their use of Telegram, building a rhythm of messaging that bundles combat clips with social governance content: reconstruction shots, funeral eulogies, community handouts. The sequencing is deliberate. In the aftermath of losses, the narrative leans into resilience and civil legitimacy; during tactical gains, it pivots to deterrence and celebration. The intent is to present a state-within-a-state that not only fights but also cares, positioning the movement as the only reliable service provider in the South when formal mechanisms feel absent or paralysed. Across the border, Israel’s information operations against Lebanese audiences combine open broadcasting with targeted psychological pressure. Spoofed text messages, opportunistic advertisements and precisely timed bursts of rumour are designed to unsettle communities, generate flight and, critically, erode confidence in the Lebanese Armed Forces and municipal authorities. In a country where broadband is patchy and power cuts are routine, the result is a choppy public sphere: sudden spikes of panic, followed by periods of numbness in which anything can be believed because everything has been tried. Facts Under Fire: How Disinformation Shapes the South The credibility of UNIFIL has become a particular target. The mission’s value hinges on impartial observation and freedom of movement; undermine either in the public eye and operational effectiveness degrades. Fabricated stories about patrols, insinuations of collusion and choreographed confrontations seek to brand the mission as either partisan or inert. The method is crude yet effective: seed a false incident, accelerate outrage and make even routine verification look like back-pedalling. In that sense, information attacks become operational attacks; they fence in patrol routes, chill cooperation and complicate de-escalation. Lebanon’s experience mirrors a wider playbook: Dismiss, Distort, Distract, Dismay. Unfavourable reports are dismissed as enemy fabrications; images are distorted through re-captioning or selective edits; attention is distracted by tangential scandals whenever civilian harm risks becoming the story; and targeted intimidation aims to induce dismay in border villages already hollowed out by displacement. Each tactic on its own might be manageable; in concert, they overwhelm editorial capacity and fracture social trust, leaving citizens to navigate crisis with nothing more than identity and instinct. Diplomatic initiatives are duly pre-contested online. Any proposal that touches Hezbollah’s arms, Israeli postures or the role of the Lebanese Armed Forces enters a hall of mirrors before it reaches a negotiating table. Anonymous channels claim to leak drafts; partisan accounts circulate forged “annexes”; poll numbers appear with no methodology attached. By the time officials speak, many minds are closed. The stakes are obvious. If the public sphere is primed to disbelieve, negotiators lose room to manoeuvre and spoilers gain an unearned veto at negligible cost. Generative tools have thickened the fog. Synthetic audio of battlefield orders, fabricated statements in familiar voices and night-vision montages with metadata scrubbed now arrive at industrial scale. The barrier to entry is minimal; the impact on verification workflows is brutal. In a media culture habituated to forwarded clips on WhatsApp and Telegram, provenance dies at source. The result is an ambient uncertainty in which the most emotive or identity-affirming explanation wins by default. Lebanese media and civil society retain considerable resilience, but capacity is stretched. Staffing attrition, legal pressure and energy insecurity erode editorial standards precisely when they are most needed. Into these gaps step partisan channels with slick production values and legally deniable ties, promising instant updates and moral clarity. The immediate casualty is the middle ground: cautious, conditioned reporting that admits uncertainty. Once audiences default to the belief that “everyone lies”, the informational high ground is ceded to whoever shouts with the greatest conviction. The Information War for Lebanon: From Telegram to the Blue Line A credible response does not require grandiose “strategic communications”; it demands boring, disciplined habits done quickly and in concert. Newsrooms and NGOs can pool verification into a standing, round-the-clock desk producing ultra-short debunks in Arabic and English, time-stamped and written for screens, not archives. Provenance labels—date captured, source, verification status—should become default on broadcast footage. A direct, on-record channel linking UNIFIL, the Lebanese Armed Forces and editors would allow for prompt, factual incident notes in the South, reducing the oxygen available to rumours without straying into advocacy. Platforms also have responsibilities commensurate with their influence. During escalations, temporary friction on message forwarding in affected districts can blunt virality without imposing blanket bans. Crisis-surge moderation crews with Levantine Arabic competence are not a luxury but an operational necessity. Transparency around takedown rationales, even if partial, matters more in a small, highly networked country than in a continental market; opacity feeds the very narratives that disinformation operators cultivate. Policy-makers, for their part, should treat attribution as a tool of deterrence. When state-linked actors target Lebanese civilians with intimidation campaigns, even partial public attributions raise the cost of repetition. A modest investment in cyber-civics—two-hour, phone-based modules embedded in schools and municipalities—offers compounding returns by normalising scepticism, not cynicism. The aim is not
How “Human Rights” Became a Western Weapon. Deconstructing the “Western Weapon” Narrative
Klarenberg’s article on the 50th anniversary of the Helsinki Accords, exploring how the West transformed the concept of “human rights” into an instrument of subversion, regime change, and intervention. In the evolving landscape of political and information warfare, narratives surrounding “human rights” have often been used to shape legitimacy and delegitimise adversaries. In an article published on the anniversary of the Helsinki Accords, investigative journalist Kit Klarenberg advances a provocative thesis: that the West appropriated “human rights” after 1975, converting them from a universal principle into a political weapon. By privileging civil and political freedoms while ignoring socio-economic rights, and by embedding monitoring bodies within Eastern Bloc societies, the West is presented as having engineered a Trojan horse that contributed to the eventual downfall of the Soviet Union and its allies. This analysis deconstructs Klarenberg’s argument, situating it within the broader strategic repertoire of Cold War subversion, and considers its implications for today’s information environment. Deconstructing the “Western Weapon” Narrative Klarenberg highlights how the Helsinki Final Act focused on freedoms of expression, assembly, and movement, while excluding guarantees central to socialist systems, such as housing, employment, and education. This emphasis institutionalised a Western-centric rights framework. Creation of Monitoring Mechanisms He traces the rise of Helsinki Watch (later Human Rights Watch), which monitored Eastern Bloc compliance, forged ties with dissident groups, and broadcast findings globally. By contrast, no reciprocal oversight of the United States or NATO states was envisaged. Dissident Networks and Western Support The article details how Solidarity in Poland and Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia grew into mass movements underpinned by covert Western aid. Klarenberg cites declassified US National Security Directives which explicitly tasked Washington with loosening Soviet control, promoting liberalisation, and reintegrating Eastern Europe into the Western order. Transition and Shock Therapy Klarenberg emphasises that the fall of Communism was followed not by universal prosperity but by traumatic economic transitions. Rapid privatisation produced unemployment, inequality, and social insecurity, which the Western “human rights” framework dismissed as outside its scope. Interpretative Commentary Klarenberg’s construction of the narrative reflects several disinformation and framing techniques: False Equivalence: Eastern Bloc social guarantees are presented as equal or superior to Western civil rights, overlooking systemic repression and lack of pluralism. Cherry-Picking and Omission: Western support for dissidents is heavily emphasised, but the grassroots agency of local activists and the stifling control of Communist regimes are minimised. Emotional Framing: By linking “human rights” directly to the disillusionment of the 1990s, the narrative stokes nostalgia and resentment, portraying the West as both manipulative and hypocritical. The West’s Geopolitical Playbook Klarenberg frames the Helsinki process as a deliberate Western strategy of political warfare: – Delegitimisation: By codifying rights selectively, the West could indict adversaries while immunising itself from scrutiny. – Instrumentalisation: Dissident groups became vectors of Western influence, supported with printing presses, communications equipment, and covert funds. – Democracy Promotion as Intervention: US programmes channelled millions into sustaining movements that eventually displaced Communist governments. – Strategic Objective: Declassified directives confirmed the goal of integrating Eastern Europe into the Western political and economic system, undercutting Moscow’s sphere of influence. Interpretative Commentary This narrative portrays “human rights” as an early form of cognitive and political warfare. It suggests that the moral power of rights was weaponised to delegitimise adversaries, destabilise regimes, and advance systemic transformation aligned with US interests. By cloaking subversion in the language of morality, Western states blurred the line between advocacy and intervention. Conclusion Kit Klarenberg’s article reframes the Helsinki Accords as a turning point in the weaponisation of human rights. By privileging civil and political rights while excluding socio-economic guarantees, the West is depicted as having built an ideological framework for destabilisation, exploited through dissident networks and covert funding, culminating in the collapse of the Eastern Bloc. The narrative is compelling because it blends archival truth – US directives, covert funding, shock therapy outcomes – with omissions that erase the pervasive repression, censorship, and lack of freedoms that defined life under Communist regimes. For today’s defence community, the lesson is clear: – Human rights discourse remains contested terrain in information warfare. – Historical reinterpretations can delegitimise the post-1989 order and strengthen authoritarian counter-narratives. – Effective defence requires integrating socio-economic and civil-political dimensions of rights to prevent adversaries from exploiting accusations of hypocrisy. In the era of cognitive conflict, history itself has become a weapon. Countering these narratives requires not only factual correction but also the reaffirmation of a consistent, universal human rights framework – one that adversaries cannot so easily recast as an instrument of domination. The weaponisation of “human rights” illustrates how even the noblest concepts can be repurposed as instruments of power. By reframing Helsinki as a covert offensive rather than a diplomatic compromise, this narrative seeks to erode trust in Western legitimacy and present democracy promotion as merely a façade for imperial ambition. Such reinterpretations, while persuasive to disillusioned publics, risk obscuring the lived reality of repression under the Eastern Bloc and weakening the universal claim of rights themselves. For policymakers and defence communities, the task is not only to expose selective histories but to demonstrate coherence between values and practice. Only through consistency, integrating political freedoms with socio-economic protections, can democracies neutralise adversarial disinformation and preserve the credibility of the international order in an age where history itself has become a battlefield.
RT Arabic uses anonymous “Polish” voices to spread anti-Ukrainian narratives
At the beginning of September 2025, there was a serious violation of Polish airspace. During a Russian attack on Ukraine, a group of drones, identified by the Polish side as Russian, flew into the territory of the Republic of Poland. They were neutralized by Polish air defense forces in cooperation with NATO. Prime Minister Donald Tusk declared that the incident was intentional and called on citizens not to succumb to Russian disinformation. He rejected the emerging accusations directed against Ukraine, clearly stating that the responsibility lay with the Russian Federation. This statement was part of Poland’s broader effort to maintain solidarity with Ukraine and to assure both public opinion and allies that Moscow’s provocations would not lead to divisions. The Russian reaction was defensive and predictable. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov described the prime minister’s statement as “nothing new,” accusing Warsaw and other European capitals of making baseless accusations. The Russian Ministry of Defense denied that the attack was aimed at Poland, claiming that no targets were planned on its territory. It was also argued that the range of the drones used did not exceed 700 kilometers, which was meant to suggest the accidental nature of the violation. Meanwhile, the Belarusian General Staff put forward the thesis that Ukrainian electronic warfare had “pushed” the drones into Belarusian airspace, presenting this as an alleged provocation by Kyiv rather than Moscow’s actions. Such claims fit into a coordinated disinformation campaign designed to blur the facts and shift responsibility away from Russia. A strange RT Arabic article about “reactions on social media” Against the backdrop of official communiqués and government positions, particular attention was drawn to an article published by RT Arabic (the Arabic-language branch of Russia Today). The piece did not focus on analyzing statements by authorities or experts, but on alleged reactions from Polish social media users. The article, titled “The Polish prime minister’s statements set social media platforms against him”, suggested that Donald Tusk’s warnings against Russian disinformation had sparked wide-ranging debate in Poland’s digital space. RT Arabic illustrated this thesis by citing several anonymous comments, allegedly from the X platform. The highlighted quotes aligned with key Russian propaganda themes: they criticized Ukraine, relativized Russia’s responsibility, and undermined the credibility of the West. One of the cited posts stated that “the real harm to the Polish state does not come from Russian propaganda, but from Ukrainian, German and Anglo-Saxon propaganda.” This directly inverted the narrative presented by the prime minister and exemplified the blame-shifting technique. The strategy used by RT Arabic departed from the typical pattern of Russian state media, which usually base their message on statements from officials, experts, or institutions—even if biased or controlled. In this case, the material relied solely on anonymous posts whose authors were unverifiable. Such an approach allowed for arbitrary content selection and created the impression that the Polish government’s position was met with widespread opposition from citizens. It cannot be ruled out that some of the cited comments came from real Polish internet users. However, the probability that they were the work of pro-Russian trolls or bots is high. This method fits into the technique of astroturfing—creating a semblance of public debate using anonymous or fictitious voices. Combined with the mechanism of false balance, suggesting that such posts were equivalent to official state positions, it illustrates the growing flexibility of Russian disinformation directed at Arab audiences. The novelty here is the departure from conventions used in earlier RT coverage of Poland. Previous reports drew on comments from politicians or experts, while the current article was constructed entirely from anonymous, unverifiable sources. This may signal experimentation with new narrative formats, granting the Kremlin greater freedom to tailor messages to the expectations of Arab recipients. Propaganda through anonymous accounts: What was quoted? The content of the posts cited by RT Arabic fit neatly into the main lines of Russian propaganda. For example, the claim that “the real harm to the Polish state does not come from Russian propaganda, but from Ukrainian, German and Anglo-Saxon propaganda” reflected classic blame shifting. The implication was that Poland’s troubles stemmed from its Western allies, not Russia’s aggression. Other parts of the article quoted comments mocking Prime Minister Tusk and NATO, stressing that Poland allegedly “overreacts” and “accuses Russia out of habit.” RT Arabic also underscored that the prime minister “described the drones as Russian but presented no evidence”—a textbook example of denialism and an attempt to undermine the credibility of government communications. This construction served several propaganda goals at once. First, it blurred Russia’s responsibility for violating Polish airspace, diverting attention toward alleged Ukrainian or Western guilt. As noted in our earlier analyses (compare: https://disinfodigest.pl/2025/09/12/prorosyjskie-narracje-w-polsce-dezinformacja-wokol-incydentu-z-dronami/), the identical narrative—accusing Ukraine of provocation—was actively promoted in pro-Russian media within Poland. RT Arabic thus employed false balance, presenting unverifiable posts as proof of widespread opposition to government policy. Second, the selected quotes undermined trust in Polish institutions and leaders. By portraying anonymous comments as “the voice of Poles,” RT Arabic suggested that the prime minister did not represent the public but acted against it. This is a clear example of astroturfing: manufacturing apparent grassroots debate through anonymous accounts, trolls, or bots. Third, the quotes reinforced anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western disinformation. The claim that “Ukrainian and Anglo-Saxon propaganda” posed the real threat to Poland echoed the Kremlin’s broader strategy of eroding trust in Polish-Ukrainian relations. The insinuation that Ukraine might have provoked the incident was intended to weaken solidarity with Kyiv and frame the situation as a ploy to drag NATO into war. Finally, some cited posts targeted NATO directly, portraying the alliance as ineffective and passive in the face of Russian actions. This classic technique of discrediting international institutions sought to weaken Western defense cohesion. By contrasting this with Belarus’s supposedly “responsible” stance, RT Arabic created a false image of Russia and its allies as stabilizing actors. In sum, every element of the RT Arabic article—from blaming Ukraine, to ridiculing Polish leaders, to questioning NATO—formed part of a coordinated disinformation operation. The use
“Western” voice in the service of Russian propaganda: the case of Warren Thornton in the Arab infoshere
On the night of September 9-10, 2025, there was an unprecedented violation of Polish and NATO airspace. During a massive Russian drone attack on Ukraine, several unmanned aerial vehicles entered the territory of Poland. Some of them were neutralized by Polish anti-aircraft defense and NATO fighters, and fragments of the falling machines caused material damage in the eastern part of the country. This was the first such clear confirmation that Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is entering the security space of the Alliance itself. The reaction was not long in coming. Russian and Belarusian propaganda channels immediately began to blur the authorship and suggest that the incident was the result of “an accidental deviation from the course”. At the same time, comments from informal actors appeared in the Polish public space (commentators and politicians known for sharing the Kremlin’s narrative) who, without any evidence, began to accuse Ukraine of a “provocation” and an alleged attempt to draw Poland into the war. Similar voices also began to be exposed in the West. Particularly publicized was the comment of Warren Thornton, presented as a British journalist, who wrote on social media: “The hysterical scream that the EU caused resembles the screams of children fainting because they were denied a piece of chocolate before dinner. God only knows how they would react if an ordinary Russian citizen approached their border with a stick.” In another part of the same post, Thornton added: “Russia did everything in its power to prevent other countries from being drawn into this conflict, despite all European provocations.” It was precisely such narratives, downplaying the incident, shifting the blame to the West and using the figures of “Western voices” that became, within a few hours, an element of a larger information operation of the Kremlin. The following analysis shows how Russian propaganda uses actors such as Thornton to legitimize messages in the Arab world, what manipulative techniques are used and how they can be recognized and neutralized. “Western” voice in the service of Russian propaganda: the case of Warren Thornton in the Arab infoshere On the night of September 9-10, 2025, there was an unprecedented violation of Polish and NATO airspace. During a massive Russian drone attack on Ukraine, several unmanned aerial vehicles entered the territory of Poland. Some of them were neutralized by Polish anti-aircraft defense and NATO fighters, and fragments of the falling machines caused material damage in the eastern part of the country. This was the first such clear confirmation that Russia’s aggression against Ukraine is entering the security space of the Alliance itself. The reaction was not long in coming. Russian and Belarusian propaganda channels immediately began to blur the authorship and suggest that the incident was the result of “an accidental deviation from the course”. At the same time, comments from informal actors appeared in the Polish public space (commentators and politicians known for sharing the Kremlin’s narrative) who, without any evidence, began to accuse Ukraine of a “provocation” and an alleged attempt to draw Poland into the war. Similar voices also began to be exposed in the West. Particularly publicized was the comment of Warren Thornton, presented as a British journalist, who wrote on social media: “The hysterical scream that the EU caused resembles the screams of children fainting because they were denied a piece of chocolate before dinner. God only knows how they would react if an ordinary Russian citizen approached their border with a stick.” In another part of the same post, Thornton added: “Russia did everything in its power to prevent other countries from being drawn into this conflict, despite all European provocations.” It was precisely such narratives, downplaying the incident, shifting the blame to the West and using the figures of “Western voices” that became, within a few hours, an element of a larger information operation of the Kremlin. The following analysis shows how Russian propaganda uses actors such as Thornton to legitimize messages in the Arab world, what manipulative techniques are used and how they can be recognized and neutralized. Thesis and context The statement of the “British journalist” Warren Thornton, who described Europe’s reaction to the drone incident over Poland as “ridiculous”, was quickly seized and amplified by Kremlin-controlled or affiliated media, also in Arabic versions. This is a classic example of privileged citation of actors from the West in order to lend credibility to Russian narratives in the MENA region. RT Arabic published a material signaling this opinion and embedded it in a broader stream of content downplaying the incident and undermining the credibility of Poland and NATO. The above actions are an element of a coordinated influence operation, whose goal is interpretive dominance: blurring Russia’s authorship, insinuating “Ukrainian provocation”, ridiculing the reaction of Warsaw and the Alliance. Who is Warren Thornton? Thornton is a niche commentator and a pro-Kremlin blogger, and not a recognizable British journalist, as suggested by Russian propaganda channels. He has a documented history of spreading disinformation about Ukraine (he was detained in the UK in 2023 in connection with publications deemed by the police as misleading). In 2025, he became famous for the thesis about “1.8 million” Ukrainian soldiers killed (a number without a basis), which the Russian media turned into a “news story”. How do Russian (including Arabic-language) media use Thornton? Fast amplification: materials in Russian services (Runews24, OSN, aggregators) expose quotes from Thornton, titling him as a “British journalist”, which is intended to give the appearance of external impartiality. Embedding in the Arabic content stream: RT Arabic amplifies the statement and at the same time publishes lines consistent with the Kremlin’s message (“Poland accuses without evidence”, “maybe it’s a mistake”), creating for the recipient the impression of a consensus. Recycling of earlier theses: the same “person from the West” previously provided catchy, extreme narratives, which were duplicated by pro-Russian media and niche portals as the “voice of a British journalist”. Identified manipulative techniques Appeal to (false) authority / testimony of an authority – giving credibility to the message by
Summary of Media Narratives about Poland in Lebanon and Recommendations for Action
Summary of Media Narratives about Poland in Lebanon and Recommendations for Action This material is one of ten analytical briefs accompanying the full report on the security of Lebanon’s information environment. It forms part of a broader series examining key trends and incidents shaping the informational landscape. We encourage you to read the full report:https://shafafiyat.com/ar/2025/09/17/%d8%aa%d9%82%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%b1-%d8%a3%d9%85%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a8%d9%8a%d8%a6%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%85%d8%b9%d9%84%d9%88%d9%85%d8%a7%d8%aa%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d9%84%d8%a8%d9%86%d8%a7%d9%86/ Lebanon, despite its apparent media diversity, remains a highly politicized environment in which information dissemination often serves the interests of specific internal groups or foreign sponsors. In this context, Poland’s image also becomes a subject of manipulation – both within the broader anti-Western narrative promoted by Russia, Iran, or Hezbollah, and within the framework of informational rivalry taking place at the regional level. Disinformation, distorted narratives, and the instrumentalization of facts weaken Poland’s credibility and threaten its strategic interests in the region. An analysis of the Lebanese media environment shows that, despite the large number of media outlets, the real diversity of information is significantly limited by the politicization of the media sector. Instead of serving as independent guardians of democracy, media often function as political instruments serving the interests of specific groups, political parties, and sects. This close link between media, politics, and religion not only undermines their credibility but also creates a serious risk of information manipulation, making it difficult for citizens to make informed social and political decisions. In such conditions, media pluralism, although theoretically valuable, in practice leads to further polarization instead of promoting rapprochement between different social groups. Although traditional media such as television, radio, and press still play a role in shaping public opinion, their importance is declining in favour of digital media. It is digital platforms – blogs, social media, and influencers – that are becoming the main sources of information for younger generations. At the same time, these same platforms, although offering a wide range of information, also create space for disinformation. In the case of online media, the lack of regulation and content quality control leads to a situation where the ease of access to unverified information can mislead society, which may have serious consequences for the country’s political and social stability. Recommendations Strategic analysis – the impact of the regional situation on Poland’s strategic goals The Lebanese media environment represents an interesting space for Polish-Lebanese cooperation, particularly in the areas of media digitalization and ensuring cybersecurity for existing media platforms. In this context, cooperation with Polish companies could support the modernization process of Lebanon’s media landscape. One aspect would be ensuring the protection of journalists from cyberattacks and surveillance, which is particularly important in the context of repression in authoritarian regimes. Additionally, such cooperation could contribute to strengthening competencies in data protection and information quality, opening opportunities for the expansion of Polish technology companies into the Middle Eastern market. Poland should leverage its historical legacy of defending freedom, democracy, and pluralism to counter disinformation narratives in Lebanon and the broader MENA region. This legacy, especially embodied by figures such as Jan Paweł II, resonates deeply with audiences who value resistance against oppression and the promotion of democratic values. By emphasizing these connections through targeted cultural diplomacy and public messaging, Poland can strengthen its image as a reliable ally in promoting stability and human rights. Summary of Russian messaging in the region Although direct exposure to propaganda targeting Poland is limited in Lebanon, disinformation narratives appear through global media supported by Russian and Iranian platforms. Narratives such as portraying Poland as a NATO pawn or criticizing its migration policy fit into the broader anti-Western and anti-NATO sentiments common in the region. To counter this, Poland should focus on creating counter-narratives that emphasize its engagement in NATO as a stabilizing force and its role in supporting humanitarian and security efforts in Europe. By cooperating with Lebanese media and forming partnerships with local opinion leaders, Poland can directly respond to these disinformation narratives. Recommendations Countering Disinformation and Social Polarization The Lebanese media environment is dependent on numerous external geopolitical and economic influences, which significantly hinder access to reliable information and introduce the risk of disinformation. Sectarian media, dependent on the interests of external states, often manipulate public opinion, leading to regional destabilization. Poland should focus on countering disinformation narratives and promoting democratic values in Lebanon and the MENA region, using its historical legacy of defending freedom and pluralism. Cooperation with Lebanese media and partnerships with local opinion leaders can help create counter-narratives that emphasize Poland’s engagement in NATO and its role in humanitarian and regional stability. Poland should also remain vigilant in monitoring disinformation on media platforms such as RT Arabic and Al-Mayadeen and support cooperation with local journalists and universities to effectively debunk false narratives and strengthen its position in the international arena. Recommendations Key Activity Elements Poland must remain vigilant in monitoring and analysing disinformation trends in Lebanon and the MENA region. Establishing dedicated resources to track these narratives, especially on platforms such as RT Arabic and Al-Mayadeen, will enable rapid responses. Cooperation with local universities, journalists, and decision-makers to examine and debunk disinformation can further strengthen Poland’s credibility as a reliable partner in the fight against propaganda. Recommendations Summary In the Lebanese media space, both positive and negative portrayals of Poland are present. The positive image is based on perceiving Poland as a stable, democratic country that supports humanitarian values, especially in the context of the war in Ukraine. On the other hand, in narratives inspired by Russia, Iran, or organizations such as Hezbollah, Poland is portrayed as a NATO and U.S. tool destabilizing the region and fitting into the alleged “imperial” policy of the West. Such narratives are particularly dangerous as they influence local societies through channels considered trusted sources of information. To counter disinformation and polarization, Poland should develop strategic media partnerships in the region, strengthen its public diplomacy presence, and invest in media education and digital security. Establishing cooperation with Lebanese universities, journalists, and media experts can serve to create counter-narratives based on facts and democratic values. At the same time,
A Voice from Lebanon: How to Restore Ethics to the Public Sphere and Overcome Extremism
We recommend a very important essay written by Lebanese intellectual PhD Ziad el Sayegh, with whom the Info Ops Foundation has worked closely on projects countering disinformation and promoting the idea of citizenship and good governance in Lebanon and other Middle Eastern countries. The essay is devoted to the role of Christians in the Middle East in the face of growing tensions and challenges. It is part of an important debate about the role of religion, its relationship with politics, and the distortion of its role by extremists. In his essay, Ziad el Sayegh refers to a comprehensive document entitled “We Choose Abundant Life,” which discusses the role of religion in building civil society, ensuring good governance and other aspects related to the necessary political and social changes. In his essay, Ziad el Sayegh draws attention to the dangers that come from combining religion with political regimes for protection. This is because it leads to a distortion of the role of religion, its spiritual mission and, as a result, generates problems for its credibility. The author writes: Religion, as a spirit, dogma but also as an institution, loses its persuasive ethical message in terms of accountability and responsibility if it sticks with political regimes for the sake of protection, influence, or if it be comes dependent therefrom […] it is necessary to rediscover ways in which religion and religious communities increasingly can function as an ethical guarantor of public order rather than of a certain political regime […] it should rather engage in dialogue on public policies instead of simply watching unresponsively the politics professionalism of any authority […] exaggeration in both the political and the religious arena while talking about the need for continuous reform proves that both actions are tarnished with structural defect […] Good sustainable governance based on sustainable public policies is the key to reformation of societies. This can be only produced by a common good mentality, as well by the conviction that the ethics can serve the building of human dignity and peace. The author further refers to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) defined in “We Choose Abundant Life,” stressing that religion is linked to them by maintaining public order, building public policies, and promoting good sustainable governance, stressing the necessity to bring back the ethics to the public space based on a contextual theology. The author goes on to list the necessary steps needed to achieve a sustainable policy in the Middle East. Ziad el Sayegh writes: Moving from simple development initiatives to sustainable policies in the Middle East requires fundamental efforts that are summarized below: Redefining the concepts of minorities and majorities in the region Moving from broadening religious common spaces to building a common vision for a civil state that strengthens and solidi es the citizenship of individual identities of various groups Connecting religious actors, development policy makers, as well as civil society organizations to foster knowledge exchange about diverse communities Building partnerships to ensure deep understanding of perceived tensions between certain SDGs and religious values and to ad dress them Disseminating knowledge about the SDGs to local religious groups and empower them to participate in the global development discourse and mobilize local resources for achieving Agenda 2030 Encouraging the local engagement of religious groups with the SDGs implementation as active partners with national governments Delineating the socio-economic interests as key factors in any peace building framework Inciting social and economic reforms based on the sustainable development pillars that support human well-being and quality of life- independent of faith or religion Reinforcing freedom of practicing religious rites, safeguarded by mutual knowledge and by overcoming prejudices Supporting the freedom of religion and belief (FoRB), expressed by the right to convey one’s faith distinctively in his community through the broadening of communication of commonalities and the intellectual deliberation on issues related to faith from various perspectives; i.e. legal, political, cultural, theological and socio-economic; even admitting the right to disbelief Adopting the freedom of conscious integrity and ethics that implies accepting others and respecting their dignity Discussing common concerns and reinforcing these with collective interests to encourage interreligious dialogue with experts from multidisciplinary sectors Fostering new interreligious projects for human rights and peace building in the region Restructuring educational curricula to address the challenges the region is facing Ziad el Sayegh opposes a policy based on the concept of minority and majority, arguing that such an approach should be replaced by the principle of inclusive citizenship, which would accommodate different individual and group identities. It is worth noting in this context that in the Middle East, particularly in Arab studies, a conceptual apparatus in sociology and political science that differs from that of Europe has emerged. This is particularly true of concepts related to identity and the definition of minorities. The latter is highly controversial and has been rejected by many scholars. It also seems that Ziad el Sayegh’s approach is very much influenced by the French post-revolutionary model of the nation as a demos comprising a community of equal citizens. In the ethnos-based model prevalent in Europe, however, the concept of minority identity, whether ethnic or religious, does not necessarily lead to the kind of pathological phenomena Sayegh writes about. Europe has dealt with this in a different way, i.e., by fitting minority rights into the standard of human rights and liberal democracy. The fact is, however, that political system models must be contextualized territorially, as Sayegh also writes. Transferring European models to the Middle East without considering local contexts is not only a sign of arrogance but also a path to failure. The problem is that in the West the wrong conclusion is too often drawn, i.e., that democracy, freedom, human rights, civil society are concepts foreign to Middle Eastern culture and that a dictator’s strong hand is needed there. The problem with countries such as Lebanon, Iraq and Syria is that the consequence of a complex ethno-religious structure is a confessional (ethno-sectarian) system, which, while ensuring the participation of all groups
Propaganda Activities Targeting the Perception of States, Including Poland
Propaganda Activities Targeting the Perception of States, Including Poland This material is one of ten analytical briefs accompanying the full report on the security of Lebanon’s information environment. It forms part of a broader series examining key trends and incidents shaping the informational landscape. We encourage you to read the full report:https://shafafiyat.com/ar/2025/09/17/%d8%aa%d9%82%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%b1-%d8%a3%d9%85%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a8%d9%8a%d8%a6%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%85%d8%b9%d9%84%d9%88%d9%85%d8%a7%d8%aa%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d9%84%d8%a8%d9%86%d8%a7%d9%86/ The image of Poland in the Middle East, including Lebanon, has increasingly become the target of propaganda activities carried out by states interested in weakening its international position. Poland, as an active member of NATO and a clear opponent of Russian aggression against Ukraine, has become the subject of narratives aimed at distorting its intentions and actions. In information campaigns, particularly those conducted by Russia, Iran, and their affiliated entities, disinformation, manipulation of facts, and anti-Western themes are used to portray Poland as a country subservient to the interests of the United States and the European Union, rather than as a sovereign actor supporting regional security. Propaganda from Russia Poland is a leader in opposing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Presenting Poland in a negative light by Russian propaganda is not new and is also used in communication directed toward Middle Eastern countries. Russian media such as RT and Sputnik adopt narratives that depict Poland as a country that has become a puppet in the hands of the West, particularly the United States and the European Union. Russia promotes in Lebanon and other Middle Eastern countries the narrative that Poland is one of the countries contributing to the escalation of the conflict in Ukraine through its close ties with NATO and the United States Looking closely at the Sputnik portal, one can find evidence supporting this statement: “Germany’s proposal for NATO to send Patriot units to Poland at the beginning of 2025 in order to protect a logistical hub in Poland, ensuring the safety of vehicles, weapons, and ammunition supplied to Ukraine. Russia believes that arms deliveries to Ukraine hinder the resolution of the situation in that country. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that the United States and NATO are directly involved in the conflict. The Kremlin warned that the West is only escalating the conflict by supplying weapons to Ukraine”. A Russian fake news story concerned protesting farmers at the border, allegedly related to the import of Ukrainian grain, which they claimed negatively affected the domestic agricultural market. Polish farmers announced that they would resume action if their demands for market protection were not met. They demanded an end to duty-free imports of Ukrainian agricultural products and the rejection of the European Green Deal, whose goal is zero emissions by 2050. The truth: Farmers protested because their demand to maintain the 2024 agricultural tax rate at the 2023 level was not met. The second reason was linked to the European Union’s trade agreement with the Mercosur countries of South America. Therefore, it was a blockade near the Ukrainian border, but it actually had nothing to do with Ukraine itself. Propaganda supported by Iran Iran and its affiliated organization Hezbollah have an interest in portraying Poland as part of the Western coalition opposing their regional interests. Iran and Hezbollah may use propaganda to depict Poland as a country supporting policies unfavourable to their allies in the region. Examples of propaganda actions include: 1) Poland as a tool of the West in implementing its policy in the Middle East, especially in the context of the war in Syria or relations with the United States; 2) Poland’s policy toward the Middle East and its relations with the United States may be presented as contrary to Islamic interests, which may strengthen in Lebanon the narrative of Poland as an ally of states supporting actions against Iran. Media in Lebanon, both pro-government and opposition-affiliated, can shape the image of Poland in the context of its foreign policy and role in international affairs. Depending on the political preferences of various groups, Poland can be portrayed in different ways In numerous Lebanese media outlets, Poland may be presented as an example of a country that successfully underwent democratic transformation after the fall of communism. In the context of political uncertainty in Lebanon, such an image of Poland may be perceived positively as a country that achieved political and economic stabilization. Conversely, media closer to pro-Russian narratives, more critical of the West, may portray Poland as part of the “imperialist” international policy that threatens the sovereignty of Middle Eastern countries Hezbollah The main medium of Hezbollah’s narrative in Lebanon is its news channel Al-Manar. The topic of Poland appears in Al-Manar’s coverage of the situation in Ukraine and Belarus. The channel clearly reflects views sympathetic to Russia’s portrayal of the situation in Ukraine. Fake news concerning the statement of Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki Content: Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki sharply criticized Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky for his speech at the UN General Assembly and warned Ukraine against strengthening ties with Berlin. Morawiecki stated that Warsaw “no longer provides weapons to Ukraine”. Fact: Mateusz Morawiecki did criticize the Ukrainian President’s words, but there were no threats in the form of warnings against ties with Germany or statements about stopping the supply of weapons to Ukraine. This fake news was exaggerated to show rising tensions between Poland and Ukraine. News items such as “Warsaw and Kyiv want to provoke Russia into war with NATO by accusing Russia of an explosion” and “Poland is conducting military exercises and intends to occupy western Ukraine in order to annex its territory to Poland” also appear. Diplomatic policy and the activities of the Polish Embassy Poland’s diplomatic efforts, conducted through the Polish Embassy in Beirut, aim to promote the image of Poland in Lebanon. As part of its diplomatic activities, Poland may engage in various initiatives designed to present itself as a country committed to solving international problems, including humanitarian aid and the promotion of peace Attribution/Involvement of selected countries International engagement in Lebanon is complex and stems from the geopolitical interests of various states and international organizations. Lebanon, as a
State Entities of Lebanon Key to the Media Landscape
State Entities of Lebanon Key to the Media Landscape This material is one of ten analytical briefs accompanying the full report on the security of Lebanon’s information environment. It forms part of a broader series examining key trends and incidents shaping the informational landscape. We encourage you to read the full report:https://shafafiyat.com/ar/2025/09/17/%d8%aa%d9%82%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%b1-%d8%a3%d9%85%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a8%d9%8a%d8%a6%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%85%d8%b9%d9%84%d9%88%d9%85%d8%a7%d8%aa%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d9%84%d8%a8%d9%86%d8%a7%d9%86/ Lebanon, though geographically small, is characterised by an extremely complex political and social system in which media and telecommunications infrastructure play a strategic role. In this country, freedom of speech is theoretically protected by the constitution; however, in practice, control over information is heavily dependent on political and sectarian interests. State institutions responsible for regulating media, communications, and the protection of journalists operate in a complicated environment where formal independence often does not translate into real effectiveness. Lebanese media are at once dynamic and deeply politicized. This sector remains under the influence of both state regulations and private interests connected to political parties or religious communities. The aim of this analysis is to present the key institutions responsible for shaping media and telecommunications policy in Lebanon, and to assess their roles, effectiveness, and limitations. In Lebanon, state institutions play a key role in regulating the media and telecommunications sectors. The Ministry of Telecommunications, the National Audiovisual Council (CNA), the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (TRA), and the Lebanese Media Syndicates shape the informational landscape, influencing access to information, press freedom, and the country’s technological development. 1. Ministry of Telecommunications (MoT) The Ministry of Telecommunications is responsible for the entire communications sector in Lebanon, including network infrastructure, mobile operators, and internet access. It manages state-owned companies such as Ogero and oversees private operators Alfa and Touch. Although it theoretically holds strategic importance for the country’s digital modernization, in practice, many shortcomings are evident: the sector has been accused of opacity and corruption, and according to reports from 2010–2020, as much as USD 6 billion in public revenues was allegedly lost irretrievably. 2. Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (TRA) The TRA was established in 2002 with the goal of introducing competition, transparency, and market liberalization in the telecommunications sector. It handles licensing, frequency management, and the enforcement of user rights. In practice, however, this institution is weakened by its lack of independence and real influence. Legislative changes have not been fully implemented, and TRA decisions are often blocked or ignored by politicians. 3. National Audiovisual Council (Conseil National de l’Audiovisuel – CNA) The CNA is the official regulatory body for audiovisual media. Established in 1994, it is tasked with issuing licenses, controlling program content, and monitoring media ethics. The Council consists of ten members, selected partly by the government and partly by parliament – making it highly politicized. Due to its advisory nature and limited executive powers, the CNA is unable to effectively prevent media abuses. 4. Ministry of Information (Ministère de l’Information) This ministry oversees state media – including Télé Liban and Radio Liban – as well as certain aspects of public communication. In the past, it had greater regulatory power, but today its role is diminishing. Nevertheless, it remains important for broadcasting governmental messages and licensing new media entities. Reforms aimed at transforming this ministry into a more transparent and modern institution are still in the planning stage. 5. Lebanese Journalistic Syndicates Organizations such as the Lebanese Press Syndicate (Syndicat de la Presse Libanaise) represent the interests of media workers. Their role is to defend press freedom, negotiate with the government, and uphold professional standards. The problem, however, is that many editorial offices are not members of any syndicate, and independent journalists often lack support. The weakness of these structures prevents them from effectively resisting political pressure, self-censorship, and physical threats. 6. Private Media and the Information Landscape Lebanon boasts a wealth of television and radio stations such as LBCI, Al-Jadeed, MTV, and OTV. Although they operate as private entities, most are financed by specific political parties or religious communities, significantly shaping their editorial lines. These media outlets often serve as instruments of political struggle rather than vehicles for objective public information. With the rise of the internet, numerous news portals have emerged – unfortunately, many are also used to spread disinformation. Major Media Entities in Lebanon Television Lebanon has one of the most developed television markets in the Arab region, though it is highly politicized. Télé Liban, the historic public broadcaster, was once a pioneer in the Arab world. Today, however, its viewership is limited and its influence marginal. LBCI (Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation International) is one of the most popular private stations, founded during the civil war and originally linked to the Christian Lebanese Forces. MTV Lebanon is another private television station with a distinctly conservative and pro-Christian political orientation. Al-Manar, owned by Hezbollah, serves as a propaganda tool for the party and has high viewership among the Shia community. Al-Jadeed stands out as an independent outlet known for bold investigative reporting and criticism of both secular and religious authorities. Radio The Lebanese radio sector is equally diverse. Radio Liban is the state-owned station broadcasting in several languages, including Arabic, French, and English. Voice of Charity (Sawt el Mahabba) is a Catholic radio station run by Maronites, focused on religious and educational content. Radio Orient is a private station offering a mix of news, music, and socio-political programs aimed at a broad, multi-sectarian audience. Print Press Despite financial challenges, print media in Lebanon continues to play an important role. An-Nahar is an influential Arabic-language daily with a liberal profile, in existence since the 1930s. L’Orient-Le Jour is the leading French-language daily, regarded as an opinion-forming newspaper catering mainly to the Christian middle class and elite. Al-Akhbar, by contrast, is known for its pro-government and pro-Hezbollah editorial stance, though it often publishes high-quality socio-political analyses. Summary The system of media and telecommunications regulation in Lebanon is multilayered but also full of contradictions. Formally, numerous institutions exist to ensure balance, freedom of speech, and high-quality communication services. In reality, however, most are constrained by political influence, lack of transparency, outdated laws, and limited autonomy. The Ministry of
The Kremlin’s Historical Revisionism: How Russian Disinformation in Arabic Links Nazism to American Roots
In the sprawling, often murky landscape of global information warfare, a particularly insidious narrative has taken root in Arabic-speaking corners of the internet: the idea that the conceptual and ideological origins of German Nazism lie not in Germany, but in the United States. Propagated through a series of coordinated articles on sarabic.ae — a media platform affiliated with the Russian state-run Sputnik network — this narrative exemplifies the Kremlin’s strategic use of historical distortion to serve present-day geopolitical goals. By twisting documented facts, selectively quoting scholarship, and exploiting cultural grievances, Russian propagandists aim to recast the United States as the ideological progenitor of one of history’s greatest evils, and, by extension, to morally disqualify it from criticizing Russia or leading any international coalition. This article deconstructs the Arabic-language content disseminated through sarabic.ae, situating it within the broader framework of Russian disinformation and psychological operations targeting the Global South. Deconstructing the “American Roots” Narrative Factual Analysis: Between April and May 2025, sarabic.ae published at least five articles that collectively construct an elaborate argument: that Nazism, far from being a unique product of early 20th-century German political extremism, was a derivative ideology that drew heavily on American precedents. The key claims made across these articles are: Racial Laws and Eugenics: Multiple articles allege that Nazi Germany modeled the 1935 Nuremberg Laws on U.S. segregation statutes, particularly the Jim Crow laws of the American South. This argument is partially grounded in historical fact: scholars like James Q. Whitman have demonstrated that Nazi legal theorists were aware of and even studied American racial law. However, sarabic.ae takes this insight far beyond its evidentiary base, presenting the U.S. as the conceptual originator of Nazi racial doctrine, rather than one of many influences in a complex matrix of European and global ideas. Westward Expansion and Lebensraum: A recurring theme is that Hitler’s idea of Lebensraum (living space) was inspired by the U.S. policy of Manifest Destiny and the violent conquest of Indigenous lands. One article, dated 6 May 2025, explicitly describes Hitler as emulating “the American colonial project,” equating the U.S. frontier wars with Nazi invasions in Eastern Europe. Here again, a superficial parallel is inflated into a structural equivalence. Cultural Influences: Other texts delve into supposed aesthetic and cultural inspirations. A 22 April piece suggests that American Western films helped shape the propagandistic vision of the Nazi regime, while another claims that German author Karl May’s novels about the American frontier offered Hitler an ideological and psychological model for racial conquest. Eugenics as an Exported Ideology: A 2 May article emphasizes that the American eugenics movement, which gained significant traction in the early 20th century, served as a theoretical foundation for Nazi policies. The article omits that eugenics, though international in reach, was interpreted in uniquely brutal ways under the Third Reich. Legal Imitation as Ideological Transmission: The 29 April article attempts to draw a direct line from the American legal system to the Nazi legal apparatus. While it is accurate that Nazi lawyers examined foreign legal systems, the portrayal of the United States as a “mentor” in genocidal policy is a gross simplification. Interpretative Commentary: The argument constructed by sarabic.ae is not an exercise in honest historical inquiry. Rather, it exemplifies several core techniques of disinformation: False Equivalence: The narrative attempts to collapse moral distinctions between American racial segregation and Nazi genocidal policies. While both were systems of oppression, equating Jim Crow with the Holocaust is analytically unsound and morally dishonest. The Holocaust was a state-engineered, industrial-scale extermination campaign; racial segregation in the U.S., while egregious, did not aim at total physical annihilation. Cherry-Picking and Omission: These articles omit any reference to American participation in the defeat of Nazi Germany, the civil rights movement, or the ideological differences between liberal democracy and totalitarianism. Likewise, they completely ignore the unique ideological roots of Nazism in German völkisch nationalism, antisemitism, and revanchist post-World War I sentiment. Emotionally Charged Framing: The texts are clearly designed to provoke emotional reactions in audiences predisposed to anti-American sentiment. By positioning the United States as both morally corrupt and historically evil, the narrative invites indignation, distrust, and ideological disengagement from Western actors. The Kremlin’s Geopolitical Playbook Factual Analysis: This campaign aligns with a long-standing Kremlin tactic: recoding the moral history of the 20th century to fit Russia’s contemporary geopolitical interests. Since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin has regularly invoked the rhetoric of “denazification” to justify military aggression. Simultaneously, Russian officials and state media have painted NATO, Ukraine, and even domestic opposition as fascist threats. The “American roots of Nazism” narrative serves several functions in this broader effort: Discrediting Democratic Powers: By associating Nazism with the United States, the Kremlin seeks to invalidate any moral criticism leveled by Washington and its allies. If the U.S. is portrayed as the ideological ancestor of Hitler, then its role as a global leader becomes deeply compromised in the eyes of foreign publics. Targeting the Global South: These articles are carefully tailored for Arabic-speaking and Global South audiences, where historical grievances against Western colonialism, racial injustice, and imperial hypocrisy resonate deeply. The narrative positions Russia as a more “authentic” partner — one that “fought fascism” rather than “invented it.” Deploying Whataboutism: The strategic function is not to persuade based on evidence but to confuse and paralyze. Any discussion of Russian war crimes, authoritarianism, or censorship is redirected with a rhetorical “what about the United States?” — effectively neutralizing criticism without engaging in factual debate. Interpretative Commentary: This strategy reflects the Putin-era revival of Soviet memory politics, where Russia is recast as the eternal enemy of fascism and the moral victor of World War II. Yet it systematically omits crucial counterfacts — including the 1939 Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, which aligned the Soviet Union with Nazi Germany in the invasion of Poland. By eliminating these historical details, the narrative permits Russia to continue weaponizing antifascist imagery, even as it engages in aggressive wars, suppresses dissent, and disseminates antisemitic conspiracy theories. The implications
Recognition of Religious Institutions as Sources of Information in Lebanon
Recognition of Religious Institutions as Sources of Information in Lebanon This material is one of ten analytical briefs accompanying the full report on the security of Lebanon’s information environment. It forms part of a broader series examining key trends and incidents shaping the informational landscape. We encourage you to read the full report:https://shafafiyat.com/ar/2025/09/17/%d8%aa%d9%82%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%b1-%d8%a3%d9%85%d9%86-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a8%d9%8a%d8%a6%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%85%d8%b9%d9%84%d9%88%d9%85%d8%a7%d8%aa%d9%8a%d8%a9-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d9%84%d8%a8%d9%86%d8%a7%d9%86/ In Lebanon, a country with a deeply rooted confessional system, religious institutions play a key role not only in the spiritual sphere but also as main sources of information, social support, and education. In the face of state weakness and chronic crises, they often assume functions typically reserved for public institutions, shaping citizens’ daily lives and influencing public opinion. The confessional system in Lebanon, based on a balance between 18 recognized denominations, has led to a situation in which religious institutions take over many state functions. These organizations manage schools, hospitals, and personal status courts, making them key actors in the social and political life of the country. Religious institutions in Lebanon serve not only as places of worship but also as crucial sources of information that significantly influence public opinion and provide essential social services that the state often fails to deliver. This phenomenon has its roots in Lebanon’s unique confessional system, which institutionalizes religious divisions within government structures by recognizing 18 distinct denominations, each possessing autonomy over personal and communal affairs. Religious organizations often fill the gaps left by the government, offering services such as healthcare, education, and social support. Supported both locally and internationally, they have gained the status of trusted entities within their communities, performing roles that in other countries are usually assigned to state institutions. The influence of religious institutions as sources of information is further reinforced by the pervasive lack of trust in Lebanon’s state institutions. Citizens, often disillusioned with political leadership, turn to these organizations – closely tied to their religious identities – for guidance in both political and social matters. This dependence fosters strong bonds within communities but also reinforces sectarian loyalty, sometimes at the expense of a unified national identity. As a result, Lebanese society remains deeply divided, and religious leaders exert significant influence over public opinion and community behaviour, especially during times of crisis. Religious welfare organizations in Lebanon are viewed as credible and direct sources of support, particularly in times of crisis. The government’s tolerant approach toward these institutions grants them considerable autonomy, enabling them to develop resources and infrastructure. Consequently, religious institutions can operate almost parallel to the state, serving in many areas as substitutes for government services. As a result, they have gained a powerful position in shaping Lebanon’s informational landscape, influencing public discourse, and reinforcing sectarian divisions within society. Historically, religious institutions have shaped and sustained Lebanon’s power model based on sectarian divisions. Religious leaders often oversee community-specific institutions, including personal status courts that regulate matters such as marriage, divorce, and inheritance – further strengthening their role as reliable sources of legal and social counsel. Religious leaders frequently base their teachings on themes of national unity and social morality, striving to promote coexistence among Lebanon’s various communities. During periods of political or sectarian tension, they are perceived as mediators, providing stability and a sense of security. However, the reliance on religious institutions as sources of information highlights a paradox: although they strive to promote unity, they simultaneously maintain sectarian boundaries. By managing social and legal matters within confession-specific structures, they perpetuate social divisions, hindering efforts toward social integration and a cohesive national identity. Mohammad Al-Amin Mosque in Beirut One of the largest and most recognizable mosques in Lebanon. This mosque serves not only as a place of prayer but also as a centre for the Muslim community in Beirut. It hosts religious lectures, social gatherings, and various forms of charitable support such as aid for the needy. The mosque also functions as an informational hub, especially during political or economic crises. Maronite St. George Cathedral in Beirut St. George Cathedral is the main Maronite cathedral in Lebanon, located in the heart of Beirut. For the Christian – particularly Maronite – community, the cathedral serves as a religious, educational, and social centre. Meetings, lectures, and charitable activities are held there. The church also provides counselling in both spiritual and family matters and serves as a source of information and support for the faithful. Qozhaya Monastery in the Qadisha Valley One of the oldest monasteries in Lebanon, belonging to the Maronite Order of Saint Anthony. The monastery is a popular pilgrimage and spiritual retreat site. The monks who reside there offer spiritual advice and support to pilgrims and those seeking inner peace. Retreats and workshops are also organized there. Druze Religious Center in Mukhtara Mukhtara is a historic village in the Chouf Mountains and the headquarters of the Druze community. It houses Druze prayer houses and religious centres. The Druze gather in places such as Mukhtara to discuss not only religious matters but also social and political issues. Druze religious leaders, known as sheikhs, are often sources of knowledge and guidance for the entire community, also in everyday matters such as marriages, conflict resolution, or organizing social events. Shrine of Our Lady of Harissa Located on the hill of Harissa, this shrine is one of the most important pilgrimage sites for Christians in Lebanon. It attracts both local and international pilgrims who come to pray and seek spiritual support. The church also organizes educational and social events aimed at supporting the faithful and serves as a meeting place and source of information exchange. Social Centres in Tripoli In Tripoli, one of Lebanon’s largest cities, there are many religious centres serving the Sunni and Alawite communities. These centres function as places of worship as well as hubs for charitable and educational activities. Many organizations in Tripoli operate within these religious centres, providing humanitarian aid, education, and workshops that help people better understand their religion and cope with everyday challenges. Summary Religious institutions in Lebanon play a much broader role than merely spiritual. In the context